The trees were approximately fifteen feet tall with the bottom branches about four feet above the ground. All branches were heavily laden with snow, visibility at no point was more than thirty feet. As the men advanced they would have to bend forward in order to clear the low branches. As they would brush against the branches the snow and pine needles would fall down their necks adding greatly to their discomfort. After advancing about 100 yards through this young forest the left squad of the 2nd Platoon came to the first fire break, as they were crossing an enemy machine gun opened fire from about 200 yards up the break. The Company Commander moved to the left flank to check on the situation. There he contacted Lt Helm and found that one squad was safely across, and the remainder of the platoon on the near side. This fire break ran diagonally across our front, where it intersected the trail on which we were advancing is where the enemy machine gun was set up. An attempt was made to get more men across, this met with failure, as they neared the break the enemy would open fire with machine guns and rifles. The enemy force was known to be at least two machine guns and several rifles. It was decided to leave the one squad across the fire break as a holding force until Baker Co could move up and clear the obstacle. The remainder of the 2nd Platoon would move to the right of the trail and follow the 1st Platoon.
The Battalion Commander was notified of this action and the Company moved on to the objective without further incident, arriving there at about 1600 hours. An all around defense was set up to the left of the trail awaiting the arrival of Charlie Co, which cams at about 1700 hours. The flanks of both companies were tied in. The men dug in the best they could through frozen ground and snow. During this time intermittent artillery was falling in the area, also both companies were receiving machine gun fire from across the Rau de Langlire river. The only contact with the Battalion now was by the artillery radio that the forward observer had. We were notified that the Battalion headquarters had moved into Bihain along with the aid station and ammunition dump, also that Baker Co was in Bihain and would remain there during the night. This left Able and Charlie Cos well over a 1000 yard forward of the front lines. With the enemy, of undetermined strength between them and friendly forces. With this in mind both companies prepared to spend the night in the edge of the forest.
The men started preparing positions for the night; after they had completed digging their foxholes it was noted that water was seeping in. This water continued rising until it had reached a depth of about one foot. The men were not able to keep their feet dry and warm, this added greatly to their discomfort as the temperature was around zero degrees and it had begun to snow again. Just before dark firing broke out in the rear of Charlie Co. This proved to be a rather strong enemy force armed with MP-38/40 Machine Pistols and Panzerfaust. They succeeded in over running Charlie Co’s mortar positions capturing the mortars and wounding several men. This fire fight was taking place about 100 yards from Able Co’s right flank. Realizing the situation in Charlie Co was rather serious. after some of their men withdrew into Able Co area, the Company Commander of Able Co sent a strong patrol to envelope the enemy rear. This was very effective as the enemy was soon routed with the loss of fifteen killed, but none captured. Nor was any of Charlie Co’s equipment recovered. In this brief action, Charlie Co had one killed, five wounded; Able Co one wounded. It is believed this was the enemy force that was bypassed earlier in the afternoon, as we had no further contact while in this position. The enemy artillery no longer was falling in the area and the machine gun fire to our front had ceased.
At 2130, Lt Col Neilson came to the CP of Able Co. He stated that the battalion had been ordered to make a night attack and was due to jump off at 2200, thirty minutes from now. The battalion was supposed to be on the western edge of Langlire at 2200 prepared to move into the town as soon as the artillery preparation had lifted. Thirteen battalions of artillery was to fire a fifteen minute T.O.T. (Time on Target) the last rounds from one battalion was to be smoke shells so we would know the preparation was over. This was to be a division coordinated attack with both regiments, 331-IR and the 329-IR attacking abreast with the main effort being in the area of Petite Langlire. The 1/331-IR was to attack generally west, from its position on the bank of the Rau de Langlire river, seize the town of Langlire, prevent the enemy from reinforcing from the south, also to cut his escape route from the north. The Battalion plan was Charlie Co to lead end seize the south half of the town. Able Co to follow and seize the main east-west road and the north half of the town.
