Argentina, the German Fourth Reich (Holger M. Meding)

The Argentine mission in Rome organized the illegal transfer, ordered entry permits in Buenos Aires, produced Argentine passports bearing the original names and took care of the air travel. Through this path, dozens of former employees of Tetschen-Bodenbach and Peenemünde weapons plants reached the Rio de la Plata. Dr. Kleiner, who had taken part in the development of the intermediate-range VI and V2 missiles, was received personally by President Peron (48). After the war leading figures in Argentina’s German community wanted to help German expellees. In cooperation with Argentine Immigration, a young German-Argentine, Carlos Werner Eduardo Schulz, was sent to Sweden in the middle of 1947 (49). There, Schulz decided whom he wanted to let in and the Direction de Migraciones issued, without any further check, entry permits. After this, the Argentine consulate handled the visas. Many traveled with, a false identity. What was often assumed to be a worldwide Nazi escape organization was in reality the variety of immigration routes that originated from Argentina. At last, Schulz was arrested by the Swedish police, who connected him with illegal emigration and the forging of passports. But nothing was proven, and Schulz left the country on board the sailing ship Falken.

Frequently, transportation was very uncomfortable. Those who were not able to pay for an airplane ticket or passage on an ocean liner and those who wanted to avoid the risk of a personal check made their way to Buenos Aires on sailboats, small motorboats, and even tugboats. The most adventurous story is that of the Falken which, followed by Soviet submarines and nearly destroyed by storms, reached Buenos Aires six months after departure (50). There were other routes besides those via Italy and Scandinavia. Some scientists arrived by airplane from Switzerland, and former diplomats of the German Embassy (51) came via Spain. Some who were being hunted worldwide, such as SS-Untersturmführer Walter Kutschmann, also used the Spanish escape route.

After arriving in Buenos Aires, newcomers were registered by the Direction de Migraciones. Eyting came in as a Croat, Tank, and Kleiner as Argentines, Kutschmann as a Spanish priest, and Adolf Eichmann as an Italian. According to Argentine law, ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) from Eastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula were registered with the nationality of their native country, i.e. someone born in Klausenburg, Rumania was automatically considered Rumanian, someone originating from Fünfkirchen, Hungary was Hungarian, an inhabitant of Laibach, Yugoslavia was Yugoslavian and someone from Engels in the former Volga German republic came in as a citizen of the USSR. In other words, Argentine statistics on German post-war immigration are practically worthless. In documenting these numbers of Germans and ethnic Germans it is possible to make only estimates and projections. The following table shows the entry and exit of Germans and Austrians according to statistics of the Direction de Migraciones, Buenos Aires:

Between 1945 and 1955 approximately 80.000 Germans and Austrians entered Argentina, including repeated counting, but only 61.000 left the country. Therefore there remained 19.000 people of German and Austrian origin at that time in Argentina (52). To those officially registered must be added an estimate of those who came in with false identity papers and those with a false nationality, as well as ethnic Germans not included in Argentine statistics and repatriated German-Argentines. Altogether the stream of people of German origin – citizens of the Reich, ethnic Germans, Austrians, repatriated German-Argentines – add up to between 30.000 and 40.000 in the Peron era. Two-thirds of them originated from areas occupied by the Red Army. In the 1950s newcomers represented 10 to 15 percent of the German community at the Rio de la Plata. Of the one to two percent who had fled for political reasons, approximately 50 individuals could expect no mercy or clemency from an Allied or German court. These people had to hide from exposure indefinitely.

Compared to previous waves of immigration, these newcomers were mostly highly-qualified professionals. During wartime, they had to use the most modern techniques, make quick decisions, calculate risks and improvise effectively. Thus they were at an advantage over most native Argentines and were generally able to integrate themselves quickly into this South American country. Leading figures in the German community who had helped create an escape and migration network from Europe to Argentina assisted in the newcomers’ integration. The Argentine republic often paid for transportation and provided funds to highly-qualified scientists to employ them according to their abilities. Organizationally this was often difficult because some areas of science were not yet represented in Argentina, meaning for some scientists neither academic nor military institutions could make use of their expertise in the short run. Therefore, the Museo Argentino de Ciencias Naturales Bernardino Rivadavia, reorganized 80 years before by Herrmann Burmeister, served as an intermediate station for many of them. The museum’s budget was raised considerably by law (53). This enabled the directorate to provide work to immigrant scientists for a transitional period.

