Thus unlike British soldiers, it was not a colonial lifestyle that these boys dreamed of. It was the promise and charm of recruiters that significantly played an important role, in showing overwhelming interest for volunteers. Although, the potential recruits were initially checked by medical officers and recruiting officers, at a recruiting depot upon their arrival; the recruiter had to identify the underlying physical downfall of the young men to prevent further failure, not because of his overwhelming effort. Such as; flat-footed, deformed fingers especially the trigger finger, and bad teeth. The reason lies that; recruiters were paid a bounty on each successful recruit, but not for the failed one. Individual recruiters had enormous strains, as parents were reluctant in permitting their sons to join the army, and in other cases, recruiting officers at depots looked for high standards of potential recruits. He sometimes had to return without any. In this case, Morris argues, it will be seen, therefore, that it is to a recruiter’s advantage to work for quality rather than quality. (70)
(62) Interview with J P. Cross. (63) Morris C.J, Gurkhas; Hand book, p 144. (64) Interview with Jemadar Krishna Gurung, 1/3rd Gurkhas. (65) A term, commonly used in Nepal, to refer to the Gurkhas. (66) Interview with Jemadar Krishna Gurung, 1/3rd Gurkhas. (67) Cross and Gurung, Gurkhas at War, p 18. (68) Interview with Balkrishna, 1/6th Gurkhas. (69) Cross and Gurung, Gurkhas at War, p 123. (70) Morris C.J, Gurkhas; Hand book, p 144-145
As for the officer, normally, a battalion of Gurkha infantry consisted of 12 King’s Commissioned Officers and 17 Viceroy Commissioned Officers. (71)
To command the tidal pool of recruits, the requirement of superior officers was critically high. The rapid expansion itself had restricted individual regiments from being selective, thus forcing them to accept Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECO). Marston argues, Indian officers had traditionally been restricted to positions in which they could not command British officers (72) however adaptation of ‘Indianisation’ in WW-2, allowed the native Indians to commission into the Indian Army’s commissioned officer in the same grades as British Officers, but this policy did not apply to the Gurkhas. (73) In the case of the Gurkhas, they were part of the Indian Army. Nevertheless, they were not Indians. When the term Native Officers was dropped, their Subedar and Jemadars became Gurkha Officers, not Indian Officers. (74) Despite the implementation of ‘Indianisation’, the system of the Officers Corps in the Gurkha Brigade remained unchanged. Only British Officers were allowed to join, not Indian. Gurkha Officers recently retired were called back while those about to retire were retained. (75)
Rather, the Gurkha units adopted and maintained a disconnected officer system other than the rest of the Indian Army. In the case of recruiting men and Officers, Mason states; the Gurkha regiments became the extreme example of separatism. (76) Most of the regular British Officers’ places were taken by Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECO). These temporary gentlemen arrived rapidly from Britain, with few with some military experience from the OTCs. Schlaefli recalls on TEWIS (Tactical Exercise Without Troops), we had to work out infantry platoon and company maneuvers in the attack. (77)
Nonetheless, military skills were not the primary challenge initially; it was language to any potential officers joining Gurkhas regiments. Without learning Urdu first, and then Gurkhali, none of the ECOs could join the Gurkha regiments. This proves that the language formed a barrier in one sense, however, if mastered, it provided an opportunity to prove oneself as the most exceptional officer in the Indian Army.
The ECOs’ received four to six months of tactical training that was drastically shortened from the normal schedule as a result of wartime expansion. (78) The 5th Gurkhas history claims, on joining the Gurkhas; knowledge of (a) regiment and its history and tradition (b) the Gurkhas (c) the language had to be mastered by each Officer. (79) Thus, joining the Gurkhas meant that the British officers must adhere to the way of the Gurkhas. Wounded and sick Gurkha officers and NCOs were utilized in training battalions, to teach the Gurkha customs. This particular problem imposed a tremendous level of restriction on individual regiments, in employing these officers for front-line duty.
(71) Lunt J, Jai Sixth: 6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Rifles 1817-1994, (Leo Cooper, 1994, London), p 46. (72) Marston D.P, A force transformed: The Indian Army and the Second World War in A military history of India and South Asia; From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era, ed. by Marston D. P and Sundaram C.S, (Indiana University Press, 2008, Bloomington), p 121. (73) Sundaram C.S, Grudging Concession: The Officer Corps and Its Indianization, 1817-1940 in A military history of India and South Asia, p 89. (74) Mason. P, A Matter of Honour, p 309. (75) Bullock C, Britain’s Gurkhas, p 97. (76) Mason. P, A Matter of Honour, p 309. (77) Schlaefli R, Emergency Sahib; of Queens, Sikhs, and the dagger Division, (R J Leach and Co. 1992, London), p 16. (78) Marston. D.P, Phoenix from the Ashes, p 43. (79) The History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, p 439
Regardless of constraints imposed by the newly arrived ECOs, most importantly the ‘milking’ of units was carried out on a great scale. The Army memorandum on recruitment states that; the new battalions will be raised from personal to be ‘milked’ from active battalions of regiments concerned. (80) In this case, Marston argues: Various regular units were milked of regular men and officers for the rapidly expanding army; as recruits were raised, the regular units would be asked to provide a certain number of officers and men to send as a cadre to the new unit. (81)
The Gurkha Brigade more than doubled its strength during the war, but to do so its cadre of trained and experienced VCOs and NCOs, not to mention British officers, had to be spread dangerously thin. (82) In the first stage of expansion, the 4/8th Gurkha’s raised in 1941, initially had to bring two hundred men and Officers from other battalions. The 5th Gurkha’s regimental history claims that a degree of nucleus sharing had to be given to each newly raised battalion while itself was under strength. (83) Desperately the Gurkha Brigade grappled with the problem (84), as the original battalions drained out of experienced staff when the newly raised battalions had not enough of them.
