The first knowledge the machine gun platoon leader had that there were actually enemy forces near his foxhole via when a Jap smelling like they do, leaped into the foxhole. He had a knife in his hand but was small which was indicated by the weight as he closed with the platoon leader. As had been his habit, all during training and since being in this operation the platoon leader had stuck his hunting knife, usually strapped to his right leg, in the bank on the side of his foxhole, within easy reach. He quickly had it in his hand and prepared for the worst. The fight did not last long, since the platoon leader outweighed the enemy by nearly thirty pounds and ended with the platoon leader slitting the enemy’s throat.
He then rolled the body out of the hole and waited for further attack. None came, so he crept out of the foxhole, and crawled toward the nearest gun position to lend assistance. By the time he had identified himself, the action had ceased and the enemy dispatched. Nothing could be done for the wounded on that night because of the intense darkness.
The following morning it was discovered that Cpl Greenstein had received a saber cut on the head which was superficial. Pvt Charles W. Smith had his right ear badly chewed in close fighting, and several men, including the machine gun platoon leader, needed new articles of clothing, which had been ripped and cut, by the Japs. The enemy was mounted at 10 dead and 3 so badly wounded that they died early the following morning. Three men in the first rifle platoon were killed and two others wounded. No other casualties were reported for the company. New clothing was issued, and the company prepared to move out at 0030 on Apr 6. The 1st Battalion had been relieved of the inland responsibility and was put in regimental reserve.
Progress was much easier throughout the entire sector as the Regiment moved up the north-south roadway, on the west coast of the Isthmus, reaching the small hamlet of Chuda on the evening of Apr 6. Since the 22d Regiment had proceeded on the 29th and cleaned out all resistance en route, it was not necessary to set up defensive positions but a night watch was set in each company’s area as a security measure.
On Apr 8, the 29-MR was committed to the task of cleaning out the Motobu Peninsular. It was no longer in Division reserve, as (less the 1st Bn) it had been from its landing on Love plus one until Apr 8. The 22nd continued up the northern end of the island to wipe out enemy resistance in that area, and the 4th was held in reserve to assist where ever needed. The Motobu Peninsula is approximately ten miles long and eight miles wide at its widest point. It extends at right angles from the main island in a north-westerly direction. The highest point on the peninsula, Mount Yaetake, extends upward, amidst a large hill mass to the altitude of nearly fifteen hundred feet, and is located in the south-central portion of Motobu. The avenue of approach to this strong point was up deep ravines, until nearly to the crest of this highest point. Since the enemy had the entire area set up in the defensive perimeter of Mount Yaetake, they were virtually looking down the throats of the attacking forces until the mountain was captured on Apr 18.
THE ATTACK ON MOTOBU
On Apr 9, 1945, the attack up Motobu Peninsula was started. The 1/29th Marine Regiment was to proceed up the Nago Toguchi road cleaning out all enemies contacted in their zone of action. The 2d Battalion was ordered to proceed directly north, and to capture and neutralize the small town of Unten, which was a midget submarine base. The 3d Battalion was ordered to proceed along the roadway on the southern edge of the Peninsular. They were to neutralize and pass through the small towns of Suga, Sakimotobu, Hamasaki, and to hold up at Toguchi. This action would give our forces the southern half of the Peninsula, and an avenue of communication and supply.
The first few hours of the drive were uneventful for the 1st Battalion. Baker Co leading with elements of Able Co on the flanks, and Charlie Co in reserve moved out along the road. The machine gun platoon was held intact with the mortars, behind HQs Co. Light guns were carried because of the expected march. As progress was made it was quite noticeable that the terrain was rising rapidly above that in the vicinity of the Love +8 line. The roadway was unimproved and flanked on either side by high hills. It had many curves and it was noted that it moved generally up a natural corridor.
At 1200 a halt was called to eat the noon-day meal, and at 1300 the march was continued. Shortly after 1400, the 1st rifle platoon of Baker Co reported that there were enemy troops in a small canyon that was at right angles and south of the road. Word of this was sent to Battalion. A halt was called, and the 1st Platoon, with a section of machine gun, moved out to intercept the enemy. This force turned out to be five Japs and they were quickly killed, except for two who escaped up into the mountains. No other resistance was met that day and the march ended just before the town of Itomi was reached. A defensive position was set up on the available high ground. No out guards were established, and no patrols were sent out. No one knew exactly where the enemy was concentrated, but it was suspected that he occupied the highest ground.
