Five-inch (12.7 cm) rockets being loaded under the wing of a Vought F4U Corsair of MAG-33. Just before take-offs, the safety pins are removed and the rockets are ready for charging. Okinawa, Japan, ca. June 1945. FFAR (Forward Firing Aircraft Rocket) than an HVAR (High-Velocity Aircraft Rocket)

(8). Rockets

The trackless, high-velocity, five-inch rocket has been thoroughly tested under combat conditions in this Command. It has been found to be accurate and especially effective against tanks, armored vehicles; locomotives, and gun positions. It adds little to the plane in weight, detracts little in speed, and, considering its flexibility, it is considered an extremely valuable tactical weapon and I recommended for all fighter-bombers.

(9). Armored Column Cover

(a). The practice of assigning to one fighter-bomber group the task of providing continuous cover for one armored division during daylight hours proved most satisfactory. Groups are directed to furnish 8 to 12 aircraft for cover to armored columns. As each flight approaches, the leader checks in by radio with the flight leader being released, also with the Air Support Party radio on the ground. Suitable targets left to be attacked are passed to the flight picking up the patrol. SOP with flights is to patrol ahead to a distance of 35 miles seeking out possible strong points or pockets of resistance that might hamper the forward movement of our armor. Such targets are attacked and also reported to the armored column.
(b). The Germans’ camouflage discipline is excellent. Pilots, however, after 15 or 20 missions could pick out irregularities of shadow along roads, which disclosed the presence of the enemy.
(c). Both the number of planes, 8 or 12, and their bomb load varied with the amount of enemy armor-opposing the movement of our column and the possibility of encountering enemy aircraft. For example, in the area between Le Mans and Fontainebleau, where few thick-skinned enemy vehicles were encountered, it was possible almost to dispense with carrying bombs, since the desired results could be obtained by strafing. In the Nantes – Grassicourt area, close to Paris and the enemy’s fighter fields, only one-third of our aircraft were bombed up because of the frequency of encounters with enemy planes.
(d). It has been proven quite conclusively that our .50 cal. API ammunition can, and has, destroyed enemy armor. Pilots have repeatedly reported tanks being set afire by low-altitude strafing from the rear. Evidently, ricochet bullets found their way into the engine section through exhaust and cooling vents.

(10). Air-Ground Communications

At the outset of the campaign, C Channel was used for all communication between aircraft and ground forces. This channel proved badly over-crowded, however,and early communication difficulties were overcome by-assigning frequencies as follows:

Button A – Group frequency and homing
Button B – Air-Ground communication with VIII and XII Corps
Button C – Communication with all aircraft of Ninth Air Force
Button D – Air-Ground communication with XV and XX Corps

(11). Altitude of Operations

Ground crew of the 354th Fighter Group load ammunition into a P-51 MustangOperations under 3500 feet were found to be impracticable for fighter-bombers because of the damage inflicted by the intense light flak encountered over concentrations of enemy troops. The P-51 was found to be much more susceptible to serious damage by light flak than the P-47, because of the former liquid-cooled engine and its somewhat lighter construction.

(12). Minimum Weather

For dive-bombing, our operations required a 5000-foot ceiling with broken clouds. For armed reconnaissance, the minimum was 3500 feet with broken clouds. For take-off from the base, minimum conditions were a 1000-foot ceiling and three miles of visibility.

(13). Frequency of Operation

Two group missions, or six squadron missions, per day per group proved to be the most desirable average scale of effort. Our squadrons had been reduced in number from 16 to 12 ships since this gave added flexibility and was adequate for any task encountered. Two group sorties per day thus meant 72 individual airplane sorties, and it was found that this scale of effort could be maintained day in and day out without affecting maintenance. As a general policy, each group was allowed one day off for maintenance every 7 to 10 days. Also, two missions with 12-plane squadrons were the maximum that could be supported with the flow of replacement aircraft.

