Ready for the night attack

It was during this attack that the lines of sound-powered telephones running from the observer to the gun positions in the 1st Squadron were knocked out. Lt Furdy, 1st Squadron S-3, contacted the 2nd Squadron and asked for supporting mortar fire. As soon as the request was received, all seven mortars opened up on prearranged targets. The mortar fire came in close to the front-line troops of the 1st Squadron and was very instrumental in breaking up the enemy attack in A and B Troop sectors which had received the brunt of the attack. Excitement ran high in the anticipation of the second attack. The sight was chilly but not as cold as it seemed. Beads of perspiration stood out on the brows of most of the men. Everyone was anxiously awaiting the attack, wondering from what direction, whose sector, and what strength. It wasn’t long until these questions were answered. At 0015, January 30, a second attack was made from the same draw and the same direction, but it lacked the punch needed and was soon broken up by concentrations of mortar fire and machine gun fire.

At 0100, January 30, a request again came from S-3 of the 1st Squadron asking that the 2nd Squadron commit a troop to dislodge the enemy from a draw into which it had withdrawn. The 2nd Squadron Commander pointed out that there would be no particular advantage in jumping off into an attack since the enemy had taken no positions and the advantage in this situation certainly was with the defender. At 0130, the regimental headquarters notified the 2nd Squadron Commander to attach one troop to support the 1st Squadron at daybreak. A guide would be sent from regimental headquarters to move the designated troop into position. Troop B was given this mission.

124-CAV in NampakkaAt daybreak the same morning, the guide, who happened to be the adjutant relieved from the 2nd Squadron the day before, met Troop E and guided it to its position which was on B Troop’s exposed left flank. From the information received the night before it appeared that Troop E would have to fight to relieve the pressure on B Troop’s flank; but when Troop E arrived at its new position, there was no enemy present. Troop E started digging in.

RECONNAISSANCE

Early the morning of January 30, the 2nd Squadron received an overlay-type order showing its objective. The day of the attack was tentatively scheduled for January 31, the time was to be designated by the squadron commander. The hill mass which was the objective formed a ridge that was 1600 to 2000 yards east and northeast of the 2nd Squadron front lines. The hill was covered with scrubby oak and dry grass. From a map study, the hill appeared to be about 1400 yards in length and 800 yards in width. Even though there was a good observation from a hill occupied by the 3rd Squadron, it was very difficult to determine the exact nature of the terrain. The 2nd Squadron Commander started on a recon taking with him the 2nd Squadron S-3, the weapons platoon commander, a radio operator, and two messengers. No sooner had the party arrived on the forward slope of the hill occupied by the 3rd Squadron than the Japanese greeted it with seven salvos of 77-MM artillery fire. The party immediately took cover in nearby foxholes of soldiers from Troop L. It was now apparent why the 77-MM gun was called the ‘whizz-bang’ since all that could be heard from the weapon was the ‘whizz’ of the projectile coming in, then a terrific bang. If a person heard the bang, he had reason to assume that he was safe.

Burma IllustrationThe party remained in the forward-slope hill position of the 3rd Squadron observing and studying the terrain and then moved along the front lines toward Troop I. As the party neared Troop F it was again brought under fire from the same Japanese 77-MM but fortunately, no one was hit. At Troop F, the squadron commander talked with Lt Knight, Troop Commander, and learned that during the night there had been an unusual amount of truck movement out to his front; furthermore, the Japanese could be heard cutting trees. From this information, it could be assumed that the Japanese were reinforcing their positions as well as re-supplying. Lt Knight also stated that during the previous night his troop had not fired a shot as it had been quiet along his front but that all ‘hell’ had broken loose to his left.

While the squadron commander was at the F Troop CP, American C-47s, flying through the draw over Troop F to re-supply at the drop zone were receiving rifle and machine gun fire from Japanese positions to the front. It was on one of these occasions that the Air Corps reported six of their planes riddled and one of their kickers killed. It was impossible to pick up any smoke or flash from the concealed positions of the Japanese in the jungle growth beyond I Troop and only the distinctive crack of their machine gun fire could be heard. It is felt that much of the fire which was placed on the C-47’a could have been eliminated if the air liaison officer had notified the pilots of the situation and advised them to approach the drop field over friendly lines rather than flying low over enemy-held positions. The 2nd Squadron Commander and the party continued from F Troop CP on to A Troop’s position and arrived there just in time to see a platoon from Troop C moving out on recon to determine the exact location of the Japanese positions. The patrol moved straight out from A Troop’s front lines in a column of two’s with two officers leading. The patrol moved about 75 yards when it drew fire from ‘nambus’ (Japanese light machine guns) of the enemy defensive positions. One of the officers was hit and the other one stayed with him. The machine guns from the 1st Squadron immediately engaged the Japanese guns in a brisk firefight which lasted several minutes before fire superiority was gained and firing ceased. The patrol returned without the two officers. It was learned from the men in the patrol that one of the officers had been hit in the initial burst of fire and that the other officer had stayed with him ordering the patrol to return. The body of one of the officers was later recovered; the body of the other was never found.

