Document source: Engagements of Panzer Brigade 107, September and October 1944, by Generalleutnant Friedrich Sixt, (English translation provided by C. Awender), Historical Division, Foreign Military Studies Branch, Karlsruhe, Germany, June 11, 1954. A research of Oberstleutnant Berndt-Joachim Frhr.v.Maltzahn and with additional information from the Kreigsstagebuch (War Diary] of OB West.
Prélude
In summer of 1944, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) ordered the formation of a number of independent tank brigades out of non-combat ready formations which were withdrawn from the front for reforming or refreshing. The purpose was to have new tank formations immediately ready.
One of these brigades was the Panzer Brigade 107 under the command of Maj Berndt-Joachim von Maltzahn. Early in September 1944, the brigade reached combat readiness on the Eastern Prussian training ground Mielau and was transported west by rail. At this time the brigade was supposed to be transported to the area of Aachen (Germany). The Allied air landings in Holland on September 17, changed the destination to Venlo (Holland) via Bocholt (Germany).
(1) HQ Company: 1 reconnaissance platoon in half-tracks; 1 scout platoon with kettenkrads and volkswagens; 1 light flak platoon and 1 signal platoon in half-tracks. (2) Tank Battalion: HQ detachment with HQ company and flak platoon; 3 tank companies, each with 11 Panther (MK V); 1 Sturmgeschütze company with 11 JgPz IV. (3) Armored Infantry Battalion: HQ detachment with HQ company (half-tracked); 5 infantry companies in half tracks. (4) Armored Engineer Company: 2 Engineer platoons (half tracked) and 1 flamethrower platoon (half tracked).
Report of Obtslt. von Maltzahn, May 1954, about the actions on September 18, 1944, after the arrival in Venlo
In the early morning respectively in the night of September 17/18, the first transport train with the HQ Detachment (Führungsstaffel) and some command vehicles arrived in Venlo. There was nobody at the train station except some railway officials. There was no information about the situation. It was also not possible to gather information about the plans for the brigade from the units that were digging in around Venlo.
Finally it was possible to get contact to the headquarter of Generaloberst Kurt Student by phone. The brigade commander received order to report at the HQ of LXXXVI.A.K. in the Hillenraad Castle, east of Roermond which the brigade was subordinated. Immediately the commander drove there to establish contact. Chief of staff, Oberst v.Wißmann, informed him about the current situation. At this opportunity the commander asked not to divide the brigade, bring it into action as one unit and not before all elements of it have arrived. This was granted to the brigade commander. During the early day it was possible to contact the commanding general v.Obstfelder.
The unloading was constantly disturbed by enemy fighter bomber attacks and it was important to set up the brigade under cover around Venlo. After the brigade commander had been back to Venlo for two hours (HQ in the railway station building), an aide to the commanding staff (Ordonnanzoffizier) that could be tasked with hand delivering important orders of the LXXXVI.A.K arrived with the order to take Eindhoven with the available elements of the brigade. The second transport train was unloading while the third train waited outside the station.
As it was allowed to load only 8 Panzer V on one tank-transport-train, the trains were loaded with a mixture of elements of the brigade. At the time the order arrived no company was completely ready for action. The commander called the Korps and after explaining the situation the order was cancelled. In the evening of September 18, the brigade received another order. It was ordered to attack Son and take the bridge at Son with all elements that had arrived by that morning. As the supply elements of the brigade have not arrived yet the commander requested that the Korps had to take care of providing enough fuel for the attack. The Korps granted this to the brigade but was not able to deliver even one liter of fuel. The fuel was taken from all available trucks including administration trucks.
Report about the actions of Pz.Brig.107 against Son and Veghel by Gen Kurt Student.
On this especially hard battle day for the 101st Airborne Division, the fight for base at Son on September 19, at 1715, suddenly German shells hit Son and German tanks surprisingly appeared like ghosts in the south of the new Bailey-bridge. It was the fresh Panzerbrigade 107, the name of the commander wich was Maj.v.Plüskow, was unknown to me at this time, with 40 tanks and a mounted parachute-infantry battalion which FM Walther Model moved from the Rhineland to Venlo.
