2-ID, 38th Field Artillery Battalion's howitzers firing toward German lines

FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR ACTION

At 1800, December 17, a meeting was held at the battalion CP. All unit commanders were given final instructions as to the urgency of the situation and were further instructed to again imbue the men with the absolute necessity of holding the position at all costs. Lt John Milesnick, CO of Baker Co, made arrangements for the platoon leader of the 644-TDB to deliver what AT mines his platoon had to the road crossing. The CO was instructed to plant mines on each side of the road leading into his position and to place Daisy Chains of mines across the road when the enemy armor made its appearance. The companies were warned that there were still remnants of routed friendly troops to the front and that there were probably some friendly tanks still to be withdrawn from the front. At this time, the artillery liaison officer gave the company commanders the number of three artillery concentrations that he had been able to register before darkness. The companies were issued extra ammunition. Particular attention was given to placing extra machine guns, and extra bazooka ammunition on the defensive positions. The radio and wire communications were double-checked. The command radio was unable to reach the 9-IR and it was decided to save the batteries for the artillery radio, as no extra batteries were immediately available.

Destroyed German Armor

DEFENSE OF THE CROSSROADS – DECEMBER 17

At 1900, a phone call from Baker Co indicated that the three tanks followed by approximately thirty infantrymen had passed through their lines and were proceeding towards Rocherath. Lt Milesnick stated that the tanks and infantrymen were believed to be friendly; however, he had not positively identified them due to the darkness and heavy fog that had settled over the countryside. Col McKinley immediately directed Able Co to identify the tanks and infantry. This was done by a patrol, and the tanks and infantry were identified as German. Lt Stephen A. Truppner, CO of Able Co, directed artillery fire on the German force with good results. He reported that one tank was set on fire and that the troops were screaming and had dispersed in all directions.

At approximately 2000, Baker Co reported that several tanks could be heard in the heavily wooded area 2000 yards to the northeast of the battalion position. This was verified by reports from the other front-line companies. By this time, the noise could be heard from the Battalion CP. It sounded as if a large column of tanks was approaching the battalion position from the road leading from the heavily wooded area to the northeast. The battalion CO directed that Baker Co mine the road in front of their position. This was done by Lt Roy Allen by placing a Daisy Chain across the road and covering it with two bazooka teams. Shortly after this was completed, the column of armor came down the road toward the battalion’s defensive position. The column of armor was in closed formation with a distance of approximately fifty yards between tanks. Each tank was followed by a platoon of infantry. Hitting the Daisy Chain, the leading tank was disabled. The second tank in the column attempted to move around the disabled tank and was disabled by the same Daisy Chain. The two disabled tanks formed a roadblock. The armored column was partially canalized by the high road banks on each side of the road, however, several of the tanks were able to pull off the road to the left continuing towards the battalion position. Lt Milesnick dispatched two bazooka teams to attack these bypassing tanks in the flank as they moved around the roadblock. Two additional tanks were destroyed by the bazooka fire. Lt Milesnick reported the events to the battalion CO and further stated that the tanks were continuing to move out of the woods to the northeast.

Artillery Support - Just call to get it

There was evidence of confusion among the German forces as the tanks continued to close up in front of the battalion position. McKinley was quick to make an estimate of the situation. The German forces had apparently been surprised by the battalion’s defensive position. This as believed to have been brought about by the failure of the first elements of the German force to report the battalion’s position as they passed through earlier in the evening. McKinley directed that all available artillery be brought down on this enemy column and in approximately five minutes, Lt John C. Granville, Artillery Liaison Officer, had the entire 15-FAB firing on this target. The road was searched from a point just in front of Baker Co to a point 2000 meters to the northeast where the main road leading into the battalion position emerges from the woods. The artillery fires caught the German column in an extremely vulnerable position and the results were evidenced by the cries from the Germans in the burning tanks that had received direct hits from the concentrated artillery fire. Fires from two light, four medium, and one heavy artillery battalion were available and full advantage was taken of this support. The road to the northeast and the heavily wooded area were under almost continuous fire during the entire hour that followed.

