The official history of WW-2 asserts that the notable success was largely due to the fine qualities and conduct of the Indian troops, resolutely led. (107) Smith declares: After such beginning, the morale was high, although nearly six months were to elapse before the 1/2nd and 2/7th were called to join the already famous 4th Indian Division, under the command of Gen Gertie Tuker. (108)
(97) Lunt, Jai Sixth, p 73. (98) 5 GR regimental history, p 49. (99) Elliott, Roll of Honour, p 82-83. (100) The Battle account of Bilbahadur Thapa, 2/8th Gurkhas in Gurkhas at War, p 128. (101) Interview with Gurkha Officer, Army No. 16216, 2/10th Gurkhas. (102) Parker. J, Gurkhas. (103) Bullock, Britain’s Gurkha, p 99. (104) Elliott, A roll of honor, p 100. (105) Interview with Gurkha Officer, Army No. 16216, 2/10th Gurkhas. (106) Lunt, Jai Sixth, p 74. (107) Playfair, I.S.O, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, V. II, (Her Majesty’s Stationary Service, 1956, London), p 212. (108) Smith, Brigade of Gurkhas, p 92
The 4th Division adopted a few changes to the composition of regiments in 1942, between the Middle East and North African forces, so that garrison units in Pairforce might benefit from their battle experience. (109) Stevens proclaims, the Divisional commander made a strong plea for the Gurkha units as replacements, with the result that the 2/7 Gurkha Rifles joined the 11th Brigade, and the 1/2GR joined the 7th Brigade. (110) The Western Desert Force of Gen Wavell had already inflicted heavy losses on the Italian Forces, before the arrival of Rommel, but the Gurkha Regiments were not a part of this early success.
Sixsmith argues, in the winter of 1940/1941 operations in Egypt and Libya showed the Italians to have little stomach for the war and the British, Australian, and Indian regular forces to be in every way their superior. (111) The series of Wavell’s victories over Italians finally dragged the German’s prioritization in General of North Africa. Rommel, taking over the command of the Afrika Korps won a series of brilliant victories which had forced the British Eighth Army to retreat in haste and disorder into Egypt. (112)
Withdrawing British forces failed to form a strong defense; in many cases, the defense was not even established properly. The shortages of equipment were rife among the men. Recently transferred Gurkha regiments were not confident with this kind of warfare in the desert either. It proves the composition of the desert force was not balanced to fight against a first-class enemy.
The 4th Gurkha Regiment’s history asserts; We had no experiences in the technique of mines or in working with tanks, both of which featured largely in this desert warfare. (113)
In India, the Gurkha Regiments did not see tanks, and the campaign in the Middle East was not with the first-class enemy; thus, the modern type of mechanized warfare was completely new to them. Despite the short intensive training before Rommel’s offensive began, men from the 2/4 Gurkhas were not confident with their equipment; especially with the newly introduced two-pounders and new hand grenades, most importantly they were not familiar with fighting as dismounted troops alongside large tanks units. They did not receive the right training, to prepare for this kind of mobile and mechanized warfare. Despite the mentioned underlying downfalls, the 2/4 Gurkhas, as part of the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade, were ordered to hold a box ‘Kennels’ at Bir Hacheim, along with the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry and the 4/10 Baluch Regiment.
The front from Gazala to Bir Hacheim consisted of six brigade-sized defensive ‘boxes’ which, sheltering behind the minefield, were intended to hold any German Panzers Corps. (114) Mines were the most formidable defenses, as tanks and anti-tank weapons were not enough. British anti-tank guns were far inferior to their German foe. Kulman Pun asserts, for every shot we fired; German fired five back at us. (115) The 2/4 Gurkhas fought against the overwhelming German Panzers and artillery for 48 hours continuously without any reinforcement. Gumansing Thapa claims, first German aircraft bombed us and the Germans came on us from the rear and said ‘Hands up!’We had finished our ammunition by then, that fighting was not even an option. (116) The fall of the outer defense line, on Jun 6, 1942, directly allowed the advance of Rommel to Tobruk.