(48) Ibidem. (49) Interview with Carlos Schulz, Buenos Aires. (50) Interview with fellow travelers of the Falken. (51) R. Spitzy, So entkamen wir den Alliierten. Bekenntnisse eines Ehemaligen (München, Berlin 1989), p. 18. (52) Direccion de Migraciones, Buenos Aires, Archivo, ‘Extranjeros por nacionalidad. Entradas, salidas y saldo’. Periodo 1938-1947; Periodo 1948-1958. (53) Law No. 12.901, approved by the House of Representatives on December 1, 1946. (54) Testimony of Paul Wittich, from 1950 to 1971 professor at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumän. (56) Luca de Tena, op. cit., p, 86. (57) Letter by Paul Wittich.

For that purpose, the Institut ο National de Investigations Naturales was established as an adjunct to the museum. The institute did not restrict its admission to Germans: Russian, Hungarian and Croatian scholars worked in various departments, although the lingua franca of the institute was German (54). With the institute acting as a liaison, these European specialists eventually obtained positions at universities or in industry. Independent from the Museo and its scientific Institutο, universities developed their own policy of granting professorships to academics from Germany. Especially, the new Universidad National de Tucumän (UNT) actively added Europeans to its teaching staff. In 1950 one-third of its professors came directly from Germany (55). Others taught at the universities of Mendoza, La Plata, Cordoba, and Buenos Aires. Their fields were in the natural sciences and, of course, Germany. Among them were the Nobel Prize laureate in chemistry, Prof. Bergius; the former rector of the University of Vienna, Prof. Menghin, who established Argentine prehistoric research; Prof. Szidat from Königsberg who developed new methods in the field of parasitology; and the nuclear physicist Prof. Gans, also from Königsberg.

In addition, there were outstanding hydrologists, botanists, geologists, chemists, and physicists. ‘The German Government has invested millions of marks into the development of these people, Peron once recounted, ‘we only paid for the airplane ticket’ (56). German scholars were very well-liked in Argentina. The relations between them, the native professors, and the students were generally excellent during the Peron era and beyond. Initial problems with the language were overlooked (57). Altogether, about 100 highly-qualified scientists and about 1000 engineers, technicians, and specialists took advantage of the opportunities offered by Argentina. Peron’s hopes came true: the number of trained engineers multiplied and some of the German professors’ students acquired international reputations.

Argentina’s military sector was modernized by war-experienced German instructors, specialists, and engineers; in military technique, Argentina gained a leading position on the South American continent. Within three years, Kurt Tank’s highly qualified team designed the first operational fighter jet in South America (58). On a technological level, Argentina was beginning to make great strides and Peron’s policy of transformation was creating an impression on the industrialized nations. The general aim of Peronist foreign policy was the strengthening of the Argentine position in the world. Peron’s dream was for Argentina to be the most advanced, the most powerful country in South America. He provided government funds for a research institute to be headed by nuclear physicist Ronald Richter, a former collaborator of the famous Baron Manfred von Ardenne. The project’s goal was to produce energy by nuclear fusion. Peron gave Richter carte blanche to buy the necessary materials.

The Pilot Plant, on Huemul Island on beautiful Nahuel Huapi Lake in Northern Patagonia, became a restricted area (59). On May 24, 1951, at an international press conference, Peron announced in conjunction with Richter that Argentina was prepared to produce atomic energy. Peron claimed that for the first time ever hydrogen fusion had taken place in an Argentine laboratory, and suggested Argentina was working out problems related to producing a hydrogen bomb. This presidential assertion caused a real sensation, especially in the United States and the Soviet Union. Nobody knew exactly what had happened in the Patagonian reactor but, before long, it became clear the news was without foundation, and the physicist apparently had misinterpreted the results of his research. Although Richter recognized early on the erroneous direction of American physicists trying to produce nuclear fusion, he too was unable to produce positive results.

