Gestapo Control (Geheim Stadt Polizei)
by Generaaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff (Scheel)
– a. The prerogative of the Gestapo grew over the course of time so that every free expression of opinion was killed until finally it became unbearable and developed into pure terror. Their methods were protected against any criticism by the enforcement of the utmost secrecy, and who should have furnished the opposition? Every organization that did not belong to the Party was destroyed. The creation of new organizations was made impossible by the far-flung spy system of the Gestapo, which reached into the smallest groups of independent thinkers, even into the officer corps of the Army.
– b. The arrest of relatives, that is the arrest of or trial of wife and children of anyone suspected of guilty which was used more and more as the war progressed – was a specially cruel method opposed to even the simplest rights of men and was designed to quiet the opposition completely (the original states to make them mundtot). Naturally, this had an extraordinarily great effect on morale.
– c. All those who were not connected with the leading circles in the Party, which was the great mass of the German people knew as good as nothing about what was going on behind the curtains of the Gestapo. Now for the first time, with the disclosure of the horror in the concentration camps has the veil been drawn away and an appalling light been thrown on the criminal side of its activity.
Gestapo Control (Geheim Stadt Polizei)
by SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolf
After the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934 the total dictatorship which followed, without any freedom of the press, any possibility of criticism or any necessity to submit important decisions for negotiations to a parliament or other controlling body, led, after some surprising initial successes, not only to a loss of that which had been won but directly to the total destruction of Germany.
Mistakes in Foreign Policy
by Generaaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff (Scheel)
1. The principal questions in this connection were: a. The restoration of German sovereignty over the whole of the Rhineland. b. The reincorporation of Austria into the German Reich, was wanted by both of the countries concerned and had already been attempted once before under a democratic government. c. The restoration of border territories which had been taken from Germany in 1919 when Czechoslovakia and the Polish State were set up, although they were preponderantly inhabited by German settlers; also the return of the purely German city of Danzig. d. In spite of numerous efforts of the previous German government, the League of Nations was never able to affect any sort of discussions, let alone the settlement, of these questions. The fact that Hitler decided on an independent solution with respect to demands Nos. a and b, which affected only German territory was therefore welcomed by the majority of the German people, especially since the conduct of the Allies seemed to give these actions their silent approval. Hider’s domestic position was strengthened to an extraordinary degree precisely because of this attitude of the Allies, especially since the previous democratic government had never been granted any success whatever of this kind. Other countries, therefore, appeared to be in agreement with Hitler’s actions.
2. Later mistakes in foreign policy seemed to me to be as follows: a. Steady intermingling of domestic problems into the field of foreign policy. b. In the question of personnel, that is in the choice of the leaders for the German foreign office and diplomatic corps, to an ever-increasing extent Party membership, not expert knowledge, became the prerequisite. This insufficient knowledge of foreign affairs resulted in an underestimation of the strength and will to fight of foreign powers and created at the same time an overestimation of Germany’s power. Not actual facts but rather wishful thinking became the basis for all decisions affecting foreign policy. Significant in this respect is also the choice of Allies (Italy, Rumania, Finland, Bulgaria) on the basis of a false appreciation of their true worth.
Mistakes in Foreign Policy
by Generalmajor Hans Leyers
1. Hitler basically underrated Russia’s vigor and the stability of the Soviet system. In this respect, however, the following points must be mentioned in his favor: a. The poor showing which Russia had made in the winter campaign in Finland in 1939-40. b. Russia‘s strong isolation and the clever camouflage, applied for years, of the actual potentialities. c. The conflicting news about the stability of the regime.
2. Here, the vast number of experts on local conditions was not available, as in the case of England, the United States, and Italy, could have raised their warning voices from their own experience.
3. On the other hand, Hitler should not have overlooked the danger of the ‘vast spaces’, the undetermined length of a Russian campaign and thereby the danger of a war on two fronts which in the First World War had led to Germany’s collapse. Hitler, who always and on every occasion quoted Clausewitz, should have remembered the passage in which Clausewitz writes that Russia can be beaten on the Oder River, but not on the Volga River.
Mistakes in Foreign Policy
by General der Artillerie Kurt Jahn
– a. Extreme authoritative conduct of the government with no possibility that anyone could interfere with steps being taken or could criticize them. At the same time, foreign policy rested in one man’s hands without accountability to anyone.