The 2/7 Gurkha Rifles was apart along with a light battalion of the Cameron Highlanders and a battalion of Mahratta Light Infantry in the 11th Brigade. (117) At worst, Smith claims that around the perimeter mines and wire had been removed for use elsewhere in Egypt. (118)
Thus, the German tanks and artillery drove through without any great resistance, and Stukas flocked without opposition from anti-aircraft weapons. First, the enemy weight fell into the position of Mahratta, then burst through the gap, split into two groups, and swung into the rear of the Cameron and Gurkha positions. (119) The Brigade HQ had been overrun already.
Having lost communication with other units, the Gurkhas and the Cameron fought until the last round, after the official surrender of the 11th Brigade. To which, Stevens claims, throughout the forenoon of Jun 21, isolated Gurkha posts without food or water held out under intense fire, where panzers waited for a kill in close range of a few hundred yards. (120) Despite the great effort performed by the remaining men, the 2/7th Gurkhas fell into German captivity for the second time in its history. Few men from other Gurkha Regiments managed to escape from the advancing German forces towards El Alamein, most of them, by their wit, strength, and guile. In such a chaotic situation and against the ever-watchful Germans that Durga Pun escaped to a friendly location under the command of his platoon Subedar. (121)
Gould argues, until the end of 1942 the experience of most Gurkha Battalions (which had taken no part in Wavell’s early victories over the Italians) was restricted to defeat and surrender. (122) Francis Tuker, in this case, blames the Generals for their conduct in the battles. Battalion after battalion of these Highlanders were being heaped into the ill devised, ill-conducted series of operations in the Western Desert from Gazala to Alamein where they, like all others, suffered heavily to no purpose whatsoever. (123)
In supporting the argument presented by Tuker, Fraser claims that Ther British equipment was inferior; that British training was inadequate, British organization and tactics faulty; that British generalship was remote and combat inexperienced. (124)
(109) Lt Col Stevens G.R, 4th Indian Division, (McLaren and Son Limited, 1948, Toronto) p 162. (110) Stevens, 4th Indian Division, p 162. (111) Sixsmith E.K.G, British Generalship in the Twentieth Century, (Arms and Armour Press, 1970, London), p 214. (112) Smith, Brigade of Gurkhas, p 92. (113) Lt Col. Borrowman C.G, A history of the 4th Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkha Rifles, V II, 1938-48, (William Blackwood & Sons Ltd, 1952, London), p 47. (114) Bullock, Britain’s Gurkha, p 99. (115) Cross and Gurung, Battle accounts of Kulman Pun, 2/3rd Gurkhas in Gurkhas at War, p 136. (116) ibid, p 140. (117) Bullock, Britain’s Gurkha, p 101. (118) Smith, Brigade of Gurkhas, p 93. (119) Stevens, 4th Indian Division, p 171. (120) ibid, p 174. (121) Interview with Durga Pun, 2/3th Gurkhas. (122) Gould, Imperial soldiers, p 238. (123) Tuker, Gorkha, p 217. (124) Fraser D, And we shall shock them, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1983, London), p 157-158
Change of command was the obvious choice at this time of defeats. Montgomery replaced Auchinleck, and reluctantly he was a critic of the Indian Army. Smith argues, that suspicions about the performance of the Indian Army; undoubtedly existed in the minds of some senior British Army Generals. (125) To which, Gould argument is, Monty’s failure to pass out of Sandhurst high enough to get into the Indian Army had prejudiced
him against it for life. (126) Certainly not as a result of their performance in Tobruk, but, the Indian Army had not taken any major victories, yet in this war. It was clear that the Indian Army had been underestimated by British generals. Their performance in WW-1 had been somewhat forgotten, at worst the retreat into Burma additionally damaged their reputation. This prejudice exercised by senior British commanders towards the Indian Army prevented the Gurkhas from fighting in the battle of El Alamein; to which, Gen Tuker protested strongly with Gen Montgomery. The resentment expressed by the Indian generals finally counted. The 4th Division had been included in the battle formation, for a final drive to Italy; in which, the Gurkhas of the 1/2 GR and the 1/9th GR were part of it. Parker claims; that North Africa was to be the scene of many Gurkha battles in the campaign that had progressively driven Rommel from one stronghold to another. (127).