81-MM Mortar

The 3rd Squadron Commander went from Troop A on into Troop E positions and inspected the dispositions of the troops. As a result of this inspection, the Squadron Commander sent a message to have Troop G occupy E Troop’s old position since it was felt that from this new position Troop G could better support both Troops E and F. The squadron commander and party then returned to the 2nd Squadron CP and it was learned that orders from the regiment had been received that the attack scheduled for January 31, would be delayed until February 2. The reason given for the delay was to allow more time to clear all casualties from the portable surgical hospital prior to the big attack. Postponement of the attack allowed all unit commanders more time for further recon and planning. A request was made by Squadron S-3 through the air liaison officer at the regiment for an airstrike on the objective using napalm bombs. This request was denied since all aircraft had been allotted for other liaisons. A request for the use of an L-5 plane to fly over the assigned objective was also made, but this request was also denied as no planes were available. During the night of January 30, the 3rd Squadron received intermittent artillery fire. Japanese patrols were actively firing with their nambus machine guns attempting to draw fire and feel out positions of Troops E, F, and G. About all that was accomplished by these nuisance raids was to interfere with the men’s sleep.

Field Radio Communication - Probably OSS-101

On January 31, further recon was made by the 2nd Squadron Commander and his staff of the high ground east of Mong Noi. Maj How Chau Wen, 2/89-IR, 30-ID of the 1st Chinese Army was contacted and the disposition of his Chinese troops was pointed out. Meanwhile, a section of the I&R Platoon was sent on patrol to the front of Troop F with the mission of locating the disposition of enemy weapons and positions. It was while the squadron commander and his staff were on recon here that two Japanese were spotted at a range of about 300 yards. The Squadron commander was armed with a carbine and didn’t fire since it was doubtful whether the Japs could be hit at that range and to have fired on them would have disclosed his position. The party then moved on to the high ground in the area where they could get a better view of the objective.

2ND SQUADRON (124-CAV) – PLAN OF ATTACK

The squadron Commander, after deliberation, arrived at a decision and formulated a tentative plan for the attack of the objective. The two courses of action open to the squadron commander were (1) to make a frontal attack through the 1st Squadron or (2) to make a withdrawal from present positions to the northeast and envelop the enemy on his right flank. The latter plan was decided upon. The troop commanders were called forward to a vantage point from which the objective could be seen and the following oral order was issued.

(1) Enemy is estimated to be a weak understrength company occupying that hill. Disposition of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons is known to you. 2/89-IR occupies the area to our right and rear.
(2) The 2nd Squadron will attack at 0620 on February 2 and will capture that high hill with a bare spot on top.
(3) Troop F will be on the right, and Troop G on the left. Troop G will capture this high ground prior to 0620 on February 2, and be ready to support the attack initially by fire and continue the attack on order.
– (a) Line of departure will be that draw over which that fence is cut diagonally;
– (b) All mortars will be under squadron control;
– (c) The Machine Gun Platoon is attached to Troop E; I&R Platoon will maintain a screen along the high ground to insure that no enemy ambushes are set up in this area prior to the attack and will send out patrols to determine whether or not that ground is occupied;
– (d) The 613-FAB will support the attack;
– (e) The left Squadron will make a feint to attack at 0600 and in addition will send a combat patrol down that trail;
– (f) The 2/89-IR will support by machine gun fire to the right of our objective;
– (g) The Plan for reorganization is for Troop F to turn right and dig in on the west slope of the crest of the hill. Troop G will turn left and dig in on the east slope of the crest. Troop E will come up the center toward the crest and tie in with Troop F on its right and Troop G on its left.
(4) Administrative details will be issued later in the complete written order. (5) The Squadron CP will be in Mong-Noi, Radio silence from now on until H hour minus five. It is now 1400. Any questions ?