This proved true when at 1700, a considerable machine gun and some mortar gunfire were received by Baker Co in their bivouac area. The fire continued until 1800. All hands were in foxholes, but several casualties were suffered. The Battalion CO then, established out guards, which were stationed at the obvious avenues of approach and on the high ground to the right and left.
After the attack, it was necessary for the machine gun platoon leader to shift the gun positions so as to adequately cover the terrain to the front and flanks as well as two obvious avenues of approach which were trails coming into the position from the ground on the north. Later that night, three enemies, apparently out on patrol, were killed by machine-gun fire as they were coming down one of the trails. The fire of the guns immediately brought down another hail of enemy fire. This lesson was quickly taken to heart until a Banzai attack, later on, was not violated.
Rain began to fall at about 0330 on Apr 10 and by 0700 all hands were thoroughly soaked, cold, and quite miserable. Small, well-obscured fires were permitted for heating coffee and K rations which had been issued the previous night. Visibility was poor, and the men expected to remain in position all day. However, the order to prepare to move out was received at 0800 and by 0830 the troops were on the move. With Baker Co in the lead, closely followed by Able Co Battalion Hqs and Charlie Co the march continued. The dirt road was now muddy, and slippery, near the river. Many times men fell and were helped by buddies to regain footing. Progress was extremely slow for the remainder of the morning. At 1300, the enemy struck.
The leading elements of Baker Co had just traversed an open field that had a small stream running through it. A cement bridge, crude in structure spared the water. Just as the 1st rifle platoon had crossed this bridge heavy mortar and machine-gun fire was rained on them, seemingly only from the front. All hands took cover, wherever it was available. Word was sent for Able Co Commander to proceed, to the right and attempt an encirclement or lift the enemy’s flank. By passing to the right of Baker Co, they proceeded toward a small valley to the right of the road. As they reached the general base of their hill it was noted that an increase of mortar fire was delivered by the enemy forces. Soon after this, a runner from Able Co came sloughing his way to the company commander of Baker Co with the request that the machine guns of Baker Co moved up to the left flank and fired on enemy positions.
This action started with the machine gun platoon leader, leading the platoon. Because of the fire received movement was made up the small creek in knee-deep icy water. Just as a bend in the creek was reached heavy mortar fire fell right across the line of march. It seemed to cover the entire area to the front. Halting his platoon, the machine gun platoon leader sent a runner back to report the situation to the Company Commander. Prior to the arrival of the runner at Hqs Co, another runner arrived with the message that all troops were to pull back out of this area and proceed back to the bivouac area of the previous night. This order proved to be difficult to carry out. The mortar barrages and concentrations became heavier, Nambu machine guns, and automatic rifles of larger caliber had now entered the firing plan of the Japs. The retreat was started and the units moved back down the road. As they reached the entrance to the valley an increase in enemy machine-gun fire was received from south of the road. Leading elements were pinned down. Makes a nasty estimate of the situation.
The machine gun platoon leader of Baker Co set up one gun on the near side of the fields of fire of the enemy guns. He was asked whether or not he could bring overhead fire to bear on suspected enemy positions, up the ravine, which was holding up our movement. By going up onto the side of the mountain on the left circling around and then back to the road, the machine gun platoon leader was able to emplace two guns in such positions that they provided overhead fire for retreating troops. Under these protective fires, Able and Baker Cos, and the Battalion HQs were able to continue down the road, to return to the bivouac area. It was not until the following day that it was discovered that one platoon of Able Co had gone into the hills to the south, became separated from the Battalion, and did not get back until 0330 on the morning of Apr 11.
Several casualties were sustained in the Battalion, but no machine gunners were hurt. Many weapons were lost, including one 81-MM mortar. It was a disheveled outfit that reached the bivouac area that evening. The reorganization was conducted and the supply officer furnished the required weapons. A patrol was sent out the next morning to regain the 81-MM mortar. This was accomplished and no enemy fire was received. From Apr 11 to Apr 14, the Battalion remained in the general vicinity of the Love +10 lines. Time was spent making patrols in a circumference of a thousand yards around this area. Baker Co, at this time, was bivouacked on top of a hill some eight hundred yards from Battalion, having reached it by a series of daily movements. Several patrols, with attached machine-gun sections, were sent out. Few enemies were contacted, but the consolidated reports of these patrols set the enemy’s position as on a high hill mass in the south known as Mount Yaetake.