Originally, Montgomery had a plan to launch all force concentrated in a frontal attack, through the coastal gap in the Mareth defense line, where the enemy had a great concentration of force. The Eighth Army’s offensive had been anticipated, by Rommel’s successor Gen Giovanni Messe, just as Montgomery’s original plan proposed. Hamilton claims, neither Gen Francis Tuker nor Gen Douglas Wimberley liked the idea when they reconnoitered the ground. (128) To which; Carver argues, Monty was a master planner of the victory in North Africa however the attack on the Mareth Line, which was not a battle of which Montgomery could be proud. (129) Gould accepts the argument presented by Carver, claiming that Tuker was a master of the moving battle in a more tactical setting in this battle. (130) Aware of the mountainous capabilities of his Indian troops, Tuker suggested a tactically advantageous alternative initial thrust, through the heights of Fatnassa Mountain that would give tactical benefit to the main armored assault against the strong German defense. To this profound confidence, Bullock claims, Gen Tuker knew the mountain warfare capabilities of the men in his division, especially his Gurkha, and he was confident that they could do it. (131) The overall objective for the 4th Division was to take the Fatnassa heights, in a silent night attack, to allow the main assault from the Eighth Army. Gould claims, Tuker, drawing on his experience of the Northwest Frontier, and what he was suggesting was a night attack spearheaded by the Gurkhas on the massif of Fatnassa. (132)
The 1/2nd Gurkhas and the 1/9th Gurkhas were given the leading role, the former was selected to seize the first summit, to create a gap for the next brigade to pass, during the night of Apr 5, 1943. The route was one of the unexpected routes the enemy had anticipated, and extremely difficult to assault through; in Tuker’s words beyond human accomplishment. (133)
In this brave attack, Subedar Lal Bahadur Thapa led his men and fought his way up the narrow gully with no room to maneuver in the fury of machine-gun fire and liberal use of hand grenades by the enemy. (134) Against such overwhelming fire, the Gurkha officer secured the vital entrance, through which, infiltrated the rest of his men from 1/2nd Gurkhas. This brave attack won him a Victoria Cross (VC). Subsequently, the 1/2nd GR secured the vital ground of the enemy and opened a corridor for the 5th Brigade. H Hour, for the main assault of the 8th Army, began after two hours of taking the critical objective. Because of this exploitation, most of the hidden German artillery observation posts on the mountains were eliminated. It relieved the huge intense focus of enemy artillery fire on the main forces, in the coastal plain. The 4th Indian Division’s official history claims, it is scarcely too much to say that the battle of Wadi Akarit had been won singlehanded several hours before the formal attack began. (135)
Finally, ending the war in North Africa, the German Commander of the Afrika Korps and Italian troops surrendered to Lt Col L.C.J Showers of the 1/2nd Gurkhas on May 11, 1943. Smith claims, in this battle, the Gurkhas unwittingly proved their prowess as mountain troops by seizing two of the passes in the Matmata Mountain massif. (136) Stevens supports the claim presented by Smith, that, the high renown of India’s soldiers and the redoubtable Gurkha troops have been enhanced by the outstanding performance of the 4th Indian Division. (137) A victory had been won, a victory that led to increasing interest in the Gurkhas, and on the other hand, overshadowed the critical views, towards the initial failure of the Gurkhas in the First Chindits, in Burma. It was in fact; a turning point, in renewing the reputation of the Indian Army. (138)
(125) Smith, Brigade of Gurkha, p 94. (126) Gould, Imperial, p 244. (127) Parker, Gurkha, p 125. (128) Hamilton N, Monty; Master of the Battlefield, 1942-1944, (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1985, Sevenoaks), p 215. (129) Carver M, Montgomery, ed. by Keegan J in Churchill’s Generals, (George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1991, New York), p 156. (130) Gould, Imperial, p 245. (131) Bullock, Britain’s, p 108. (132) Gould, Imperial, p 245. (133) Parker, The Gurkhas, p 126. (134) Uprety P.R, Nepal, p 222. (135) Stevens, Fourth Indian, p 223. (136) Smith, the Brigade, p 97. (137) Stevens, Fourth, p 229. (138) Smith, The Brigade, p 99
Press in India, Britain, and America covered the bravery of these once forgotten Imperial Indian soldiers. The war office used the recently victorious 4th Indian Division as war propaganda, to convey a message to the general public, that, this was not only a British war but involved all citizens from the Commonwealth. Importantly, the victory in the Mareth Line and Wadi Akarit, repositioned the Gurkhas, on the list of the generals’ plans again. Many years of soldiering in the Northwest Frontier proved them as skilled mountain soldiers, second to none. The debates on whether Indian soldiers were allowed to fight in Europe, came to a definite conclusion. As a result, the highlander Gurkhas moved to the mountainous terrain of Italy, to recapture Europe. Smith argues that; Conditions in the Italian campaign were more like those of the Western Front in the Great War than any other theater of operations during WW-2. (139)
