As the battalions continued their attack at 0800 hours, the following morning the 2/26 almost immediately ran into mines and wire covered by fire from pillboxes. The battalion launched a coordinated attack with its recently arrived tanks and TDs which was successful. It is interesting to note here that in one of the pillboxes captured by the men of the 2/26, an American machine gun was discovered. This was still an extension of the Siegfried Line defenses. By 1400 hours, the 2/26 reported breaking through the stiff resistance to their immediate front with Easy Company located at Point #1, however within a few minutes the enemy located the battalion and dropped intense artillery and mortar fire upon it.
Meanwhile, the 1/26 swept the woods to the left of the 2/26 on the west to prevent infiltration or attack by the enemy bouncing from the 16-IR’s attack in the vicinity of Hamich. Shortly before dark, the battalions began to button up for the night with positions generally as shown on the map below. Because of the nature of the terrain and the aggressive enemy, a tight all-around defense was now more essential than ever. Defensive fire plans were a priority. It was extremely important that units report their exact locations at all times, especially so when requesting artillery fire. As it was the artillery was experiencing a certain amount of difficulty in giving troops close support because of the extreme seasonal dampness which was believed to be affecting accuracy some. Moreover, the friendly and target areas were covered with trees of 75-100 foot heights requiring the artillery to fire extremely accurate high-angle fire in close support to prevent casualties to our troops.
Operations on November 18, followed pretty much the pattern of the previous two days. The 2/26 going north now was stopped again at the road junction of the secondary gravel road and the trail at Point #2 by enemy defenses similar to those encountered the previous day. Again the platoon of engineers was called upon to rush the road reconstruction so that the tanks and the TDs could be brought up to support the assault. Late in the day the tanks and TDs were brought up into position to support by fire. The coordinated attack jumped off after a short preparatory blasting of enemy installations by the self-propelled mounts, however, the battalion made little if any progress during the remainder of the day. The 1/26 had jumped off at 0800 hours like the 2/26 going generally north parallel to the Schevenhutte – Langerwehe Road. Again the battalion hit stiff opposition and made small gains. The battalion holed up for the night 200 yards north of Hill #272. During the day, the regimental commander ordered the 3/26 to move from its assembly area to occupy positions vacated by the 1/26 that morning. The battalion commander was called to the regimental CP to receive the order for his battalion’s attack on the following day. It was the intent of the regimental commander that the 3/26 pass through the 2/26 as soon as the enemy was cleared from the road junction.
The road north from that point appeared to be capable of supporting armor even at this season. Moreover, it was felt that if the 3/26 could move as soon as the 2/26 had cracked this line the shook action of a fresh Battalion reinforced with a platoon of tanks and a platoon of TDs might force a deep wedge into the enemy line. On the following morning, 2/26 successfully attacked the positions at the junction. The 3/26 spearheaded by tanks moved through the 2/26. By 1600 hours, it had taken its objective, the high ground and road junction east of Laufenberg (Point #3), by-passing the castle itself. Meanwhile, the 2/26 was ordered to hold its positions to protect the regiment’s right flank. At the time, the regiment had no contact with the unit on the right except by patrol.
At about 1800 hours, Easy Company 2/26 right received a counter-attack from the right flank which it repelled with well-placed mortar and artillery fire. Apparently all units in the division were facing extremely heavy opposition and were making maximum use of their supporting fires. Division artillery reports firing 200-300 missions daily during this period. The 1/26, continued with its mission on the left flank keeping abreast of and in contact with the 16-IR. The regimental picture was brighter than it had been since the offensive opened. The 3/26 gains showed a deep salient pushed into enemy territory but the regiment was now entirely committed with its right flank open. The cost of ground gained had been extremely heavy in manpower – casualties had sapped the strength of the 1/26 and the 2/26, especially so in key personnel. The problem of assimilating replacements in this situation was particularly difficult. All of the rifle companies were dangerously low in strength at one time or another during the drive, moreover, those units needing reinforcements most were necessarily in contact and under fire.
