Principes of Employment

A. General – The Italian ideal of the employment of infantry presupposed the possibility of an attack undivided into principal and auxiliary actions. Supposedly sufficient elasticity would be maintained to direct the effort to those points where success appeared best assured upon initial contact.

B. Infantry division – The infantry division was the basic large combat unit. Its maneuverability was sacrificed to the development of increased attack capability and the ability to undertake deep penetration of enemy positions. It had a fixed table of organization and was considered to be an indivisible unit. Whenever its strength required increasing for accomplishing its mission, superior commands were expected to assign the required additional equipment and personnel.

C. The binary infantry division organization was adopted on the eve of war. It was born in the Ethiopian War and was to create a mobile infantry force in which one division would fix the enemy or begin to advance and the second division would bound forward to launch an attack and/or push on. The binary infantry division was, by doctrine, supposed to be capable only of frontal attack. The maneuver was the prerogative only of the army corps. The divisions were to function as attack columns to create and exploit any tactical opportunity. Control both of the movement of individual divisions and the medium caliber guns were retained by corps headquarters.
This flaw should have been realized early in the attacks against France in 1940. Italian units dashed forward into the killing zone of French artillery and were stopped with cruel casualties. The Army Staff misinterpreted the failure and blamed inadequate artillery support rather than on an operational concept that was assigned to poorly trained infantry tasks of offensive deep penetrations that no infantry in the world could accomplish in the face of an unshaken defense. In practice, the superiority of numbers only produced superior numbers of dead, wounded, or captured.

D. Motorized divisions were originally formed to work with an armored division. They also operated with the Celere divisions for strategic reconnaissance or as a general advance guard often preceded by light and very fast force of motorcyclists, light tanks, or other units on observation missions.

Artillery

A. General – It was planned that the Italian artillery is divided into echelons: the first was to operate in direct support of the infantry battalions; the second was to act generally as a reserve for lateral extension of the line or depth. Depth in the echelon was sought to increase shock and penetration, almost to the point of risking the maintenance of a sufficiently strong front.

B. Principles of employment – (1) Prompt intervention in response to tactical necessities; (2) Close cooperation with other arms; (3) Violent action in mass and by surprise; (4) Co-ordination of the action of the various artillery echelons so that the effects of fire produce the total results desired in the general concept of the battle, with a single final purpose—that of facilitating the action of infantry; (5) Elasticity of organization permitting not only the maneuvering of fire rapidly, but also the following of the action and its support with the movement of the batteries, particularly when it assumes a character of velocity; (6) Artillery is useful only if the ammunition supply is assured and (7) Observation is essential for artillery. This last-mentioned principle was possibly the most important, for to achieve observation at all times Italian artillery was often situated well forward and resorted to direct laying far more frequently than other armed forces did.

C. Division artillery – The division artillery commander regulated the employment of artillery except in counter-battery and interdiction. Decentralization of command for these functions was designed to expedite rapid and effective action, and thus contribute to the desired war of movement.

D. Method of employment – The employment of artillery by the Italians was quite normal, and the only feature worthy of note was the tendency to site the bulk of their artillery well forward. Artillery personnel earned a reputation for good shooting and displayed considerable courage under heavy fire or indirect attack. In many cases, artillery firing over open sights was used against attacking tanks or infantry. In defensive situations, roving pieces were sent far forward of the main defense area to force the enemy to deploy and execute counter-battery fire Alpine artillerymen were highly skilled in the manhandling of pack artillery. The highly centralized Italian artillery did better than their German allies against Montgomery’s 1918 style set-piece tactics in North Africa.

E. The artillery arm was spread throughout the army and was classified as divisional, corps, or army. There also existed Adhoc formations known as the raggruppamenti (tactical organizations of flexible size and mission), which had no fixed establishment.