(14). Bomb Loading

(a). The most frequently used loading consisted of two 500-pound general-purpose bombs with instantaneous fuse. This bomb was found suitable for most military installations not protected by reinforced concrete or heavy masonry. The 500-lb. general-purpose bomb was also used satisfactorily, with an 8 to 11 seconds delay fuse, for cutting railroad lines, the bomb being driven into the side of an embankment by minimum-altitude skip-bombing methods. With a 6 to 12-hour delay fuse, the same bomb was Incendiary Bombdropped on highways to discourage road movement by night. When the Germans were endeavoring to escape across the Seine River, these bombs with long-delay fusing were dropped in the water close to ferry slips.
(b). Fragmentation bombs were used less extensively than the 500-pound GP because this swift ‘end-run’ type of campaign offered fewer opportunities for their effective employment. The Argentan pocket was an outstanding exception, and frags were used there with excellent results. Frag clusters and, to a lesser extent, the 260-pound anti-personnel fragmentation bomb, were employed against personnel and thin-skinned vehicles.
(c). Napalm was found to be a very good weapon if properly employed on the proper targets. Along its advantages are the fact that it can be dropped from a low altitude without danger to the aircraft, and, it completely smothers the target with intense flames, burning everything combustible and destroying personnel by anoxia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and burning. It is particularly adapted for attacks, on deep shelters, because of its effect on the ventilating system. In attacks on guns and ammunitions, the effectiveness of artillery pieces was found to be destroyed by Napalm’s intense heat. For Napalm the regular belly tank (usually the 150-gallon type) was used, with a detonator but no fins. Dropping was done from minimum altitude by visual methods, without the use of sight.
(d). Virtually no 1000-pound bombs were used during the mobile warfare of August, two 500-pound bombs being found more effective for most purposes.

(15). Radius of Action

The effective radius for the P-47 with full bomb load but without a spare tank was 200 miles; the 150-gallon tank increased this to 350 miles; For the P-51 the A map of the distance WWII fighters can fly from the UK mainlandradius was 325 miles on fighter-sweeps without tanks, or about 600 miles with 150-gallon tank, although this much range is rarely needed in tactical operations of the type conducted thus far by this Command.

(16). Airfield Surface

A minimum of 5000 feet proved necessary for taking off with a full tank and two 500-pound bombs since most of our fields had a dip or roll and acceleration was not so rapid as on a hard-surfaced runway. Hessian waterproof material proved very satisfactory when laid on a graded surface. Considerably better than such landing grounds, however, were established airfields captured from the Germans and repaired, such as those at Rennes, Chateaudun, and St Dizier. Such fields had extensive dispersal areas and were large enough to accommodate two groups.

(17). Flank Protection

The swift pace of Gen Patton’s advance pose many new problems, one of the most important of which was the protection of the long flank along the Loire River. The task of watching that flank and preventing any dangerous concentration was turned over entirely to the air – an important milestone in the history of air warfare. This task was successfully carried out by vigilant tactical and photographic reconnaissance backed by our fighter-bombers, who were continually attacking enemy troops and transport, interdicting movements by road and rail, and keeping the enemy constantly off balance so that small units had little chance to ‘snowball’ into an effective opposition. The full results of these efforts were not apparent until the middle of September, when the German general commanding 20.000 troops south of the Loire surrendered, with all his officers and men, to the 9th US Army and to the Commanding General, XIX TAC. His capitulation resulted from three factors: relentless air attack, effective action by French Forces of the Interior (FFI), and the cutting of the only remaining escape route by the junction of the 3-A and the 7-A.

(18). Operations on Fronts 350 miles apart

When Brest, still held out a 3-A’s main attack and meanwhile moved well to the east of Paris, the Command found itself operating simultaneously on fronts 350 miles apart. This proved entirely practical because of the flexibility and range of air power.

(19). Situation Map
So rapid was the advance and so wide the extent of the front, that it was found impracticable to continue maintaining the general situation on a map of 1 to 100.000 scale. Gen Patton’s spearheads were continually running off the map, even though it was maintained on boards aggregating 16 feet long and 8 feet high. Accordingly, the 1 to 250.000 map was substituted and proved satisfactory.

P-47 pilot Ray Walsh was almost caught by the blast produced when he destroyed an ammunition truck on June 23, 1944. Explosions downed a number of fighter-bombers(20). Reconnaissance and Intelligence

Reconnaissance, intelligence technique, and teamwork between the A-3 and A-2 sections improved materially in the course of the month and were reflected in the results achieved in hunting down the enemy’s air force and catching his aircraft on the ground, attacking enemy transport attempting to escape into Germany from south of the Loire River and in providing direct aid for the ground forces.



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