When the regiment was notified that replacements were available they were picked up at the division and brought to the regimental rear CP where the regimental Executive Officer met and received them. There he saw to it that they had a hot meal and were properly clothed and equipped to join their units. They were then briefed on the Division and Regimental histories, on the type of men they were to be with, or what to expect when they joined their companies, and all those things a newcomer should be acquainted with. Unfortunately, they then were sent up to the Battalions, all of which were in line. It was impossible to get them to their companies in daylight – companies were generally attacking or in contact and under extremely heavy fire. At night when the Battalions had stopped and buttoned up the new men were brought to the company areas. Before they knew where they were the men were hustled to a foxhole or a site for one – to them it must have been a hell they never thought existed.
As might be expected, attrition was high among the newcomers. Many of them never made their first attack – their first night with a company in the line had cost them their lives or limbs. The 1/26 and the 3/26 were ordered to move again at 0800 hours. The 1/26 again was moving west and north against heavy opposition to protect the left flank by clearing woods to the Schevenhutte Road – contacting the 16-IR. The 3/26 was moving north and east. As might be expected the Battalions eventually could no longer tie in and a gap developed between them. The regimental commander requested additional troops to cover the area between these units. The division commander made the Division reconnaissance troops immediately available and they were thrown into the line between the two rifle Battalions. As previously noted the 2/26 was still holding positions on the right flank north of the Closter Ruins and was being probed by enemy patrols.
The Battalion reported heavy casualties from the never-ending artillery and mortar fire, every round a tree burst, which over an extended period was falling at the rate of 500 rounds per hour by count. Finally at 1225 hours, elements of the 115.Grenadier-Regiment, hit the Battalion with a strong attack – but by now the Battalion was firmly entrenched and by darkness was still holding its own when the enemy was forced to withdraw. The 3/26 moved well initially and by 1100 hours, was on the high ground east of Laufenberg and south of the trail into Merode from which they could observe certain Roear Valley towns to the north. Throughout the day, the 3/26 received extremely heavy artillery and mortar fire. The enemy had evidently gotten a fix on them once they had stopped. That was one of the great penalties of fighting in the woods – once stopped the enemy got an accurate location and literally showered the area with artillery and mortars. Not that moving troops received none – that was not the case. The amount of fire received in woods fighting (all things being equal) was relative to fixing the target and friendly troops. Conversely, an enemy being pushed closer and rapidly is unable to bring down indirect fires on the pursuer – he happened to be as thin-skinned as his target when on the move toward his Fatherland or elsewhere.
At the end of the day, the 3/26 held the high ground above and east of Laufenberg and positioned across both roads running northeast and northwest about 1000 yards south of Laufenberg. The 1/26 held a line in the woods overlooking the north-south road extending from just south of Hamich to the north for 1000 yards. Plans for the following day called for the 1/26 to pass through the 3/26 to take an objective in the vicinity of triangulation point 245 just west of Merode, however, Division insisted that the 1/26 remain in its present position in Division reserve because the 16-IR on our left had been receiving extremely heavy counter-attacks. By 0930 hours on November 21, the 16-IR situation cleared and Division released the 1/26 to the regiment. Plans, as outlined the previous day, were put into order and the 1/26 moved through the 3/26 east and then north toward the triangulation station and the road junction to the south but progress was slow as both Battalions took heavy shelling.
By 1600 hours, the 1/26 had Able Company 100 yards south of Point #4. After the 1/26 had passed through the 3/26 and moved forward a few hundred yards, the 3/26 brought the 3d Platoon, 734-TD up to fire on the Laufenberg castle preparatory to its attack to seize it. The four 3″ guns fired 27 rounds of APC and 20 rounds of HE into the castle without once piercing the walls of the fortress, Col Corley had planned his attack to start as soon as the rounds had been fired and he insisted that the attacks take place as planned – and fortunately so, because some of the Germans in the castle had been broken to the extent that they chose to be relieved of the responsibility of defending to the last man.
As is customary some chose to fight longer but the 3/26 gained entry into the fortress and proceeded to mop up those remaining as holdouts. Late in the afternoon, the Division ordered that the Regiment straighten out its line and tie in by the following morning. The regiment’s mission was to cover the right flank of the 18-IR in its attack for Schontal on the morning of November 22. Coordinating with the attack of the 18-IR on Schontal, the 1/26 and the 3/26 jumped off at 0800 hours. By noon the 1/26 had reached the high ground just south of their objective (Point #5) when they received a great amount of direct fire from Merode. Division artillery was requested to place a TOT (Time on Target) on the town and did so within a short time. The results were apparently quite effective. For some time the 1/26 received little direct fire from Merode, however, by late afternoon the 1/26 received a twenty-minute enemy-sponsored serenade of artillery and mortar fire which they estimated to consist of some 300 rounds of high explosives. The 2/26 and the 3/26 moved little as they absorbed another day of punishing mortar and artillery fire. Casualties in all Battalions were heavy again. For the past seven days, the medical aid stations were extremely busy places. Casualties were flowing through the aid stations at a rate never before known in the Regiment.