For the ‘Target 43’ expansion, more Indian manpower was needed to recapture Burma. In the other case, British manpower was stretched out extensively to other theaters of war, and importantly, the planning of D-Day caused much preparation of specialized units. Raw manpower for infantry was available sufficiently in India. However, the only shortages were of specialized units. As a result, the expansion target for 1943 was based on the possibility of producing the maximum number of Indian administrative units to relieve British units in Eastern theaters and thus help to conserve British manpower. (85) Native Indians were allowed to enlist in specialized units like tanks however Gurkhas were restricted. Few joined artillery regiments, but the Gurkha regiments still stood as a light infantry unit. The view was that an uneducated highlander was incapable of functioning in specialized units. The specialized roles within the battalion were mostly reserved for Line Boys’.
As more priority was given to specialized training, a centralized training division was established, ceasing the existing regimental training system. Because of a newly introduced training system, each native Indian training battalion was allocated to two regiments. In the case of the Gurkhas, however, this was not done, and the new battalion had to be formed. (86) It caused a further diversion of experienced Officers and NCOs. Not only does it drains out the capable manpower, thinning out of highly skilled VCOs and NCOs, caused a serious problem in the discipline of men, as supervision had been exercised less frequently. Kehi hokum payenna (I did not have any orders) was often the men’s excuse if summoned by seniors. (87) The excellence of potential recruits was affected. A Gurkha training instructor states, Centre ma recruit Haru ta ankha kan ani khutta langada nabhako bahek sabbai bharti hunthiyo (only the boys who did not have an adequate quality of optical and hearing power, and deformed leg could not be recruited, the rest could be recruited). (88) In this case, the ‘Target 41’ expansion enjoyed recruiting high-quality recruits, but the ‘Target 43’ faced problem, in finding suitable recruits from the traditional recruiting area.
As a result, previous recruitment criteria obliged that the potential recruits had to be dropped sharply. The only obvious criterion demanded, was that individuals must be in a capable physical condition. Despite the sharp decline in the quality of recruits, the number of volunteers also decreased sharply to the ‘Target 43’. Native Indian units adopted the expansion of recruitment policies to include men from the so-called ‘non-martial race’ in 1940; however, the Gurkha Brigade came to follow the same pattern only in the second phase of expansion. Except in the new classes, the general quality of the recruits is tending to decline both in physique and intelligence. (90) Due to the obvious problems of rapid expansion overstraining the resources of traditional recruitment areas, (91) and its effect on the quality and quantity of recruits, it was essential for the Brigade to accept Gurkhas from ‘non-martial’ races and opening new areas for recruitment, which had been hitherto prohibited. (92)
Previously, the recruitment handbook of the Gurkhas advised the recruiting officials that; no recruit from Tehsil N°1 East or N°1 West on any account be bought in; these areas are reserved for recruiting by the Nepalese Army. (93)
The GHQ India termed these recruits from the non-traditional area as ‘untied recruits’, which had to be accepted as the Gurkha units drained out of quality recruits from the traditional areas. However, the permission to increase the recruitment areas had not been granted as straightforward. During a low period for Britain, in the context of the war progression, few questions from the Nepalese Maharaja had been raised over the capacity of the British Army. The local population from the traditional recruitment areas was increasingly reluctant to the concept of recruitment, as the stories were full of horror and spread in the villages from returning Gurkhas. Also, rumors within villages maintained that if Britain lost the war, none of the Gurkhas would be eligible for a pension. Mainly, to answer the questions raised by the Maharaja, Betham went on saying it had been caused by the ‘setbacks’; which, he blamed on the late rearmament of the British Army. (94)
Uprety claims, a six-point note of clarification explaining the actual Allied position in Europe in the conflict was provided. (95) It effectively obtained Nepal’s confidence in the British Army and released more recruitment areas by temporarily stopping the recruitment of the Nepalese Army. Gurung argues; that the intention of the utterly easy recruitment policy of the Maharaja was egocentric. The new policy did not propose to serve the British interest but to serve their autocratic rule, and they were rewarded accordingly. (96)
(80) Recruitment, L/WS/1/394, (IOR). (81) Marston. D.P, Phoenix from the Ashes, p 42. (82) Gould.T, Imperial Warriors, p 237. (83) The History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, p 49. (84) Bullock C, Britain’s Gurkhas, p 97. (85) Expansion, L/WS/1/968, (IOR). (86) The History of the 5thRoyal Gurkha Rifles, p 413. (87) Gould.T, Imperial Warriors, p 237. (88) Interview with a Gurkha soldier from 2/5 Gurkhas, accession no. 025152 to Major Beven’s interviews series. (89) Marston D.P, A force transformed in A military history of India, p 121. (90) Expansion, L/WS/1/968, IOR-British Library. (91) Marston. D.P, Phoenix from the Ashes, p 49. (92) Uprety P.R, Nepal, p 261. (93) Morris C.J, Gurkhas; Hand book, p 145. (94) Tuker F, Gorkha, p 214. (95) Uprety P.R, Nepal, p 238. (96) Gurung C.B, British Medals, and Gurkhas, p 11
On top of providing consensus to the House of Rana, against the backdrop of a growing democratic political movement to the Rana rule, the Government of India paid an annual fixed royalty of two million rupees during the period of WW-2. Nonetheless, the authorization of more recruiting areas directly benefitted the Gurkha Brigade, by receiving high qualities of recruits once again. It was a relief to the brigade, as a commander like Orde Wingate had already started to question Gurkhas’ fighting qualities after his ambitious First Chindits operation. Surely, the improvement in the qualities of the recruits helped to abolish the increasing threat to the Gurkhas’ reputation, by providing high-class recruits once again. Along with its increased size, since the first stage of expansion in 1941, it adopted the ever-changing training policies as the war progressed and demanded by the ever-changing nature of war.