Knowing by now that the Rau de Langlire river was only a small stream and the bridge as shown on the Map was not a conventional type, but in reality was a man-made ford. The ford had a rocky bottom and the water not over six inches In depth. This was no obstacle whatsoever to either foot troops or vehicles of any type. The Able Company Commander realizing that it was impossible to accomplish the mission in the time alloted, called in his platoon leaders and issued his attack order. Locating the platoon leaders was, in the extreme darkness of the forest, in itself a big job. The trees were so thick and the air so full of snow that a person moving trough the woods could only see a matter of a few inches, it was not unusual to run into a tree before seeing it. These men being mostly combat veterans, would more than likely shoot first and ask questions later. Locating the Platoon Leaders and getting them to the CP took over thirty minutes. Since the Company Commander had no map of the area the attack order consisted of just telling the Platoon Leaders his plan, which was to lead with the 1st Platoon followed by the Third Platoon, both of these platoons would have one section of heavy machine guns attached, followed by the weapons less the light machine gun section which was attached to the Second Platoon bringing up the rear.
The 1st Platoon was to seize and clear all the buildings on the left side of the street, the 3rd Platoon with the same mission on the right side. The 2nd Platoon and the remainder of the weapons platoon were to occupy these buildings and prevent the enemy from re-entering. To issue the order and get the company assembled took approximately two and one half hours, making the time now after 2400 hours. It was now noted that Charlie Co was not ready to move, a messenger was dispatched to Charlie Co CP. On his return he stated that Capt Wright would not be ready for at least another hour. With this in mind, the Company Commander of Able Co decided to move out and let Charlie Co follow. This information was sent to Charlie Co and the Platoon Leaders notified of the change in plans. The Company was to move on order of the Company Commander after he had made a personal check of all Platoons. On returning to the head of the column the Company Commander found that the 1st Platoon had moved out. An attempt was made to contact it by SCR-536 radio, but no luck. Hoping the platoon would be fortunate enough in finding the objective the remainder of the Company moved out with the idea of following the trail left by the 1st Platoon. On clearing the woods and crossing the river we moved into open ground. Here the wind, which was very strong by now, was blowing the snow terrifically, obliterating the trail of the 1st Platoon. It was also impossible to locate the trail which would lead the Company into Langlire. The time now approximately 0130 January 11.
The only way possible to move was by single file changing the lead man every few minutes. The terrain across which the Company moved was from almost bare ground to snow drifts up to five feet deep. The riflemen carried four bandoleers of ammunition extra, along with two hand grenades and one clip of BAR ammunition. This was SOP within the Company. Some of the men were fortunate enough to get snow capes, but these proved to be ineffective as they would become frozen and break, they were discarded during this move.
In this movement to Langlire the men became so exhausted that when they would slip and fall some would make no attempt to rise. The Platoon Leaders and Non-Commissioned Officers had to continually patrol the column forcing these men to get on their feet. Sometimes this had to be done at the point of a gun. The weapons became clogged with snow, many bolts were frozen closed. The water in the water jackets of the machine guns became frozen although antifreeze had been used the guns were without at this point. The only means available to thaw these weapons was for the men to urinate on them, this was done many times throughout this operation. It is felt that if it hadn’t been for the good leadership ability of the Platoon Leaders and key Non-Commissioned
Officers that some of the men would have perished on this march.
By 0330, it had ceased snowing and the Company found itself about 200 yards from the edge of a village, and there still wasn’t any contact with the 1st Platoon. Here the Company was halted and a patrol was to be sent to the village to try to determine whether or not this was the company objective. Tanks could be heard moving around the town and firing occasionally. These were believed to be enemy tanks. Before the patrol could be sent out a patrol from the 1st Platoon contacted the Company. This patrol informed the Company Commander that the 1st Platoon had succeeded in taking three houses without meeting any opposition, but believed this to be another village since there were buildings only on one side of the street, also the tanks that could be heard were enemy, estimated at least seven and enemy foot troops could be heard in other sections of the town.
Langlire & Vicinity – January 1945
The Company Commander went forward to the 1st Platoon, it was here that It was decided that the Company was probably in the right town but in the wrong section. It was further noted that enemy was withdrawing and had not detected the presence of the 1st Platoon. It was then decided to push the platoon up to the crossroads in hopes of being able to establish a road block, however, this was not accomplished as the next houses were occupied by the enemy most of whom were asleep. Some of these managed to escape, evidently notifying the tankers. It was not long before enemy tanks were firing direct fire from very close range, into the buildings occupied by the 1st Platoon. It was then learned that the Company had only one bazooka, it had been destroyed by the first round that came through the building. The enemy made no effort to move ground troops against the 1st Platoon’s positions, but continued his direct firing into any building that might be occupied by our troops.
