Now Item Co wore the battalion laurels. Even the A&P Platoon was arrogant. Even the mortar men of Mike Co were more experienced. In exploits, Love Co is now ranked last. This being last place in the competition for honors was getting a little wearing. And as both the Love Co Commander and the battalion commander realized, it was not good for the morale of the battalion either. It was desirable that there be an equality of achievement among the three rifle companies, A group of men can be as sensitive as any individual personality. It was a lesson in psychology that none of the officers had learned prior to the war.

Maknassy becomes a Focal Point

After the battle of the Faid Pass, the 3/26, basing in Feriana, sent out motor patrols, day and night, toward a point of expected contact with the enemy. Love Co took over most of this patrolling during December and forged ahead a little bit in prestige. Six or twelve-man outposts were established astride the most likely approaches into this area from the Tunisian coast. Every night, jeep patrols went out along these roads from Feriana and Gafsa. The terrain made it evident that, if the Afrika Korps wanted to spill over into the area held by the Americans and the French, they would come through the Faid Pass, Maknassy, or El Guettar. On the other hand, if sufficient American forces could be brought into southern Tunisia on time, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Germans from eastern Africa, these three places would be crucial points of passage through to the coast.

Such possibilities gave some importance to the patrol work being done by the 3/26 out of Feriana and Gafsa. They were only a few hundred men, but they were pleased to receive newspapers from home, telling of the race for Tunisia. One newspaper map showed a big arrow pointed at Feriana, marked – Raff Task Force. The men were a little bit amused to think that really, they were ahead of the map arrow, and a good deal ahead of the Task Force. French Colonial troops occupied the Faid Pass and Gafsa, but did not participate in the patrolling. They had no vehicles at all. As Allies, they were still regarded a little bit askance by most of the Americans. But they were of some help in giving a semblance of strength to a line that was actually thin.
The French had a way with the Arabs, too, and often provided enemy information which, even if it was not always reliable, was never dull. A P-40 Fighter Squadron moved into Thelepte early in December and helped to provide enemy information as well as protection to the 3/26 there. Almost every day, they would put on a pretty good show against German planes over Feriana and Gafsa.

But the patrol work of the battalion provided the most interesting gossip. Lt Don Megrail of Love Co’s 3rd Platoon, took a jeep patrol from Bir Mrabott all the way to Gabes one night. There is a good macadam road between Gafsa and Gabes. The next night, on the same mission, Megrail collided head-on with a German patrol near El Hafey. Actually, these two patrols almost smashed up before they recognized each other. They stopped bumper to bumper. One German stayed in his vehicle and let go with a machine pistol while Megrail was firing at him with a machine gun mounted on the front of the jeep. The Germans lost the duel. The other three gave up.

Thelepte Airfield

This airfield located in Tunisia was about 20 Km southwest of Kasserine. It was used by the 12-USAAF in 1943 during the North African Campaign against the German Africa Corps.
The first American units arrived in late December and the P-40s of the 33d Fighter Group arrived on January 7 from Telergma Airfield, Algeria. Thelepte was used by the following units during the Battle of Tunisia: 33d Fighter Group; HQs 64th Fighter Wing (Mar 1/18, 1943); 47th Bombardment Group (Mar 30 – Apr 13, 1943)(A-20 Havoc); 31st Fighter Group, (Feb 7/18, 1943)(Spitfire); 33d Fighter Group (Jan 7 – Feb 8, 1943)(P-40 Warhawk), and the 81st Fighter Group (Jan 22 – Feb 18, 1943)(P-39 Aircobra)

On Feb 18, the 31st and 81st Fighter Groups had to withdraw from Thelepte Airfield after the German Africa Corps came within a few miles of the airfield. However American counter-attacks drove the Germans east and the airfield was re-manned on Mar 1, later hosting A-20 Havocs until mid-April, when the combat was focused around Tunis and the units moved east to be closer to enemy targets, ending American use of the airfield.

Lt Don Megrail became the hero of Love Co because he was the first man in the company to meet a German soldier at close quarters. He added to his laurels and to those of his company the following night by returning to El Hafey, where he discovered an enemy column on the road. They were Italians. He counted them as they moved into a position there. Meanwhile, under skillful German direction, an Italian force had been established in the defile at Djebel Ank. There was increasing evidence that the enemy was probing toward Gafsa via El Guettar. Col Raff then began to worry about Maknassy. It was too quiet. He ordered more patrolling in that direction. The night of Dec 13, Lt Norman Woods (2nd Platoon Love Co) took a jeep patrol through Maknassy to Mezzouna, 15 miles beyond. He was outflanked by a couple of mysterious green flares. On the way back, he walked around Maknassy. In the railroad station, he roused the agent, a Frenchman. The Frenchman mistook Woods for a German. He said that a lot of Americans were in Gafsa. Woods could not figure out whether his allegiance was German or American. He was so wrapped up in this problem that he did not look around Maknassy closely enough to fix in his mind a layout of the streets.