Armored Forces

A. General – Italian armored forces originated, like for all other nations, from the infantry support role of WW-1. The use of armor was increased to include armored brigades tasked with penetration in the offense and the role of a mobile reserve to counter enemy penetrations in the defense. The development of armored units by other nations encouraged the Italians to evolve tank brigades into armored divisions.
As a result of their experience in Spain, Italians recognized the need for motorized infantry and ordinary infantry to follow the tanks and consolidate conquered ground. There were two types of mechanized divisions in the Italian army, the fast-moving, or light motorized division (Celere) and the armored division (Corazzata).

B. (a) Celere divisions were a combination of cavalry and Bersaglieri to produce Italian mobile troops. The concept was an outgrowth of the successful actions of cooperating cavalry and Bersaglieri in the long pursuits of the defeated Austrians at the end of WW-1 and the culmination of several trends in the use of the cavalry and the Bersaglieri. The changes wrought on the battlefield by the machine gun and the tank reduced the possible roles for both. The bicycle gave the Bersaglieri mobility comparable to horse cavalry. In general, the Celere division fulfilled the missions formerly assigned to cavalry, that is, reconnaissance and covering missions. In addition, it had the mission of seizure of certain terrain features of strategic importance. Celere units were envisioned as flanking units and pursuit units. They were combined with motorized infantry and armored divisions making the breakthrough and with the alpine divisions covering the flanks, it was a formidable concept. This policy change was quickly translated into doctrine.

B. (b) In normal employment, the division would be divided into two distinct groups. The cavalry, motorcyclists, and tanks would be used as a maneuver element in operations requiring agility, while the truck-borne and bicycle-borne Bersaglieri, with the artillery, provided a unit for use in a conventional attack.
The tanks in Celere units tended to be kept as a reserve and used in situations where covering forces were required. Motorized detachments provided the best units for penetration of the enemy line and rapid movement.

C. Armored division (Corazzata) was originally given the role of a mobile reserve to be used in the exploitation of success and to counter enemy penetrations. It could also engage in reconnaissance with mobile units, or in the wide envelopment of an enemy flank, infiltration through gaps, or assault against a hastily prepared defensive position. This cautious conception of the functions of the armored division underwent some modification as a result of the lessons of war, but Italian tank tactics and training were somewhat rudimentary until the armored divisions came under German command, training, and tactical doctrines were introduced. Since it was weak in inherent infantry, the armored division was organized and trained primarily to operate in conjunction with infantry, motorized, or Celere divisions, it was not designed to operate ahead of the army in the seizure of important terrain, as the Italians assigned such missions to the motorized or Celere divisions. The armored division was designed for the exploitation of a breakthrough and also to function as a mobile reserve to be thrown in to use its shock action and firepower to obtain a decision.

D. Independent tank units of the Italian army were designed to serve primarily as a basic shock element and in support of the infantry arm. In this respect, reconnaissance missions were assigned as a particular task for light tanks.

E. The idea of three kinds of tank units appeared in the first set of manuals on the employment of tanks. One was for the normal infantry support role and a similarly organized but differently trained unit would support Celere troops. The third was in the German-inspired armored division. This divided the available tank resources between three streams of tactical development. Four if one considers the reconnaissance role often given tankette units.

Cavalry

The principal missions of the Italian cavalry were that of reconnaissance, and in case of necessity, to exploit advantages, close gaps, etc. It maneuvered mounted and fought mounted or dismounted. Horse cavalry frequently acted as mounted infantry or as dismounted machine gun squadrons in support of other units. Most cavalry depots formed dismounted squadron groups, which were employed on the coast or home defense, mainly in southern Italy and the Islands.

Antiaircraft Artillery

Antiaircraft artillery militia was concentrated near more important and vulnerable industrial targets and the larger cities and communication centers.

Coast Artillery

Coast artillery militia employed equipment furnished by the Navy for shores and antiaircraft defense of localities by instructions issued by the office of the navy.

Engineers

A. Under Italian doctrine, engineers were considered to be technical, rather than combat, troops. Engineer functions were conventional: work communications zones, erect of obstacles, clearance of obstacles, laying of minefields, water supply, and supply of engineer materials. Also, in the Italian army, the providing of signal communications and the supplying of hydrogen for captive balloons were engineer functions.