Argentina, however, could ill afford the financial and technological costs of such a large-scale, long-term project. Richter’s considerable scientific ability combined with his wishful thinking made for an unhappy mixture, and he soon fell into disgrace. Beyond the enormous impact of post-war German immigration in the areas of science and technology, the most significant influence was on the Argentine economy. The mostly young immigrants arrived without illusions and were ready to work hard. Those who had vocational training soon found employment. Companies owned by members of the German community, as well as newer organizations established by the Federal Republic of Germany were happy to employ those who was well-trained.

Years later many of them founded their own firms. While Argentina profited enormously from the post-war immigration, industries of the Federal Republic also benefited from the La Plata immigration. Through these people, West German businesses acquired access to Argentine markets from which they had been excluded for nearly ten years. In the 1950s the tradition of German and Argentine cooperation in science and technology got a new start, as did many businesses that had been previously shut out. Post-war immigrants gained a foothold, helping to create a positive climate before West Germany arrived on the scene. Early on the newcomers, e.g. returning crew members of the Graf Spee and veterans of the Waffen-SS, helped each other get through the usual problems of immigrants in a host country. This generally unorganized relief sometimes developed into social institutions, some of which were seen as exclusive political groupings. However, the political involvements of post-war immigrants proved to be insignificant; in politics, they were by and largely unable to articulate their interests in an effective, well-organized manner.

The main arena of political discourse was the German-language press of Buenos Aires (60). The Argentinisches Tageblatt, with its history of the steadfast defense of liberal democratic ideals, fought it out on a daily basis with the Freie Presse, a post-war creation, whose political direction was determined by journalists of the Third Reich. The editor-in-chief was the former press aide of Hitler’s Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels. With a circulation of 30.000 in the 1950s and 60s, the Freie Presse was the largest German-language daily newspaper outside of Europe. The most influential publication of post-war German emigrants worldwide, however, was the monthly Der Weg (61), which was established in 1947 and quickly became the traditional magazine of German-Argentines. Over time it developed into a radically right-wing journal without comparing to the post-war era and served as a forum for various and sometimes conflicting national-socialist, fascist and conservative philosophies.

Der Weg concurred fully with the political and social dogma of the Third Reich, defending Nazi leaders and their policies, including doctrines of racial determination. The magazine had correspondents worldwide and, at its peak, an international circulation of 25.000 – which was but a fraction of its total readership. Der Weg’s influence on German-Argentines was very great indeed. As to the so-called SS-Treasure, its existence has never been proved and appears to have been no more than conjecture as Der Weg and the Freie Presse went bankrupt. If there had been a scheme by underground National Socialists for an ideological comeback, these publications would have assuredly been a primary target of support.

The reasons for the mass emigration of Germans after the Second World War were: the destruction, the misery and insecurity that followed, the expulsions, and the occupation. The reasons for the escape were mainly the fear of condemnation. Argentina became the obvious destination for nearly all those wanting to emigrate because of: a Germanophile president, its neutral stance during the war (but often pro-Axis sympathies), an already substantial German community, and the country’s recruitment of German experts. The mass migration from Germany to Rio de la Plata was not especially organized. Improvisation prevailed. Italy and Scandinavia were the most important avenues of departure. The trip across the Atlantic was often made by extraordinary means, i.e. submarines, sailboats, etc.

Organized routes were initiated by the Argentine government, which was very interested in employing German scientists and other specialists. The benefits were mutual: these highly-trained immigrants, for the most part, acquired well-paid positions plus the chance to work in their field. On the other hand, the specialists saved Argentina years of training and they made a great contribution to the nascent industries of the country. In some academic disciplines, especially the sciences, Argentina caught up with the most advanced countries. Excluding those who were escaping the Allied War Crime Tribunals, many of the causes of the post-war German emigration to Argentina were similar to previous mass movements, exemplifying the sociological characteristics of other migrations, the major difference being that this one was illegal.

The often alleged existence of a clandestine national socialist organization having central command of all escapees and escape routes, with the intent of creating the ‘Fourth Reich’ (62), is without proof to this ay; it should be banished to the realm of legend.