The fighting in two theaters of war meant that it had to adopt different training manuals as the experiences of fighting in one theater did not help another. As Thinning-Out and Milking the units created considerable problems for the Gurkha Brigade, problems had to be rectified immediately as they threatened the reputation of the Gurkhas. However, with the rapid expansion of the Gurkha Regiments and changes in recruitment policies, the Brigade of Gurkhas welcomed the tempo of war.
The Gurkhas – Middle East – North Africa – Italy
Initially, 1/5th Gurkhas completed its mobilization with the 17th Indian Infantry Brigade on May 24, 1941. However, as some core manpower had to be diverted to newly raised battalions, it required some time to build up its strength and, above all, to mechanize the battalion after the departure of the horses and mules. (97) Despite these shortages, the battalion left for the Middle East to join the 10th Indian Division. This marked the beginning of deployment for the Gurkha Brigade.
The 5th Gurkhas regimental history claims, much equipment arrived only a few days before entrainment, including Bren Guns, 3-Inch mortars, and AT rifles. (98) Despite the hostile condition, and the need to fight in battles, the battalion had to ensure that the soldiers were familiar with the new equipment. Concurrent training programs in the lull of battle were the only option left; which they adopted. The condition of battle was not much improved either, since the arrival of the first Indian troops in 1940. The Germans were continuing to infiltrate the Middle East, oil was at stake then, more than ever to support the emerging mechanized warfare.
Although there are many reasons, one important reason was that troops from the Indian Contingent increased dramatically in the Middle East. Elliott argues; due to the rapid and decisive action taken from India in April 1941 the German effort was stillborn, but the issue was, for a month, too nicely poised in the balance for comfort. (99) Upon arrival in Iraq, the Gurkha Regiments found hostile situations caused by pro-German forces. 2/4th GR, as they disembarked the Iraqis opened fire on them and killed up to a platoon’s worth. (100) Regardless of proper equipment, the Gurkhas carried on fighting from one city to another.
As a result of the lack of mosquito nets, soldiers did not have enough sleep, and in some instances, the attack on the Iraqi barracks carried on without proper sleep for many nights. (101) This mosquito terror caused serious problems in the later stage of the war. However, the 10th Indian Division made short work of the invasion and soon surrounded Baghdad. (102) The defeat of the pro-German force ensured the installment of the pro-British government as a replacement.
Simultaneously, the 5th Indian Brigade fought alongside the Free French Army and troops of the Australian Army, against the Vichy French Government in Syria.In a series of naval disasters, the Royal Navy had temporarily lost control of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the diversion of a complete air corps from the Russian Front meant that the German had air superiority. (103) Fighting without air support, let down by their allies resulted in massive casualties for the Gurkha Battalions. (104) Additionally, the heavy toll of malaria has taken into the 2/10 Gurkhas in Aleppo that it became temporarily ineffective for operation and had to be sent to Aden for treatment. (105)
In this instance, without a significant involvement with a first-class enemy, heavy casualties had been inflicted on Gurkha units. However, the German venture to spread Axis policies was brilliantly countered. Elliott argues if it was too late to react, and enemy reinforcement was allowed, British forces could have lost vital oil supplies in the Middle East, and intervention against the Russian flank around Rostov could have been possible; potentially threatening Russia from the south. Lunt argues; that the main concentration of British forces against the pro-German forces was because of the German occupation of the Caucasians. It was seriously considered that they might continue this offensive either to seize the Suez Canal or drive through Iran and Afghanistan towards India or both. (106) In this case, India was potentially in danger of invasions, from both Germany and Japan. Nevertheless, the original intention of the Axis forces failed, because of the excellent fighting spirit performed by Indian troops.