THE ASSAULT ON MOUNT YAE-TAKE
During this patrolling period, fire was received daily from the enemy at about 0600 and 1730. The men came to expect it and were thoroughly entrenched during these hours. Every effort was made to keep in defiladed areas on the north side of every small hill or rise in the ground, even though it seemed that oftentimes fire was received from the north. On Apr 14, we received word that an attack on Mount Yaetake would begin. The 2d Battalion had joined the 1st and was to assist in the assault. Information was received that the 4th Regiment had proceeded to an area between the towns of Sakimotobu and Toguchi, and with the 3/29th Regiment was to assault from the south. We learned too, that Col Whaling had relieved Col Bleasdale as the 29th Regimental Commander.
By noon, the attack was underway. Able and Baker Cos were attacking up adjacent corridors, along trails out by the Japs. Flank patrols were out and the ridge between the units was adequately covered. Charlie Co was in Battalion reserve. The 81-MM mortars were set up to deliver long-range fires on the hill masses to the front. We learned that there would be air support on call and that the 105-MM and 155-MM Division Artillery guns would deliver concentrations on-call from the Battalion CO. Due to the precipitous sides of the ridges on either side, the route of advance movement was very slow. The machine guns were to be held intact and used only for defense due to the limited ranges, and lack of fields of fire.
From Apr 14 to Apr 17, the advance continued. Each night a defense was set up and the highest terrain available was utilized. Sporadic enemy fire was received constantly throughout this period, becoming heavier in the evenings and early morning hours. At frequent intervals, enemy personnel was observed in the high, comparatively treeless, areas to the front. It was at these long-range, often appearing, targets that machine-gun fire was frequently directed. Casualties on the enemy were inflicted daily, as evidenced by observation through binoculars during firing periods, and also by the non-buried enemy dead as each hill mass was overrun by our forces. Our own forces were not immune to enemy fire, as was indicated by the fact that the machine gun platoon had been depleted from fifty-six to thirty-two, during the period Apr 1-17.
Due to the inaccessibility of the terrain to motor transport, daily treks had to be made back to the Battalion supply dump, to obtain food and ammunition. This procedure was carried on, until Apr 16, when an airdrop of food, water, and ammunition was made. All of the parachutes were recovered, even though the enemy chose that moment to open fire. However, following the drop, Marine fighter pilots and medium bombers came in. They strafed and bombed the enemy positions and several Napalm bombs were dropped, which not only sent the enemy into their holes but screened the mountain from observation for hours. These aircraft also released many rockets at the prepared caves which could be seen all over Mount Yaedake. The caves had been in evidence for days, as binoculars had been weed to direct both mortars and long-range machine-gun fire, at the enemy stronghold.
On Apr 18, 1945, having secured the area leading up to and the hill mass just southeast of Mount Yaedake, the Battalion Commander prepared to coordinate an all-out attack with units of the 4th Regiment on the south and west, and the 2d Battalion on the north. The attack was launched at 0830, following a heavy artillery barrage and then an airstrike. Able and Baker Cos were abreast, as usual, and Charlie Co in reserve fired overhead machine gun and 60-MM mortar fire. The machine guns of Baker Co left on the hill mass southeast of Mount Yaedake were on the flanks of Baker Co and had the mission of firing overhead covering fire for the advancing troops. Their fire was coordinated with that of Able Cos’ machine guns, firing a similar mission. If all went well, the two machine gun units were to displace forward as their fire was mashed by the advancing troops.
By 0845 the valley between the two hill masses had been reached by the rifle platoons. It was at this time that the enemy opened up with everything they had. The machine gun platoon leader gave the command to open fire, and a few minutes later there was a blinding flash, a loud roar, and the machine gun platoon leader fell wounded, on the head neck, and on other parts of the upper body. The blow on the head, by flying fragments of an exploding mortar shell, knocked him unconscious. Some hours later, he regained consciousness in the Battalion aid center and was afterward evacuated to the Division hospital located at Nago.
Capt David W. Banks