It was evident now that the enemy was withdrawing, as there were vehicles and men continuously on the main road moving to the south. Altogether the Company had six buildings in its possession. It was decided to move the 3rd Platoon into the town to help the 1st Platoon hold its initial gain. The 2nd Platoon and the remainder of the Weapons Platoon were to dig in in the area around the cemetery and protect the flanks and rear. The Company at this time did not have contact with either Charlie Co or battalion headquarters knowing that the battalion had some tanks attached to it, the Company Commander decided to take three men and return to the battalion area for these tanks. It was thought that Charlie Co would be contacted on the return trip, however, no contact was
made and Charlie Co wasn’t in the woods where they were last seen. Moving on through the forest the patrol met Lt Col Neilson who was coming forward with a platoon of tanks. After orienting him on the situation he returned to Bihain to notify Regiment, also to try to locate Charlie Co by radio. The Company Commander and patrol returned with the tanks to a defiladed area in the rear of the 2nd Platoon and detailed a squad from the Platoon as close in protection for the tanks. The Tank Platoon was told to keep their position until being told to move. The Company Commander returned to the 1st Platoon area only to find that in his absence that Charlie Co had finally arrived on the scene. The Company Commander had moved the entire Company into the buildings occupied by Able Co.
By now it was around 0600 and the majority of the enemy force had withdrawn to the woods south of town. Their tanks were still firing at the buildings held by our troops. Since the enemy tanks had withdrawn Able Co pushed across the main road and set up a road block that succeeded in stopping the enemy foot elements. By daylight, Able Co had succeeded in clearing all of Charlie Co sector, realizing that the southern edge of the town was the more important. The Charlie Co Commander refused to assist, in any way, the attack on the town, the Company never moved from the buildings they initially occupied. The 2nd Platoon with the mortar section of Able Co was still in the cemetery area. Around 0800, firing broke out in the tank platoon assembly area this firing appeared to be from friendly weapons. On investigating this firing it was found that the tank platoon was moving from its assembly area toward town. As they moved forward they were firing their weapons to the front. The tank cannons were firing into the buildings occupled by friendly troops. The machine guns were raking the entire area.
As the tanks approached the 2nd Platoon area their machine gun fire killed one man and wounded four. As there was no communication with the tanks there was no way in which to stop them. They moved into town in single file, with one tank at the crossroad and stopped, at this moment they were taken under fire by enemy tanks in the edge of the forest about 600 yards south of the town. Four of these tanks were knocked out immediately, the other managed to get under cover behind one of the buildings. As the tanks were moving into town they must have been observed by the enemy. Just at this time enemy artillery began to fall into the town along with direct fire from tanks and self-propelled guns. This barrage was one of the most terrific that Able Co had ever encountered. This fire also was very accurate. This put both companies in a cross fire, the enemy from the south and friendly tanks from the northwest. Movement of any kind in the town was now impossible. The enemy fire continued until after the four tanks had been knocked out. After that, terrific barrages, came at irregular intervals throughout the day. This artillery greatly hampered the movements of Able Co and it wasn’t until 1120 that all buildings had been cleared and contact made with the 329-IR.
This contact was made with a patrol from the 2/329-IR. At 1300, January 12, 1945, the town of Langlire was officially reported to Division Headquarters as being cleared of all enemy troops. At 1400, the 2/329-IR relieved the 1st Battalion of responsibility of the defense of Langlire. The Battalion remained in the town awaiting its next mission. Evacuation of the wounded had been impossible sines there was no means available to do so. The aid station being in Bihain was over 2000 yards away. No litter bearers were made available to the assault companies and the only medical personnel present were the aid men with the Company. These aid men did a wonderful job with their limited amount of supplies, they had to carry morphine syrettes under their arm pits to keep them from freezing.
Able Co had thirty-four wounded men in Langlire that could not be evacuated due to the intense artillery fire from the enemy. These men weren’t evacuated until late in the afternoon and then by an armored ambulance borrowed from an armored unit in the area. Casualties for Able Co for this operation was thirty-five wounded, one killed. Several men were evacuated within the next 84 hours due to exhaustion, frozen feet and hands.