Knight Hill

After the oral order was issued to the troop commanders, Troop E was directed to send a platoon to establish an ambush on the Mong NoiHpa Pen trail 500 yards southeast of Mong Noi as Japanese had been reported moving on this trail. This platoon of Troop E was reinforced by a section of heavy machine guns. The forward echelon of the 2nd Squadron CP moved to Mong Noi late the afternoon of January 31. The platoon of Troop E established its ambush and during the night of January 31, received mortar fire which was believed to have been from mortars of the 1st Squadron. Fragments of shells that were examined the next morning verified this assumption and indicated that they were American mortar shells. The 2nd Squadron S-3 was directed to coordinate with the 1st Squadron and to let the 1st Squadron know of the trail block which had been established by the 2nd Squadron. During the night of January 31 – February 1, there was the usual Japanese night activity of skirting around the perimeter and firing their light machine guns. Intermittent artillery fire fell during the night on 3 Troop positions, resulting in several casualties.

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

On February 1, preparations for the attack continued. Supply installations and dumps were established near Mong Noi. The 2nd Squadron S-2 established a CP on the high ground north of the objective hill. As soon as it was established it received several direct hits from Japanese artillery. This necessitated the construction of another CP that night. The one which had been destroyed was set up as a dummy CP. The 252 QM Pack troop moved up with ammunition loads for the squadron ammunition supply point and continued to make preparations in packing ammunition so it would be ready to push its mule trains forward with the attacking troops. Information was received from Regimental Hqs that the 114th Chinese Regiment would attack 0620 February 2, on the left of the 2nd Squadron, and drive toward Sao Pong. This information was encouraging inasmuch as Troop G would not have to worry about its left flank. To complicate matters further, the 2nd Squadron S-3 showed the squadron Commander a written message that had arrived for information of all concerned from Col Willis J. Tack, CoS of the Brigade, which in substance stated that the theater stock of 81-MM ammunition HE (TNT) was exhausted. The artillery liaison officer had just notified the 2nd Squadron Commander that the 613-FAB was also low on artillery ammunition. The I&R Platoon had spotted a few positions on its recon patrol in the valley. Artillery fire was called for and placed on the approximate locations of the Japanese positions. Whether this artillery fire was effective was not determined.

Burma 1945

By noon, February 1, all plans had been completed for a coordinated attack. The fire support plan called for artillery concentrations on positions in front of the 1st Squadron at 0600 and on the objective hill at H-5. The 2nd Squadron mortars and machine guns were to open up H-2. The 2nd Battalion of the Chinese 69-IR was to support the attack with machine guns also. The aid station was moved to Mong Noi and established near an American portable surgical hospital that was supporting the Chinese 89-IR to insure early treatment of casualties. Arrangements were made for use of the Regimental I&R Platoon as an evacuation team under Capt J.V.H. Davis. During the night of February 1, the village of Mong Noi was shelled by the Japanese artillery and several native thatched huts were set afire. These huts, which were constructed of bamboo, literally exploded and the entire area was illuminated for several minutes with the same brilliance as if flares had been used.

THE WITHDRAWAL

The platoon from Troop E which had established the ambush rejoined its troop and occupied the high ground about 1100 yards east of Mong Noi by 2000 February 1. Troop E was now in a position to support the attack by fire. Shortly after dark, Troop G quietly moved from its position behind the 1st Squadron into an assembly area southeast of Mong Noi. In the early morning of February 2, Troop F withdrew from its positions between the 1st and 3rd Squadrons into an assembly area. This difficult night maneuver which involved a withdrawal from the perimeter was executed by F and G Troops over deceptive wooded terrain in a skillful manner. Prior planning, recon, training, and leadership were the contributing factors in its successful execution. At 0600, February 2, the 1st Squadron sent a patrol up the draw to the left of its position with the mission of attracting the attention of the enemy. At the same time, the 1st Squadron opened up with a heavy volume of fire feinting an attack on its immediate front. The 2/89th Chinese Regiment gave fire support with machine gun fire from their position, firing to the right of the 2nd Squadron’s objective. At H-5, supporting artillery fire from the 613-FAB opened up, and radio communication was established on the SCR 300. Meanwhile, in the attack area, everyone anxiously awaited H hour. Excitement mounted and the men nervously made last-minute inspections of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. A few men finished putting an edge of razor sharpness on their trench knives. The situation was tense for every soldier knew the stage was set; this is what they had trained for; this was no dry run; this was it. This would be a ‘dog eat dog’ fight. Even though the policy in the 2nd Squadron was to take prisoners everyone sensed a feeling in his heart that there would be none taken. Both sides realized that this ‘game’ was for keeps.



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