He had not been ordered to do this, but if he had, it might have helped out later. The next night, Dec 14, Sgt Henning, Sgt De Cristo, and a French Sgt, went to Maknassy. They approached the town via the Lovy Farm. They interviewed M. Lovy. He told them that a battalion of Italians had moved into Maknassy. He even plotted their positions. According to this information, the enemy was setting up at least four machine guns and two AT guns in front of Maknassy. They were digging trenches around the western edge of the big olive grove south of the town. The patrol did not verify these facts personally.

On the 15, after Henning’s patrol had returned to Gafsa, French headquarters tried to make a phone call to Maknassy. Up ’till then, the line had been open, and the French have been able to contact Maknassy every day. The line was still open, but a German voice answered. This was enough to send the French officer on the other end of the line into a fit of hysteria. He called Col Raff. But the situation did call for a bit of investigating. Col Raff called Col John W. Bowen, commanding the 3/26, and ordered him to send a rifle company into Maknassy. Raid the place, he said; shoot it up, take prisoners and come out at daylight.

This happy idea was rapidly relayed to the Love Co’s CO, who was still a little bit worried about that exploit his company needed to boost its ego. Raid Maknassy? he repeated. Yes, sir, that’s fine, fine! tonight, the battalion commander said. That wasn’t much time to get ready. It was already noon.

Italian gunners man their light field piece in a field 1943Maknassy was 100 miles away. Enemy information was as comprehensible as it ever was. But without doubt, this was the opportunity of the season for Love Co. Here was a golden chance to do something spectacular. It had all the ingredients. Col Bowen entrusted the planning of the raid to the Company CO. He would accompany the raiders himself, but it was characteristic of his leadership to admit some intelligence in his subordinates. The order had been issued at noon on the 16. A number of decisions had to be made before leaving Feriana. The problem which quite often confronts any infantry commander arose – how many men and weapons to take along in order to do the job most economically and efficiently. Col Raff had specified a rifle company. But the 2nd Plat of Love Co was out posting El Guettar, and could not be assembled in time. No need was seen for the Weapons Platoon, and this agreed with the doctrine of night attacks that the Weapons Platoon is not ordinarily employed initially. Even two rifle platoons and company headquarters seemed an excessive number of men to take on a long-range mission where the enemy situation was unclear. At any rate, it was decided to make the raid with the 1st Platoon, the 3rd Platoon, and HQs Co. In order to help preserve secrecy, the men were not told where they were going. A detailed order would be issued in Gafsa that evening. But the word got around somehow. At 1300, as the five GMC 2.5-ton trucks pulled out of Feriana, every soldier in the battalion knew that an attack was going to be made on Maknassy that night. This was disturbing because the Arabs who loitered around might have ways of getting the news overland-by signal fires. They had done this more than once.

The 40-mile truck move to Gafsa was made by infiltration, since the road was subject to daily attacks by German planes. It was completed safely by 1700. The troops detrucked at the French barracks in Gafsa to wait for darkness at 1830. This allowed 1.5 hours to plan the attack and disseminate the order to every man. The CO assembled his platoon leaders and all the men who had been on patrol in the Maknassy area. Time would not permit a personal recon before the raid since Maknassy was over 50 miles east of Gafsa. No air photo of the town was available. The only map available, a 1/200.000, made Maknassy look no larger than one of these typewritten letters. No street map or a detailed plan of the town’s layout was available; and unfortunately, none of the men who had been in Maknassy could sketch it clearly.

It was agreed only, that Maknassy was a small place, much smaller than Gafsa. There was a big olive grove on the south side and some high ground on the north. There were trees along the dirt streets. The only street that anyone could describe at all was the main road and the position of the railroad tracks and the station with respect to it. The Company CO put a magnifying glass on the 1/200.000 map and tried to make a blow-up sketch of the town, using every particle of information thereon. It was a French map and some of the symbols he could not understand. Precious minutes were lost getting them interpreted. When the sketch was drawn, it didn’t make Maknassy look too complicated.

For the approach march, the only solution was to utilize the knowledge of Sgt Henning and Sgt De Cristo, who had gone up to the Lovy Farm the night of the 14. The company would follow the same route they had taken to a detrucking point five miles short of the town, thence on foot via the Lovy Farm to the distinct line of olive trees leading into the objective. Henning and De Cristo would ride in the second of two jeeps preceding the five trucks. Another jeep leading the column would act as point security. This jeep would also move on up to Maknassy as soon as the shooting started. It had a heavy machine gun mounted and could protect the trucks when they came back to a rendezvous point on the road. A wadi crossing the road about three miles west of Maknassy would serve as this point of reorganization for the return march. Speaking of security on the approach march, the Company CO suddenly realized that our last outpost was at Sened. This meant that the company would have to ride a total of 18 miles to the detrucking point without any assurance of safety from enemy patrols. It was a chance that would have to be taken. For the plan of attack on Maknassy itself, the Company CO was probably influenced by his desire to have Love Co perform a spectacular tactical masterpiece. Contrary to elementary principles of night attack which the Infantry School has stressed for years, he conceived an envelopment and an attack in two directions. Lt Megrall’s 3rd Platoon and HQs Co would separate from the 1st Platoon at a point southwest of the town, the 3rd Platoon would then move generally northwest in single file, guiding on the outermost buildings as far as the main road. They would then extend to their right, facing northwest, firing in that direction if necessary; or, they would engage the enemy in the southwest quadrant of the town.



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