Dragon's Teeths in Reinforced Concrete

Late in the evening of September 12, Gen Schack issued an order to his divisions that defined their assigned West Wall sectors and outlined the further conduct of the operations. The 116.Panzer-Division was charged with defending the city of Aachen. The Kampfkommandant of Aachen with attached troops were subordinated to the 116.Panzer-Division as were all elements of the 353.Infantry-Division and the 526.Reserve-Division in the sector. The 8.Luftwaffe, the 12.Luftwaffe and the 19.Luftwaffe Battalions as well as the 453.Grenadier-Training-Battalion (253.Grenadier-Training-Regiment). The armored elements of the 116.Panzer-Division were to fall back to the West Wall only in the face of superior American pressure while the attached forces would move into the fortifications ahead of the main body in order to complete the improvement of the positions. The 9.Panzer-Division, with attached remaining elements of the 105.Panzer-Brigade, were assigned to the defense of the sector between the 116.Panzer-Division and the boundary with the LXXIV Corps (Stolberg Corridor and the northern part of the Wenau Forest). All elements of the 353.Infantry-Division and the 526.Reserve-Division in this sector of the West Wall were attached to the 9.Panzer-Division. These were the Hqs of the 253.Grenadier-Training-Regiment (Col Feind), the 328.Reserve-Training-Battalion and the 473.Reserve-Training-Battalion. The division was authorized to withdraw its organic elements to the West Wall only in the face of overwhelming American attacks. In the West Wall, the main effort of resistance would center around the roads leading toward the fortifications from the south and southeast. The divisions were ordered to station strong outposts forward of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR), equipped with heavy infantry weapons and antitank guns, who were to do all in their power to delay the American advance.

Nazi OrderSep 15/16 1944, LXXXI Korps to 9.Pz Div 1500, Sep 15, LXXXI Korps KTB
Kampfverlauf; Sitrep, 9.Pz Div to LXXXI Korps;
September 16, 1944, LXXXI Korps KTB, Meldungen der Div

The geographic location of the 9.Panzer-Division sector fated this division to bear the brunt of the Battle of the Stolberg Corridor. Never possessed of organic elements sufficient for an adequate defense, the division also sustained very heavy losses in this action Thus it had to be shored up regularly by all kinds of reinforcements, sometimes of a very dubious value. The designation 9.Panzer-Division became a collective term for a veritable hodgepodge of unrelated armor, antitank, infantry, and artillery units. In the sectors of the 116.Panzer-Division and the 9.Panzer-Division this outpost line was to extend from the west of Gemmenich – the west of Hauset – and to the east of Raeren to the west of Roetgen. The 353.Infantry-Division received orders to relinquish control of the Scharnhorst Line and all elements committed there to the 116.Panzer-Division and the 9.Panzer-Division. Three Land Battalions, the 1/9, the 2/6, and the 3/6, remained temporarily attached to 353.Infantry-Division for special assignments. (Land Battalions 1/9 and 3/6 were attached to the 9.Panzer-Division two days later).

Sir Winston Churchill visits the Siegfried line with FM Sir Bernard Montgomery, Gen Sir Alan Brooke and Gen William Simpson

Following its arrival in the LXXXI Corps zone the anxiously awaited 394.Assault-Gun-Brigade (six or seven assault guns) was to assemble in the vicinity of Brand. In corps reserve, this assault gun brigade would be ready to participate on short notice in counter-attacks with both, the 116. and the 9.Panzer-Divisions. The Artillery Group Aachen, composed of the artillery regiments of the 116.PD and the 353.ID and the Flak Group Aachen were placed under the command of Col Pean, CO of the 116.Panzer-Artillery-Regiment, and received orders to collaborate closely with the 49.ID, the 116.PD and the 9.PD in coordinating its fire with the main effort of defense.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, LXXXI Corps to all Divs;
at 2230, on Sep 12 44
LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div

The night from September 12 to September 13 passed quietly. During the small hours of the morning, the 8., the 12., and the 19.Luftwaffe-Fortress-Battalions were attached to the Kampfkommandant of Aachen in order to be committed at daybreak in a counterattack against the American penetration of the Scharnhorst Line on the Brandenberg Hill south of Aachen.
At 0600, September 13, the 116.Panzer-Division and the 9.Panzer-Division assumed command of their new West Wall sectors. With some local defense units in the front line, Gen von Schwerin disengaged the organic forces of the 116.Panzer-Division badly in need of regrouping and some rest in order to assemble them in the RichterichWurselen area northeast of Aachen. That move made it impossible to commit these forces against the penetration on the Brandenberg Hill before the afternoon. In addition, if the enemy continued to advance and exploit his success, which had to be expected in any event, he could not be prevented from entering the town oh Aachen from the south by noon.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944
(Schwerin); Tagesmeldungen, 116. Pz Div
Sep 13 44, LXXXI Corps KTB