– b. Filling positions in the German diplomatic service with untrained Party members rather than with trained diplomats.
– c. The impossible war against the church and the Jews with no regard for the consequences in the field of foreign politics. This undermined the faith of the
people in the German leadership.
– d. Lack of success in coming to an agreement with England on European questions. No serious attempts at peace with England after the end of the French Campaign.
– e. Forcing a solution to the Danzig and Corridor question with the force of arms rather than by diplomatic means through which the treaty obligations of England and France to Poland was thrown into the balance quite needlessly.
– f. Failure to make an honest attempt after the Polish Campaign for an agreement with Russia on the Polish question and to come to peace terms with the other warring countries.
– g. Mixing into Russian affairs in the Near East and in the Balkans.
– h. False appraisal of Italy as an Ally, especially after the experiences of World War I.
– i. Liberation and restoration of Mussolini in Northern Italy after the Italian armistice.
Mistakes Made After the Outbreak of War
by Generaaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff (Scheel)
Political
– a. Hitler’s decision to attack France was opposed by the Commander in Chief of the Army – exactly as had been the previous occupation of Czechoslovakia – along with a majority of his high-ranking officers. The Commander in Chief of the Army was of the opinion that only a continuation of defensive tactics gave any promise of permitting a discussion of peace terms in the foreseeable future. In spite of this, Hitler ordered the attack at last. His surprisingly quick and large success was a misfortune for Germany since it strengthened Hitler and the Party in their belief that Hitler was always right in any discussion with his generals. This was proved by the fact that under Hitler’s leadership the German armed forces had conquered every opponent. The Yugoslavian Campaignand the Greek Campaign, which were won just as quickly, had the same consequences.
– b. In this way, after a boundless overestimation of Germany’s strength, Hitler arrived at the fatal decision to forestall the anticipated Russian attack with an attack of his own. What the military leaders, who had been accused of negative thinking and planning, had feared, quickly showed itself to be true. Practically all of the basic information concerning Russian strength, on which this decision to attack rested, was false and trailed behind the truth to a grotesque degree. Likewise false was the hope of the Party that the Soviet system would crack up after the first strong attack. The opposite showed itself to be true.
Additional mistakes were:
– a. The type of government set up in occupied territories, especially in the east through civil commissioners of the Party. Along with the general attempt to force these countries to set up National Socialist governments – in counter distinction to the formerly expressed official statement that National Socialism is not exportable – likewise belongs to the reinstatement of the Mussolini government, which only complicated the administration of Northern Italy and caused difficulties in domestic policies.
– b. Using force in setting up the workers’ corps instead of using the previous practice which had been much more successful in winning skilled workers by means of favorable contracts (in contrast to this mistake I have heard that the method of handling foreign workers in Germany was on the whole quite good).
– c. Continuing the war at a time when it appeared hopeless. People demand from their top military leaders of a certain stature; that is, they may not chase empty Utopias but rather, when the general the situation forces a sober and critical examination of the situation and reveals that there is no further possibility of conducting the war to a successful conclusion they must face the consequences – that is, either resign from office or effect a rapid conclusion of the war through political negotiations. Hindenburg and Ludendorff acted on this principle in August 1918. Even at the time of the defeats at Stalingrad and Africa, or at the latest after the successful Allied landings in France, it must have been clear to the German High Command that the war was lost for Germany. At that time at the very latest, they should have entered negotiations for an armistice regardless of how difficult the terms were. A continuation of the hopeless war could only have the effect of making these terms worse. Indescribable misery for the German people could have been avoided by responsible action on Hitler’s part. This is an ex post facto realization on my part. At that time those of us in command were told officially again and again that sufficient forces for the complete restoration of the situation were at hand.
Mistakes Made After the Outbreak of War
by Generalmajor Hans Leyers
– a. The necessities of war led to a still more rigid curtailment of the rights of the individual, and above all to a complete exclusion of any sort of criticism and free expression of one’s opinion. The danger of the concentration camp had been big enough in place time; in time of war, a single thoughtless word sufficed to let anyone disappear immediately, for an indeterminate period.