The road between the battalion position and Rocherath was interdicted for the remainder of the night. At approximately 2100, the Germans deployed the tanks that they had been able to pull off the road. In conjunction with a company of infantry, they attacked the battalion position frontally. Six to eight tanks moved to within 200 meters of the battalion position attacking the front lines by fire for thirty minutes. Then the German infantry attempted to move in and eject the defender. This trust failed when the attacking force ran into the final protective line of fire laid down by the heavy machine guns from Dog Co. The enemy soon saw the futility of this sort of tactic and withdrew only to attack again in a few minutes with the tanks and infantry moving in together. The tanks penetrated the front lines all along the front of Baker and Able Cos. The fire from the tanks, however, was very ineffective due to the blindness of the tankers in the night and heavy fog. The German infantry was stopped at the MLR with heavy losses. Fortunately, due to the lack of visibility, bazooka teams were able to move within ten yards of the tanks that had penetrated the lines and destroy them. There were two Mark V Panther tanks that the bazooka teams could not destroy due to the thickness of their armor. These tanks made a stationary pillbox within the battalion lines and continued to harass Baker Co by machine gun fire.

Sgt Joe Busi, Cpl Roberts (Dog Co), and S/Sgt Odis Bone (Baker Co) teamed up to destroy these tanks by using gasoline. One of the men mounted the tanks, while the other passed him a five-gallon Jerrycan of gasoline that was placed over the motor of the tank. An M-14 termite incendiary hand grenade on the gasoline did the rest. By 2400, the entire attack had bogged down and all was quiet except friendly artillery fire.

81-MM Mortar ready

CONTROL RE-ESTABLISHED – RE-SUPPLY

The remainder of the night was spent in the re-establishment of control, readjustment of front lines, and re-supply. Leaders who had become casualties were replaced. Front-line positions were improved. All the needed ammunition was resupplied to the front-line companies by the 81-MM Mortar Platoon of Dog Co. The close proximity of the ammunition truck simplified their task considerably. After the ammunition was resupplied, the 81-MM Mortar Platoon was used to tie in the rear of the battalion with Charlie Co on the left and King Co on the right. Roving patrols moved throughout the battalion area for the remainder of the night. It was believed that the Germans would make a determined effort to infiltrate and around the battalion position. A patrol from Dog Co checked into the battalion command post at 0100 and reported that all was quiet throughout the battalion area. Leaving the CP, the patrol leader jumped into the sunken road which ran by the Battalion CP. Hitting the ground, he found himself face to face with a five-man German patrol that was preparing to attack the battalion CP. The patrol leader with one short burst from his Thompson M-1 sub-machine gun killed four of the Germans.

Germans trying to find another way to pass the US defenses

A little while later, the battalion CO ordered Charlie Co to move to a position just north of Rocherath to prevent the Germans from infiltrating behind the battalion position and subsequently into the town. Capt Arnold Algier, CO of Charlie Co, moved his company down the road to the designated spot. Upon arrival, he discovered that a company of the 38-IR had been ordered into the same position and Capt Algier moved his company back over the same route to his original position, the left flank of the battalion. During the night, a wireline was laid between the battalion position and the 2/38-IR. Col Boos, CO 38-IR, called Col McKinley and informed him that the 1/9-IR was now attached to the 38-IR. Col Boos further stated that the battalion could withdraw sometime the following day when the 2/38-IR completed the establishment of the line west of the 1/9-IR’s present position. Col Boos emphasized the urgency of the entire situation and further stated that the present battalion position would be held at all costs until ordered to withdraw. This, however, was unnecessary as the division commander had been very emphatic about the battalion’s mission in the initial orders.

GERMAN ATTACK

On December 18, at 0600 in the morning, the full force of the German attack struck the entire battalion front. The fog was extremely heavy and visibility was limited to a few feet. The Germans attacked with tanks and infantry moving in simultaneously. The real gallantry and tenacity of the front-line units proved to offset the superior forces of the Germans. As the tanks and infantry attempted to roll over the positions they were met with all means available. The tanks were permitted to pass into the lines while the accompanying infantry was attacked from all sides with bayonets and trench knives. This battle raged spasmodically for the following two hours and the defenders succeeded in defeating the foot troops. Several tanks were destroyed by the bazooka fire and at 0830, the German force attacked again all along the front. Since the fog was lifting to some extent, the German tanks that had penetrated the positions earlier in the morning came to life. These tanks moved all along the front destroying the machine guns on the MLR while they were firing on their final protective lines.

