(2) Use of Towns Cases have been reported where Germans permitted unopposed the occupation of a town by our troops in order to cause casualties by artillery fire when mass lines were formed or reliefs were in progress. Observation posts on nearby heights eliminated any guesswork in the timing. (Operation Notes XII Corps)
(3) Security Don’t learn security the hard way. During a conference, three of our experienced company commanders and one artillery observer were surrounded and captured because they failed to provide a security guard. (CO, 414th Infantry Regiment, 104th Infantry Division.
(4) Training Foils German Trick We have trained our men to know that the Germans put mortar fire just behind our artillery fire to make us think our own artillery is falling short. This instruction has increased our troops’ confidence in their own artillery so that they keep going close with the enemy before he recovers from the effects of our artillery fire. (S-3 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division)
(5) Atrocities against US Prisoners of War It has be determined that the mass murder of American PWs on December 17, 1944, southwest of Malmedy, was committed by the spearhead of the Kampfgruppe Peiper. PW states that the man responsible for the murders is SS-Unterscharführer Persin of the Penal Platoon of the 9 (Engr) Co, 1.SS-Panzer-Regiment. Persin and 18 men under his command were the one who actually carried out these killings. This was told to IPW by SS-Sturmmann Berger and another comrade, both of his Company.
Description of Persin: He is an uncontrollable rowdy whose bad reputation won him considerable notoriety. His age is 25-26; eyes, brown; height, 6 feet; hair, brown; weight, 180 lbs; smooth-shaven, slim, wiry build. (Source: FUSA IPW Reports)
(6) Wanted for further Interrogation
1/Lt Stach, formerly CO of I/149.Volksgrenadier-Regiment, has now been identified as CO of I/689.Vorlkgrenadier-Regiment (246.Volksgrenadier-Division). This character, whom our forces captured in the vicinity of Würselen (Germany) on October 24, escaped from one of our Prisoners enclosures and several days later, made a stinging denunciation over the air of the treatment afforded him as a captive by US guards and interrogators. Bring him back alive. (Source: FUSA)
(7) Order of Hitler On the morning of December 16, 1944, a Führerbefehl (Order of the Leader) was read to the 14.Company, 915.Regiment. It said among other things This is the decisive battle, all newly formed divisions are taking part. You will have the support of the new Luftwaffe units and your tank formations. No wounded should be carried back by the men. No one has any right to move back, and both squad and platoon leaders have the right to shoot anyone who retreats. (Source FUSA)
(8) The Evils of Strong Drink US Troops along the Moselle River, saw two enemy revelers full of Christmas cheer, stagger down the opposite bank and search for a small boat. One collapsed on the bank; the other managed to climb into a boat, row to the friendly shore, and fall into the arms of the captors. He begged them to go back for his friend, so the Americans rowed over and picked the other drunk. Both gave information of value, including the password and one offered to lead a combat patrol back to his comrades. The offer was accepted and mission accomplished. (Source: XII Corps)
(9) Enemy Looting Civilian reports that enemy troops thoroughly looted Eschdorf before retreating from the town; taking everything that ran on wheels, including carts, bicycles, carriages, and even a wheelbarrows. hey told the civilians that they had been informed that once the counter offensive started they could non expect any supplies from the rear and that it would be necessary to forage for food and equipment from the land. Sheets were a very popular item of loot, as they were used as camouflage for vehicles and personnel. (Source: III Corps)
ORDER OF BATTLE NOTES
(1) Identifications
a. The 85.Infantry-Division commands several combat groups, among which are remnants of its two infantry regiments. These are located generally in the sector from Obermaubach (Germany) to the south of Vossenack (Germany). (Source: V Corps)
b. The 79.Volksgrenadier-Division is also a newly-committed division on the US Third Army front. The division is commanded by Oberst Weber. It’s Infantry Regiments are numbered 208.Infantry-Regiment, 212.Infantry-Regiment and 226.Infantry-Regiment. (Source: XVIII Corps (Airborne)
c. Although it still consists of only weakened regiment, (1126.Infantry-Regiment), the 559.Infantry-Regiment appears to have reverted, in name at least, to divisional status. A Prisoner who was formerly with the map section of the division headquarters states that the designation Kampfgruppe von Mühlen (Generalmajor Kurt von Mühlen) was dropped about December 14. (Source: 12-AG)
(2) RESERVES
The 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division was in contact on the XV Corps front in the vicinity of Sarreguemines (France) as late as December 24. The Division apparently has been favored with a steady flow of replacements which accounts for the maintenance of its identity in spite of continuous heavy losses. It appears from PW statements that the Division received, during the month of November, about 2000 replacements, losing 50% of this complement in PWs. The Sixth Army Group (6-AG) reported on December 23, that the Division was once more at low ebb and its combat effectives were estimated at 2000, including personnel from Trains and QM services, which were being used as Infantry Replacements. FUSA reported on December 30, Prisoners taken by the US 7-A state that 50-60 tanks were unloaded at Lautzkirchen (Germany) on December 24. All men in 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division.