The company aidmen performed their duties heroically as they always had. They suffered casualties too – a shell does not have a name on it: Capt Kuby, Battalion Surgeon of the 2/26 marveled at the quality of work of the company aid men under fire. He stated that dressings were so well applied up front that the majority of casualties could be dispatched to the rear without further attention at the aid station. This was particularly gratifying information because approximately a month prior to this operation the Assistant Battalion Surgeon had been replaced by a lieutenant MSC in all Battalions. This change in the Battalion medical organization brought about an immediate improvement in the evacuation of casualties from the front-line units to aid stations. Since the new officer was not an MD his main job was administration and evacuation. In the forest, they did a fine job of expediting and coordinating evacuation from the lines to the aid station and the aid station to the rear.
Even this increase in efficiency however could not overcome the delays brought about by local conditions – the extremely heavy casualties, lack of roads, and the shortage of medical personnel. The Regimental Surgeon was forced to request additional medical corps personnel to supplement his overworked crews. Army litter bearer teams were sent to the regiment and were employed in the front-line evacuation of casualties. Even so, the heavy number of casualties coupled with the inability to transport by vehicle over the murky lanes allowed for much improvement. The regiment informed the division of the fact that evacuation and supply problems were becoming more acute and requested that a sufficient number of Weasels, 1/4 ton tracked vehicles, be procured to alleviate worsening conditions. The regimental half-track vehicles were already being used but even these were not particularly mobile in this terrain. Within a short time, six Weasels were attached to the regiment which in turn released two to each battalion. Needless to say, these new additions were immediately put into operation and worked days without cooling off.
During the early evening hours of November 22, the Division attached elements of the 4th Cavalry Group to the Regiment for employment in a defensive role and to cover the gap on the regiments right flank – in order to release the 2/26 for further offensive actions in the direction of Merode. On November 23, only the 3/26 moved. By noon, the Battalion was north of Hill #155 and its reserve company were in contact with the 18-IR on the left. Early in the evening, the 3/26 was forced to stop and button up short of Hill #200. The 2/26 situation was unchanged from the previous days with the exception of Easy Company on the right flank which had been relieved by elements of the 4-CG. The relief was to continue the following morning and be complete by dark. As planned the 2/26 was entirely relieved on November 24 and pulled back for a short rest and preparation for the final push out of the forest.
The 2/26 had moved into reserve positions in the vicinity of the Regimental CP awaiting final orders for the Merode push. As the Battalion CP Group moved into its area enemy artillery hit them before they had dug their foxholes. The artillery liaison officer was killed, the Battalion S-3 was wounded, and several CP personnel were killed or wounded. During the day, the 1/26 and the 3/26 were ordered to hold what they had, consolidate, and tie in. By noon, the Battalions reported that they were tied in just south of triangulation Point 245. The line was now facing east from the south boundary to Hill 245, then facing north with the 3/26. The 3/26 moved north along trail #6 to tie in with the 18-IR. For the next two days, no offensive action of note took place. Both sides patrolled extensively sparring as though looking for an opening. Advance notice had been given by the Division that Jungersdorf would be the next regimental objective. The 3/26 commander was advised that it would be his job in order that he might feel out the opposition by patrols and begin planning his method of attack.
On November 27, the Corps ordered the Division to take Langerwehe and Jungersdorf. The 18-IR was given the job of talking Langerwehe simultaneous to the 26-IR taking Jungersdorf. The Regiment then ordered the 2/26 to send one Company to take over part of the 3/26 area adjacent to the 1/26. At 1500 hours, the 3/26 jumped off with King Company taking the high ground to the south of the town and overlooking it, Item and Love Companies moved cross-country into Jungersdorf and were engaged in extremely heavy fighting. The Battalion Commander dispatched the tanks and TDs into the town to support the companies in clearing it. The companies were so notified and met the vehicles, and proceeded to mop up resistance. By dark, the town was reported taken and secured.