SS soldier killed during the Battle

By this time, Able and King Cos were desperate. The Germans had completely overrun their positions, and the remnants of the two front-line platoons of the company had been captured. The Support Platoon and Hqs Co were still holding out. Baker Co was still holding the road crossing. Charlie Co had succeeded in preventing the left flank of the battalion from being turned by a platoon of infantry. At 1100, the battalion CO received orders from the CO of the 38-IR to formulate plans to withdraw through the 2/38-IR which was endeavoring to form a line to the west. The withdrawal was contingent, however, on the formation of this defensive line.

COUNTERATTACK & WITHDRAWAL

All companies were contacted and given a tentative plan of withdrawal. At this time, Able and King Cos reported that it would be impossible to extricate any of their personnel with the possible exception of a few of the CP Group. Lt Truppner, CO of Able Co, called over his SCR-300 a few minutes later stating that he was about to destroy all his radios but, before doing it, he asked that a ten-minute artillery barrage be fired on his own position. He further informed that the few men that remained in his company could take cover in their foxholes and that the Germans were moving over his positions in mass. The artillery barrage was fired. No more was heard from Able Co.

At 1100, the battalion commander called the CO of the 38-IR informing him that it would be impossible to withdraw his battalion without the aid of tanks or tank destroyers. This conversation had not been completed when Lt Henski, the Battalion AT Officer walked into the CP with a tank platoon leader from the 741-TB. Although the tank platoon leader had been cut off by the enemy, he had managed to escape. He had four Sherman tanks a mile down the road towards Wahlerscheid. Volunteering his services, the tank platoon leader, Col McKinley, and Capt Harvey (S-3), set to work formulating a plan of counterattack in conjunction with the proposed withdrawal. The plans were as follows, 1. the tank platoon was to destroy three German tanks that had Baker Co pinned down, and 2. the tank platoon was to envelop both flanks of the penetration in the vicinity of Able and Baker Cos’ sector. A thirty-minute artillery concentration was planned in conjunction with the counter-attack.

Shortly after 1100, the CO of the 2/38-IR, notified Col McKinley that the withdrawal could commence at 1200. The completed withdrawal plan was given to all troops within reach. Able Co by this time was no longer considered in the withdrawal as their positions had been completely overrun. Capt Garvey, CO of King Co, stated that he preferred to stay with his company as it was impossible to withdraw any of his platoons. At 1115, the artillery preparations began and lasted until 1145. The four Sherman tanks which moved into position under cover of the artillery fire, attacked the three German tanks destroying two, while the remaining tank escaped towards Rocherath. Under the cover of the initial counterattack, the following companies broke contact and withdrew to the rear, Charlie, the majority of Baker, Battalion Hqs, and Dog, less the two heavy machine gun platoons. The 644-TDB withdrew at this time. The tanks withdrew to the vicinity of the battalion CP. From this position, they launched another attack from a slightly different direction. In conjunction with this counterattack, the remainder of Baker Co with two or three men from Able Co broke away and withdrew to the rear. At this time the battalion CO, S-3, and the tank platoon withdrew to the rear.

In brief summary of this battalion’s eighteen-hour defensive stand against overwhelming odds, it can be stated that the mission was completely accomplished. The eighteen-hour delay of the German force at this vital road crossing gave the remainder of the 2-ID time to set up a defensive line to the rear which held and remained intact during the entire German counter-offensive. The immediate results of the stand prompted Col Boos, CO of the 38-IR, to tell Col William McKinley, You have saved my regiment. Prompted, Maj Daniel Webster, G-3 of the 2-ID, to say, You have saved the entire 2-ID. Gen Hodges was prompted to phone the following message to Gen Walter M. Robertson, CG of the 2-ID, What the 2-ID has done in these last four days will live forever in the history of the United States Army.

The total strength of the reinforced battalion at the time of the attack by the German force was 26 officers and 487 enlisted men. Of this total, 20 officers and 220 enlisted men survived the withdrawal on December 18. The 308 officers and enlisted men who failed to withdraw are accounted for as follows, 17 known KIA, 61 WIA, 17 NBC, and 213 MIA. Although the losses of men and material were heavy, the eighteen-hour delay had not only saved the 2-ID from being cut off but had also permitted the piecemeal withdrawal of elements of the 99-ID through the 2-ID Lines.

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