– b. As the war wore on, Hitler more and more withdrew into the circles of the Party whom he knew at the time of his first struggle for power, and in whom alone he thought to be able to repose his trust. Thus, unlimited power was placed into the hands of those people who as a rule were grossly lacking in strength of character. This fact led to excesses in the most varied spheres and at the same time negative attitudes towards the Party in wide circles of the population. The regime, which until the outbreak of war had still been voluntarily supported and approved of by many, became in the course of the war a mere tyranny that during the last years rested almost solely on the bayonets of the SS and the close net of the Gestapo. The following joke, spread in 1944 by way of whispering propaganda, expresses this development most fittingly: The Optimist: We stand to lose the war. The Pessimist: We stand to win the war and keep the Party.
– c. Once the war on two fronts had broken out it did not commence with the landings in Normandy, but already with attacks of the enemy Air Forces on the territory of the Reich. Hitler, instead of concentrating the entire effort on the struggle against Russia, should have recognized that final victory was not to be had and should have bought peace under any conditions, even at the cost of abandoning his own person and of the regime. He could not allow the country to be doomed for a hopeless cause. The stages for the development of such a decision were: 1. The loss of the battle of Moscow, Winter 1941-42; 2. Stalingrad; 3. The loss of Africa, the defection of Italy (ex. abandonment of the Mediterranean Position); 4. Elimination of the U-boat warfare by enemy Air Forces. From that moment onwards, the superior armament potential of the United States could be brought to bear in its totality; 5. The successful landings in Normandy.
– d. The policy pursued in the occupied Eastern Territories – quite aside from humane considerations – corresponded in no way to the interests of the
Reich. If the campaign in the East was to be looked on as a crusade against Communism – and in particular be felt as such by the inhabitants of the Soviet Union – then the policy in the occupied eastern territories had to be worked out accordingly. What was actually done, contrary to these demands, can only be regarded as one of the worst mistakes and inconsistencies of Hitler’s policy.
Mistakes Made After the Outbreak of War
by General der Flieger Maximilian Ritter von Pohl
– a. Hitler’s policy of expediency and the cooperation of most of the Party members.
– b. Cutting the people off from all types of responsibilities; abolishing the freedom of the press.
– c. The Theory of Race and the way in which it was applied.
– d. Opposition to the church and the general moral laxity.
– e. Secret police and the gruesome suppression of all (even if only rumored) political opposition.
– f. Abandoning the independence of the courts.
– g. Overdoing the Fuehrer Princip down to the Ward Heeler (block wart).
– h. Exclusive centralization of administration and economic life.
– i. Militarization of all training; pushing in the background of the family.
Military Mistakes After the Outbreak of War
by Generaaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff (Scheel)
– a. Dunkirk: Premature diversion of German armored divisions which made possible the escape of the English Army.
– b. Air war against England with insufficient force and without clear objectives having military value.
– c. Campaign Against Russia: The winter attack of 1941 against Moscow during which there was a lack of winter equipment. It would have been preferable simply to hold a winter defense line. The summer attack of 1942 against the Ukraine and the Caucasus, spreading the forces too thin, a complete lack of any coordinated attack; the purpose of the attack greatly exceeded the strength of available forces. Stalingrad, complete failure of air support.
– d. African Campaign: Likewise no clearly defined final objective. Plans greatly exceeded available strength and supply facilities.
– e. From the fall of 1942 the general guiding principle – strongpoint or strength of pearls strategy. That is, that the whole of occupied Europe should be defended at its borders by a continuous line of strong points. To build and man these far-flung defenses naturally meant that they were all too weak to withstand a strong enemy attack. For the same reasons, reserves could only be provided in insufficient quantities. The strong points had to be held even though they were bypassed on both sides. In this way, there were unnecessarily large losses with no corresponding military gain.
– f. Building the Atlantic Wall without providing a strategic secondary defense line in rear areas. This was indicative of the same basic mistaken thinking of the top command.
– g. Far-Reaching Divisions of the Command: Creation of a special section of the Army for Himmler and the Luftwaffe for Goering. Using paratroopers as pure infantry and creating Luftwaffe infantry divisions merely because of a mistrust of the Army generals. These troops were under the command of Army commanders only for tactical purposes. In every other respect, they were under the command solely of Himmler or in some cases Goering. The Army commanders had no disciplinary jurisdiction over the troops.