B. The success of the German Assault Engineers encouraged the formation of Assault Pioneers known as Guastatori (destroyers). These forces were organized into battalions. They were patterned after similar German units and the Assault Engineer School at Civitavecchia was organized by a German engineer, a Col Steiner, in March 1940. The attacks by pioneers (Guastatori) were nearly always carried out at dawn, the objective having been approached during the night. Assault engineers were used against tanks at night. Personnel did not lay mines but were trained in removing them should they impede their progress.

Camouflage

A. General – The Italians placed great emphasis on artificial camouflage and installations garnished with natural materials tied into the natural surroundings.

B. Field Camouflage – In the field, Italian camouflage was made of canvas, raffia, shavings, and similar materials colored with a spray gun which was both, quick and convenient as compared with the usual paintbrush method. This field spraying was done with compressed air in a special blower. The compressed air was furnished from a shoulder-portable compressor or compressed air tanks, periodically filled. Machine guns were camouflaged by being covered with wire netting stretched over a frame of iron rods.

C. Various devices – Individual camouflage nets were 1 to 80-M², with reinforced edges furnished with buttons and garnished with strips of sisal material colored with three shades of green and tow of maroon. Metal net supports, the metal frames for overhead cover were made in two sizes, with spans of 1.5-M or 4 to 5-M. Both types collapsed into compact bundles. Simulate cloaks were used by the Italian Army as an aid for the combatant who had to remain on observation duty or was required to advance under the eye of the adversary. A man disguised by such a cloak became invisible, even on barren ground and so could accomplish his mission unmolested, even at a short distance from the enemy. The cloak was easily made by the Italian soldier and was frequently produced even with improvised materials by the combatant himself. It consisted of a rectangular piece of burlap 180-CM long and 150-CM wide. The rectangle was folded along a line and sewn along the upper edge to form a hood easily worn by the soldier without hindering his freedom of movement. To blend readily with the surroundings, the cloak was covered with hay, grass, straw, etc, depending on what was available in the particular region, and on what background was to be imitated. This cloak could be used to conceal telegraph-line guards, men stationed near roads, liaison men, etc.

Supply

In an effort to keep the combat divisions slim and agile a centralized Intendenza at Army level was given almost all of the few trucks available. The theory was to replenish Corps, Divisions, and even Regiments from the rear forward. The War of Rapid Decision was divorced from existing Italian capabilities. The supply organization functioned adequately in slow-moving or static actions but failed to support the swift movement. Even mere relocation of a unit could sometime disrupt its supply chain. Supply was over centralized at the army level, leaving forward units at the mercy of the vagaries of the Intendenza.

Italian Army Organization

Army Group & Army: Organization of army groups and armies varied considerably but the number of corps in an army rarely exceeded four. Army troops included heavy artillery and mechanized field artillery, mining, sound ranging, meteorological, and survey units.

Army Corps: Army Corps was composed of two to four infantry divisions, one motorized machine gun battalion (eventually to be expanded to a regiment), one artillery regiment, one engineer regiment, one chemical company one flame-thrower company, one chemical mortar battery, one medical company, one supply company, a motor transport center.

Theoretically, each corps had reconnaissance groups attached to its motorized, infantry, and Air Force Reconnaissance Groups. These seldom materialized. Some army corps had tank battalions attached, and special units, such as Alpini, Bersaglieri, etc.

Divisions: The Italian army showed a great deal of imagination in tailoring divisions for special uses. Much of this effort failed to reach fruition because events overtook the organizations before they could be accomplished.

Infantry Division: (a). Adoption, on the eve of the war, of the Divisione Bineria increased peacetime strength from 70+ to 90+ divisions. This resulted only in an increase in slots and staff, not an increase in combat power. Mussolini also liked his numbers. He bragged of an army of eight million bayonets. It never occurred to him that more than bayonets might be needed. Only two divisions of grenadiers retained the old three-regiment organization. A staff study claimed, A single motorized division, even for defense and occupation missions has the capability of four infantry divisions while it eats only one fourth as much and requires only a fourth as much transport from Italy.



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