The leading group of tanks fired on the school building of Son where, at this moment, was the HQ of Gen Maxwell D. Taylor was located. In this situation, the battle took an unexpected and dramatic turn confronting the 59.Infantry-Division and the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (101-A/B) around Veghel and Schijndel, 7 km west of Son. As the US attacked from three sides on Schijndel made good progress and reached its peak, on midday of September 22, suddenly German shells hit Veghel which was just defended by weak enemy forces. The Panzer Brigade 107 turned from Son east via Gemert and Erp and appeared – again totally surprisingly for the enemy – at Veghel.
The Army Group (Heeresgruppe) reinforced the brigade with additional Parachute Infantry (Fallschirmjäger), and an SS-Battalion, the 10.SS-Panzerjäger-Battalion commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer Roestel and equipped with Pz.Jg.IV tank destroyers. All the personnel were subordinated to the Kampfgruppe Walther, the former commander of the 4.Fallschirmjäger-Regiment. The mentioned parachute-infantry elements as well as the SS-battalion belonged now to the Kampfgruppe commanded by Oberst Walther.
Gen Taylor immediately stopped the attack on Schijndel and ordered his troops back to Veghel. Additionally clear-text radio messages were intercepted calling for reinforcements from Grave and Nijmegenwhich weakened the forces around Arnheim. Detachment Walther was able to cut off the corridor east of Veghel in heavy fighting for 2 days. The town and the bridges remained in enemy hands. West of Veghel the entire supply flow for Nijmegen and Arnheim stopped. On September 23, heavy fighter-bomber attacks were conducted on the German troops. The commander of Pz.Brig.107 was killed Maj.v.Plüskow was killed on September 23. On September 24, Kampfgruppe Walther had to be withdrawn mainly because British forces advanced via Helmond and Asten.
Engagements of the brigade at Son and the withdrawing battle to the Zuid-Willems Canal, September 18/21 1944
In the early morning of September 18, the first 17 transport trains with the HQ Detachment (Führungsstaffel) of the Panzer Brigade 107 arrived in Venlo. The commander of the brigade received orders from 1.Fallschirmjäger.Army (Fs.AOK 1) by radio that the brigade was to be subordinated to the 86.Korps (Gen.Kdo.LXXXVI.A.K.), HQ in Castle Hillenraad, northeast Roermond. Immediately, he reported there and was informed by the chief of staff about the landings in the area Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnheim. He reported about the brigade and asked not to bring the brigade into action before all elements have arrived. Nevertheless the corps commander, Gen.v.Obstfelder, felt impelled by the situation in the evening of September 18 to order the attack on Son, about 50 km northwest of Venlo, with the already arrived elements and with the objective to take and hold the village and the bridge across the canal south of it.
As of midnight, 8 trains had arrived in Venlo and unloaded under frequent attacks by enemy aircraft. The commander of the brigade sent the unloaded elements immediately towards Helmond according to the Korps order. Because the supply elements were missing, the supply with fuel was difficult and he asked for improvisation. In the morning of September 19, the Operation Staff (Führungsstab), the Panzergrenadier-Battalion less 2 companies, the Panzerabteilung, less 2 companies, and the Panzer-pioneer Company were heading towards Helmond. The reconnaissance platoon had not arrived yet and was replaced by an improvised unit.
There were no incidents until Helmond. There, the brigade assembled and started to advance towards Son. Because of the misty weather the advance was easier in the coverless terrain. After capturing two enemy reconnaissance squads the brigade reached the canal south of Son surprising the enemy and started to take the village and bridge under fire. The bridge was blown up but the enemy had built a bridge near it. The weather cleared up. The terrain on both sides of Dommel and at the canal was partly swamp which hindered the movements of the armored vehicles. Some tanks bogged down and were unable to be freed until the night of September 19/20. It was not possible to advance up to the bridge against the enemy anti-tank defense. The commander of the brigade only able to secure the currently occupied area south of the canal and cut off the road in and south of Son by fire.