Editorial Note
After publishing this archive, I was alerted that there were mistakes in the original text. While conducting further research, I reviewed additional PDF source material and identified an important supplementary passage, which is reproduced below. The text is presented with minimal editorial intervention; however, internal inconsistencies are explicitly noted at the end of the document.
During the winter offensive in December 1944, I was Schütze in the Engineer Platoon, Headquarters Company, 1. SS-Panzer-Division (LSSAH) (Pionierzug, Stabskompanie, Aufklärungs-Abteilung LSSAH). On the morning of December 16, 1944, SS-Obersturmführer Heinrich Goltz, my company commander, assembled the Headquarters Company for a lecture, on which occasion he expressed himself approximately as follows: This offensive will be of great importance. The Luftwaffe will support us and we have to do everything to make this offensive a success. In this offensive, civilians and prisoners of war will be shot. I am not certain whether Goltz used exactly the same words as those quoted here, but their meaning conforms to the truth and is the same. I would also like to add that Goltz read this speech from a sheet of paper.
We then moved forward into the offensive and reached Stavelot during the night of December 18, 1944. We drove through this village and reached another village, the name of which I cannot recall. However, I remember that in this village there was a large double-span railroad bridge, the spans of which did not run parallel, so that an empty space existed between them through which one could see. This bridge was located at Trois-Ponts. We passed this bridge and drove on to another large bridge, where we turned around and drove back almost to Stavelot. There we turned left, driving on a small road for approximately 1,000 meters, until we reached a village where we spent the night.
As we dismounted from our vehicles, I noticed two elderly male civilians who were shot and killed close to this bridge by SS-Untersturmführer Heinrich Dröge, my platoon leader. We then marched along the roadbed back toward Stavelot, at which time Dröge gave us the order to search the houses and to herd together all civilians. This order was carried out. The civilians were gathered in the vicinity of a shed located on the right side of the road when traveling from Stavelot in the direction of the railroad bridge mentioned above. Immediately thereafter, Dröge issued the order to herd approximately twenty civilians into this shed. I cannot state with certainty whether there were more or fewer than twenty persons.
At first, the civilians offered resistance. Consequently, force had to be used, including striking them with rifle butts. Thereupon, Dröge gave the order to shoot the civilians inside the shed. SS-Schütze Alfred Führer was the first to fire into the civilians with his machine gun. Later, his weapon suffered a stoppage, whereupon SS-Rottenführer Hartmut Strauss relieved him by continuing to fire into the civilians with his machine gun. After the machine-gun firing had ceased, one woman was brought in, whose age I can no longer estimate. Dröge personally pushed this woman into a house located to the right of the shed and shot her in the back. For this purpose, Dröge used an American weapon, the name of which I do not know.
When we had already withdrawn to a distance of approximately 130 meters, we heard cries and moans coming from the shed. I then received an order from SS-Unterscharführer Hedwig to return and determine what was happening. Upon returning, I observed two civilians, one man and one woman, who were mortally wounded and still screaming. I shot both of them several times in the head and killed them. I then returned once more and observed two young civilians, approximately 18 to 20 years of age, being shot by Dröge and others. One of these civilians, as I recall, wore a blue locksmith’s overall, and the other had red hair. In my opinion, these civilians attempted to flee, which was the reason they were shot.
Subsequently, we moved into the woods to reconnoiter an artillery position. During the night, we relocated to the vicinity of the railroad station, where we quartered ourselves in a cellar. Diagonally opposite this location was a sawmill, and adjacent to the sawmill stood a house into which SS-Obersturmführer Manfred Coblenz had moved with part of his unit. On December 21, this house became uninhabitable, whereupon Coblenz moved into the cellar with us and was subsequently captured together with us.
Editorial Caution – Rank Discrepancy
This testimony contains an internal inconsistency concerning the rank of the declarant. Although the affidavit identifies the witness as SS-Untersturmführer Richard Rosenke, he explicitly states that he served as a Schütze (Private) during the events described in December 1944. In the absence of corroborating German personnel records, the latter self-description is considered operationally accurate. Such discrepancies are common in Allied postwar affidavits and are reproduced here without correction or conjecture.