After a few months of mountainous mobile warfare training, once again, 1/2 and the 1/9 Gurkhas, as part of the 4th Indian Division, were in a leading role along with the Royal Sussex. The first engagement took place on Feb 18, 1944, to capture Hangman Hill. According to Fraser, the plan was a New Zealand Division would attack Monte Cassino itself from the south-east; the Indians, by now masters of the mountain, would then descend to take the place from the west. (140) In such a difficult mountainous geographical location, the bitter German resistance escalated the risk of attacking troops significantly. Tuker claims, a gallant but costly attempt was made by a Gurkha Battalion to seize by night the German position near the Monastery. (141) The defense position was neatly planned for years and manned by German Paratroopers, intended to hold Allied advance into the heartland of Europe. Additionally, the heavily-bombed ruins of Monte Casino provided excellent cover and concealment for their German occupants. Smith claims, the leading Gurkhas dashed the nearest scrub, only to leap into a death trap. (142) In such a death trap, Fraser asserts, the attacking brigades of the 4th Indian Division were cut to pieces by the deadly close-quarter fire of the defenders. (143) During the first day alone, the leading Gurkha Battalion had one-hundred-and-fifty killed or missing.
This desperate assault to capture the vital position of Monastery Hill inflicted many casualties on the Gurkha units. Reinforcements had a hard time trying to reach such steep terrain, and in the running out of ammunition, troops desperately hide inside the holes of the rocky mountain, against the pounding German artillery and bombs. Realizing the danger, they were in, the Germans attacked the Gurkha positions, and heavy fighting ensued. (144) Gangabahadur claims, running out of ammunition, there was more hand-to-hand fighting using khukuri due to close quarter combat, as both sides competed to gain the ground. (145) The Germans Paratroopers were simply too strong that the 1/9 Gurkhas were reduced to only one-hundred-and-eighty-five men and ordered to withdraw with the Essex and the Rajputanas. However, the second stage of the attack was renewed again on Mar 5. This time, after nearly six weeks of continuous fighting, the 9th Gurkha won renown clinging to the aptly named Hangman’s Hill on the slopes of Monte Cassino under withering fire, however, the price was too high, for such a small piece of land. (146)
The withdrawing German forces once again formed a strong defense along the Gothic Line. Bullock claims, again, breaking into the Gothic Line proved to be a long and bloody undertaking in which all nine Gurkha battalions in Italy were involved. (147) The 43rd Gurkha Lorried Brigade as infantry was primarily involved in the major battles. Since 1942, the brigade consisting of the 6th, then 8th, and the 10th Gurkha Rifles, maintained the policy of containment, against the pro-German force in the Middle East, and remained there without fighting any major battles, but these units continued to train for mobile warfare for the mountainous battles ahead.
On Oct 6, 1944, the 43rd Brigade transferring into the 10th Division was ordered on a night attack uphill in Monte Chico, 1300 feet high from the sea level. Marston claims, the fighting in northern Italy was similar to earlier campaigns-countless river crossings; the taking of hills, mountains, and fortified villages. (148) The defender used their overwhelming firepower to inflict maximum damage to advancing troops. Use of artillery extensively, was one of the prime reasons for inflicting heavy casualties in the Gurkha battalion. (149) The enemy opposition was significantly stiff, and the approaches were comparatively complex. Lunt claims that the Germans were relying on the difficulties of the approach, and were taken by surprise. (150) In most cases, Gurkhas using their khukuri at the close quarter battle, in which they always excelled, added to the old fear of such a weapon used by such warriors, against their enemies.
Witnessing his comrade’s head chopped off, was not an easy experience for a German. A Gurkha claims; that Germans used to show a picture of their family in such a situation, to save themselves as a POW. (151) However, in such mountainous terrains, the single random act of bravery was most important when the advancing troops were pinned down by a single German machine-gun post. In such circumstances, Rifleman Sherbahadur Gurung took charge of a Bren gun and cleared a strong German defensive position. This act won him the Victoria Cross, but importantly, his company was able to successfully attack an objective Point 366, because of his single act of bravery.