During the same night of Sept 12 to Sept 13, the city of Aachen had been in the grip of chaos. Since Gen von Schwerin was to assume control on Sept 13, he drove into Aachen the evening before on the way to his command post at Laurensberg. He found the population in panic. It was the picture Hitler had made all too familiar in Europe, but now for the first time, the shoe was on the other foot. Women, with small children and babies, had loaded their last possessions on small hand carts and prams and walked into the night without having any idea where to go; they were driven only by fear and the threats of the Party that every person who did not leave the town would be shot as a traitor. Stirred by humane motivations and worried about the effect of the panic and the jammed roads on the morale and mobility of his troops, von Schwerin decided to put an immediate stop to the disorganized flight. When he sent his officers out to contact the police with orders to halt the evacuation, they returned to him with the shocking news that the cowards of the entire police force and all government and Party officials had left Aachen; not one police station was occupied.

War Correspondent Lee Miller visiting the Siegfried Line

Thereupon, Gen von Schwerin took matters into his own hands. He sent his officers out once more to persuade the frantic populace to return to their homes. In so doing he exposed himself to the grave charge of having countermanded a Fuehrer order commanding the evacuation of Aachen. On the morning of September 13, the city was nearly calm again for the time being all signs of panic had disappeared. All buildings housing the Party and municipal administration were deserted. South of the city, Kampfkommandant Col von Osterroth launched another counter-attack against the American penetration at Brandenberg. Osterroth’s attempt of the night before to restore the situation had failed. The Americans were now in possession of the Bunkers #160 and #161 and were feeding additional forces into their salient. All morning attempts by the weak forces under the command of Col von Osterroth to seal off the penetration remained inconclusive.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13, 1944
(Schwerin); (7. Armee to LXXXI Corps);
1140 on Sep 13 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf

As mentioned above, Gen von Schwerin’s organic forces were executing a maneuver that prevented them from participating in the fighting southwest of Aachen before late afternoon. He believed that the American penetration at the Brandenberg Hill would develop into a main effort attack against the city, and he knew that the Luftwaffe battalions would be no match for their opponents. Convinced that the Americans would have Aachen occupied in a matter of hours, von Schwerin privately thought this the best solution for the old city. After much searching through empty public buildings, von Schwerin finally found one man still at his post, an official of the telephone service. To him, Gen Schwerin entrusted a letter, written in English, which the official promised to take to the commanding officer of the American forces as soon as they had occupied Aachen. The letter read as follows: (Schwerin); I stopped the absurd evacuation of this town; therefore, I am responsible for the fate of its inhabitants and I ask you, in the case of the occupation by your troops, to take care of the unfortunate population in a humane way. I am the last German Commanding Officer in the sector of Aachen.

In desiring to spare Aachen the terrors of becoming a battleground, von Schwerin deviated sharply from Hitler’s avowed determination to turn the city of Charlemagne into a fortified stronghold where each house would be fanatically defended to give the Allies a foretaste of what to expect inside Germany.

US Troops crossing the West Wall

Meanwhile, however, the tactical situation had changed. Gradually it dawned on the Germans that the Americans were not going to exploit their opportunity to walk into Aachen but that they intended, rather, to envelop the city by driving up the Stolberg Corridor in the direction of Eschweiler. By noon, on September 13, von Osterroth’s men had finally succeeded in sealing off the American salient south of Aachen. Col von Osterroth thought he could hold the line against the American tanks of the assault guns of 394.Assuault-Gun-Brigage just detrained at the Aachen-Nord RR Station could be committed against them the LXXXI Corps ordered the 116.Panzer-Division to wipe out the American penetration at the Brandenberg Hill at all costs. Unwillingly, von Schwerin ordered his division, which had just arrived in the RichterichWurselen assembly area, to turn around, march back to the other end of Aachen and assemble there for the counter-attack. Although some replacements had arrived in the morning, and the battalions had an average strength of about three hundred men, the fighting power of the division was still low. Only about thirty tanks and assault guns were operationally fit, and the troops were tired and battle weary.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, (von Osterroth);
Tagesmeldungen, 116. Pz Div, 1315 13 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps KTB Meldungen der Div. Rad; (LXXXI Corps to the 116. Pz Div) 1230 13 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf

Von Schwerin ordered the 156.Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment to march through the city while the 60.Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment bypassed Aachen on its southern periphery. At 1600, the division jumped off against the American salient at the Brandenberg Hill.