– h. The same lack of confidence was responsible for naming the Gauleiters as Reich-Defense commissars with large military prerogatives. The creation of the Volkssturm or in some cases the werewolves by the head of the SS can, considering the military situation at that time be described only as military insanity and as a crime against the people. The Army troops rejected these ideas to a man.
Military Mistakes After the Outbreak of War
by General der Flieger Maximilian Ritter von Pohl
– a. Abandonment of the development of air attack weapons against sea targets.
– b. Neglect of the Luftwaffe Force and especially its tactical development after 1942.
– c. The diversion of military assignments to other organizations such as Sturmabteilung (SA), the Organization Todt, or in some instances, Speer and the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK).
– d. Missing the opportunity of securing industrial installations against air attack in sufficient time when the growing air supremacy of the enemy was recognized.
– e. The abandonment of the invasion of England.
– f. Excess demands made on the Luftwaffe during the attacks on England from which it never completely recovered.
Military Mistakes After the Outbreak of War
by General der Artillerie Kurt Jahn
– a. Military leaders were not strong enough to oppose the Fuehrer and the Party. Insufficient attention was paid to their advice. The Party decided many things over the heads of the armed forces. Increasing suppression of the officer corps because of suspicion and lack of confidence. Unsympathetic and difficult commanders disappeared immediately, resulting finally in the arrest of near relatives.
– b. Lack of unified strong command of the armed forces. The Fuehrer should have refrained from military command and have concerned himself solely with matters of state, supported by competent experts.
– c. The attack on Russia against the advice of all experts was a mistake, especially since the campaign in the West was still going on and there was no peace with England.
– d. Completely false appraisal of Russian military and economic strength.
– e. The winter campaign of 1941 against Moscow despite contrary advice of most of the troop commanders.
– f. Spreading forces too thinly during the attack on Stalingrad in 1942 simultaneously with the attack in the Caucasus.
– g. Failure to prepare defensive positions in rear areas in Russia.
– h. Complete failure to appreciate the importance of Russian Partisan activities; the same later in other countries, especially in Italy.
– i. Strong-point tactics and failure to retreat to the point of sacrifice. The fact that retreat from the front was always ordered too late after the enemy break-throughs sacrificed the best troops and destroyed confidence in their leaders.
– j. After the failure of the German counterattack in the West, December 1944, the front should have been withdrawn and the war ended.
The Personality of the Fuehrer
by SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolf
– a. Since the introduction of this type of government (dictatorship), everything stood or fell with the personality of the Fuehrer. With all regard to his positive qualities and accomplishments, one has to acknowledge the following shortcomings and in some instances mistakes on his part: Lack of inborn
gentility, lack of education, character, and personal knowledge of foreign countries. This lack of personal knowledge of foreign countries did not enable him to realize the consequences of his ungentlemanly conduct (his sensational breaking of the Munich Agreement 1938); he surrounded himself with followers some of whom were definitely inferior; nor the true strength, ability to resist, and superiority of England. The appointment of Ribbentrop as the German Ambassador to London (giving the Nazi salute before H. M. King of England) and later as Foreign Secretary had disastrous consequences.
– b. He overestimated his own powers and underestimated those of his enemies. Likewise, within Germany he instigated nonsensical attacks against all established powers: Communism, Social Democracy, Evangelical and Catholic Churches, the Jews, Free Masonry, large landowners, capitalists, nobility, and branches of the armed forces. And within his own party, attacks of the SS against the SA (30 June 1934), the SS against the armed forces (Blomberg Fritch crisis of February 1938), and the SS against the Gauleiters after the attack on the Fuehrer of 20 July 1944 all resulted in moral bankruptcy (terror instead of law) and disaster.
– c. False education of the youth, absurd songs, enormous retrogression in the education and knowledge of German youth as well as for all German arts and sciences which had formerly been world-renowned but virtually disappeared after the universities were taken over by the Party can be laid principally at Hitler’s door.
– d. He was responsible for overdoing the so-called Spirit of Prussia – deifying Frederick the Great. The ideal: as far as possible to have every German man and every German girl, even in peacetime, in uniform, training for unquestioning obedience.