In the early morning of September 20, heavy enemy artillery and tank fire hit the brigade. According to the KTB OB West the ordered attack on the crossing between 0500 and 0600 did not begin. In the coverless terrain the troops were forced to withdraw from the big road and the canal; and during the withdrawal, several armored vehicles had to be blown up because of lack of fuel. In the evening the KTB OB West states that the attack of Pz.Brig.107 against Son and the line Nederwetten-Nunen failed and that it received order to build a expanded bridgehead west of Helmond. In May 1954 Oberstlt v.Maltzahn reports: ‘The brigade was ordered to secure the withdrawal of infantry units from the area west of Helmond for the rest of day, September 20, and the next day’. Because of the absence of further documents it is not possible to determine the actual order the brigade received for September 20/21. During the day the rest of the brigade which unloaded in the evening of September 19 in Venlo, arrived at the brigade. It was fighting west of Helmond until the evening of September 21. Then it withdraw across the bridge in Helmond to the east side of the Zuid Willemsvaart. The commanding general of the LXXXVI.A.K. visited the brigade and said that it is planed to subordinate the brigade to Kampfgruppe Walther east of the canal in the morning of September 22. It seems that the western part of Helmond fell into enemy hands and the bridge destroyed immediately after the last elements of the brigade crossed the bridge. The entry in the KTB OB West that the bridgehead west of Helmond was lost shows up in the evening report of September 22.
The attack on Veghel, September 22/24 1944
During the night of September 21/22, the commander of the Panzerbrigade contacts the commander of Kampfgruppe Walther who arrived at Deurne. He informed the commander that the British XXX Corps advancing from the south managed to establish contact with the air-landed US forces. The main object now was to cut the enemy supply and advance route of Eindhoven – Nijmegen. Kampfgruppe Walther, with subordinated Pz.Brig.107, received orders from the LXXXVI.A.K to attack Veghel and the bridge southwest across the Zuid Willems canal and destroy it on September 22. Immediately Maj.v.Maltzahn received order to move the brigade without delay to Gemert via Deurne-Bakel, reconnoiter via Erp towards Veghel and via Boekel towards Volkeland, and assemble around Erp to attack 
on Veghel. After securing the Aa River bridge in Erp and hasty preparation the brigade started to attack on both sides of the road Erp-Veghel at 1100. The panzer abteilung led the way on the north side of the road, followed by the panzergrenadier battalion and the panzer pioneer company on the south side of the road. Documents about the organisation and the attack sector of the brigade, the location of the battalions and the artillery battalion of Kampfgruppe Walther are not available.
The weather was rainy, the terrain unfavourable and splattered dotted with wet meadows. The attack, supported by artillery of Kampfgruppe Walther made good progress to the south of Veghel, where German tanks advanced up to within 500 M of the bridge. The enemy seemed to be surprised but defended Veghel with AT-guns and tanks. Later the day he brought in infantry reinforcements and positioned superior artillery forces. The brigade was not able to enter the village. Several attempts of the panzer pioneer company to take the bridge across the Aa River failed and the bridge was not destroyed. A further night attack on Veghel failed. The casualties of the brigade were serious.
On September 23, the day brought better weather. Enemy ground-attack aircraft participated in the battle. The well-equipped antiaircraft assets of the brigade proved their worth. Another attack in the morning of the 23 from south of Veghel was repelled by the enemy. The commander of the panzer abteilung, Maj v.Plüskow was killed and 4 tanks were lost. Artillery activity on both sides increased. The panzergrenadier battalion repelled an enemy tank attack after a counter-attack in which the battalion commander, Hauptmann Wild was also killed. The enemy reinforcements expanded the frontline of the brigade nearly to Boekel.
From 1700 on the situation for the brigade and Kampfgruppe Walther got more serious because of enemy air landings between Volkel and Erp and between the road Erp-Veghel and the canal west of it; beyond the canal at Beek enemy movements were spotted. At the same time enemy tanks advanced along the road Uden-Boekel and from Veghel towards the brigade.
The threat was neutralised after the involvement of one battalion and the Tank Destroyed Battalion (Panzerjäger Abteilung) of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division which also attached to Kampfgruppe Walther but arrived have just arrived that afternoon. Within the Kampfgruppe the brigade defended the line Boekel-Erp until the evening.
On September 24, heavy the enemy brought heavy pressure especially on the panzer abteilung. The main effort of the enemy was located on the eastern wing where the panzer pioneer company was in action. The situation was very dangerous as enemy forces from the British VIII Corps advanced from Asten and took Deurne in the back of the brigade around noon. The brigade had to pull back to the line Handel-Aa bridge, halfway between Erp and Gemert. The brigade HQ moved to Gemert. During the night to the 24, the brigade received order from Kampfgruppe Walther, to stop engagements and move to Oploo into the northern sector of the Venlo Bridgehead developing there.
In the morning of September 25, the brigade brook contact with the enemy and moved from Gemert through the Groote Moorland on a path reconnoitered before into the ordered area. The enemy did not disturb the movement because the movement was hidden by the moorland terrain.