(54) Interview with Walter Sander, Buenos Aires. (55) Testimony of Paul Wittich, from 1950 to 1971 professor at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumän. (56) Luca de Tena, op. cit., p, 86. (57) Letter by Paul Wittich. (58) H. Conradis, op. cit., pp. 345-352. Interviews with members of the construction team. (59) P. Pringle – J. Spigelman, Die Atom-Barone. Die unbekannte Geschichte nuklearen Abenteuers (US-Original) (Zurich 1983), p. 133; concerning the Richter case cf. Μ. Mariscotti, EI secreto atömico de Huemul. Cmnica del origen de la energi’a atömica en la Argentina (Buenos Aires 1987). (60) Cf. Argentinisches Tageblatt (ed.), Argentinisches Tageblatt im 100. Jahrgang (Buenos Aires 1989) and, very aggressive: M. Frank, Die letzte Bastion. Nazis in Argentinien (Hamburg 1962). (61) H. Meeting, Der Weg. Eine deutsche Emigrantenzeitschrift in Buenos Aires, 1947-1957 (Manuscript, Cologne 1988). (62) E.g. Simon Wiesenthal’s hypothesis of the escape organization ODESSA. (The Murderers Among Us. The Simon Wiesenthal Memoirs, New York, Toronto, London, Sidney 1961). (ODESSA – Organisation Der Ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen, (English: Organization of Former SS Members).

RESUMEN

Despues de la Segunda Guerra Mundial Argentina se convirtio en un pais a donde deseaban emigrar muchos alemanes. Argentina les parecia un refugio seguro por su presidente germanofilo, su politica de inmigracion, su comportamiento neutral durante la guerra y por la gran colectividad alemana existente. Para el Presidente de la Nacion, Juan D. Peron, con su deseo de ormar un elenco de tecnicos y cientificos confiables que lo ayudaran a intensificar el proceso de industrialization el objetivo era captar los mäs capacitados de ellos. Por eso el estado argentino organizo la migraciön de miliares de “alemanes utiles” al Rio de la Plata desatendiendo convenios intemacionales. Aunque se haya dicho con frecuencia, no existio ninguna organization nacionalsocialista encargada de dirigir clandestinamente la fuga a Argentina y que hubiera aspirado en aquel pais como fin la erection de un ‘Quarto Reich’.
Con el trabajo de los inmigrados Argentina se pudo enlazar cientificamente en algunos campos con los paises mäs desarrollados, y con la construction de aviones a reaction aun asombro el mundo industrializado. Usando los emigrantes de posguerra como puente la economia germanofederal entro fäcilmente en el mercado argentino, del cual Alemania habia sido excluida desde hace una decada.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Argentinien entwickelte sich nach 1945 zum fast selbstverständlichen Ziel eines Großteils der seinerzeit zahlreichen deutschen Ausreisewilligen: der deutschfreundliche Präsident, dessen forcierte Einwanderungspolitik, das Verhalten des Landes während des Krieges, sowie die starke deutsche Gemeinschaft ließen Argentinien als einladend, zuweilen auch als Refugium erscheinen. Anders als oft gemutmaßt wurde, gab es keine nationalsozialistische Geheimorganisation, welche zentral alle Fluchtbewegungen gesteuert und in Argentinien das Ziel eines Vierten Reiches konsequent verfolgt hätte, sondern es war vornehmlich die Regierung Peron selbst, die aktiv wurde und in der Situation nach Kriegsende ihre Chance erblickte, aus dem zerstörten Deutschland Träger der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Intelligenz an den Rio de la Plata zu bringen. Buenos Aires warb deutsche Experten verschiedenster Fachbereiche an, überführte sie unter Umgehung internationaler Vereinbarungen an den Rio de la Plata und sorgte für eine Einstellung durch staatliche Stellen. Argentinien erreichte durch diesen Zustrom aus Deutschland in einigen Disziplinen Anschluß an den modernen Weltstandard in Wissenschaft und Technik und beeindruckte mit dem Bau von Düsenflugzeugen sogar die industrialisierte Welt. Über die Brücke der Nachkriegsemigranten fand die bundesdeutsche Wirtschaft in den fünfziger Jahren leicht Zugang zum argentinischen Markt, von dem Deutschland mehr als ein Jahrzehnt abgeschnitten war.

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