Nazi OrderSep 13 1944, Tagesmeldungen (116. Pz Div)
13 Sep 44
LXXI Corps KTB, Kamnfverlauf

It made some headway against American armored recon which had advanced to the outskirts of the city. The armor withdrew to the break in the German MLR, and the 116.Panzer-Division was able to close the gap, without attempting to recapture the American-held pillboxes after darkness had set in.

German casualties

Nazi OrderSeptember 13/14/15 1944; Rad; (116. Pz Div to LXXXI Corps) 2235 13 Sep 44; LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div. ApB, 0100 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen, Tagesmeldungen, 1.IX. 15.X.44. Referred to hereafter as A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen

US 3-ADShortly after noon, on September 13, the US 3-AD resumed its drive up the Stolberg Corridor. South of Rott the Americans cracked a number of bunkers and at 1225, achieved their penetration of the German MLR. American armor advanced up the road toward Rott, filling in the antitank craters in its path.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, 9. Pz Div to LXXXI Corps;
1225 13 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps KTB
Kampfverlauf

Less than an hour later US forces were within one mile of Rott, and the 9.Panzer-Division mustered all its available forces for a counter-attack to be launched from Kornelimuenster. Gen Mueller asked the LXXXI Corps Operations Officer to move all available corps reserves to Kornelimuenster.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, Gen Mueller to LXXXI Corps;
1340 13 Sep 44
LXXXI Corps KTB Kampfverlauf

VII CorpsRealizing that the Stolberg Corridor, rather than the Aachener Stadtforst (Aachen Municipal Forest south of the city), was the scene of the US VII Corps main effort in his sector, Gen Schack ordered the 116.Panzer-Division to transfer half the assault guns of the 394.Assault-Gun-Brigade to the 9.Panzer-Division at Kornelimuenster.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, LXXXI Corps to 9. Pz Div;
1420 13 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps to the 116. Pz Div, 1430 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB
Kampfverlauf

American troops advance through a hole in the Siegfried Line, October 1944

US 3-ADThe US 3-AD drive up the Stolberg Corridor was in two-pronged, with one group attacking in the direction SchleckheimKornelimuenster, while the other, attacked toward Rott and Mulartshuette. At 1630, ten American tanks appeared before Rott while other US forces had already bypassed the village and were located east thereof. Hqs and Hqs Co of the 9.Panzer-Division sped to Rott in an effort to hold the line there. Other forces of the division attempted to screen off Mulartshuette by means of obstacles and demolitions. In the early afternoon, American tanks and infantry penetrated a German strong point south of Schleckheim and continued their advance toward that village.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, LXXXI Corps to the 9. Pz Div; at 1630 on the 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. LXXXI Corps to the 9. Pz Div; at 1730 on the 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. LXXXI Corps to the 9. Pz Div; at 1420 on the 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf

US 3-ADA race was now on between US armor and three assault guns of the 394.Assault-Gun-Brigade driving on Kornelimuenster from different directions. At 1600, eight American tanks were observed on the road from Nuetheim to Kornelimuenster. The German assault guns were expected in Kornelimuenster at 1800. They arrived on schedule and a battalion of the 9.Panzer-Division, reinforced by these three assault guns and a few 75-MM AT guns that the division had picked up, began to establish a line of resistance from the northern periphery of Schleckheim via the northern edge of Nuetheim to the southern periphery of Kornelimuenster. Of the first eight US tanks, four were knocked out by Panzerfaust, but fifteen more tanks wheeled off to right and left in an effort to roll up the 9.Panzer-Division line.

Nazi OrderSeptember 13 1944, LXXXI Corps to the 9. Pz Div;
1830 13 Sep 44
LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf

At 1845, fifteen US tanks broke through the line of bunkers and dragons teeth at Oberforstbach while American infantry advanced along the road north of the Aachen Reservoir (LangfeldNuetheimKornelimuenster). Five American tanks attacked the Bunker #109 on this road about halfway between the reservoir and Nuetheim. Somewhat later the Germans reported American forces before Kornelimuenster, near Mulartshuette, and in Hahn. At Rott, the Hqs Co of the 9.Panzer-Division and the 105.Panzer-Brigade launched a counter-attack in an effort to halt the American drive on Mulartshuette. German engineers hastily began to demolish all crossings over the Vicht River between Stolberg and Zweifall.

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