Late in the day on December 23, the 2/101 was taken from reserve with the mission of securing Rambrouch on the division left flank which had been in German hands since the withdrawal of the 26th Cav Recon on December 22. This was accomplished on the following day, with Rambrouch and Koetschette both wrested from the enemy.
During the second day of the Third Army attack, the 101st Airborne Division and other units at Bastogne were supplied by our aircraft with much needed medical supplies and equipment. The 4-AD continued the fight up the highway towards Bastogne, CCB reaching Chaumont and CCA still held up on the main road by a blown bridge at Martelange. The German defense against this flank attack was conducted with increasing ferocity, with paratroopers landing within the American lines, and small groups of enemy infiltrating by use of captured US uniforms and vehicles (Operation Greif-Skorzeny). Having seized the offensive, the enemy sought desperately to continue on the offensive. The Third Army attack and the heroic resistance of Bastogne constituted a thorn in the side of the German effort that threatened to cause the failure of the whole campaign in which von Rundstedt had hoped to sweep the Allied Armies from the continent.
From December 24 to December 25, the progress of the III Corps’ divisions was retarded by the recurrent counter-attacks and stubborn resistance of the enemy. The 6th Cav Group (Task Force Fickett) arrived in the Corps zone and was assigned a zone between the 4-AD and the 26-ID. In the 26-ID zone, the 1/328 fought bitterly to capture Arsdorf, with Baker and Charlie Cos fighting from house to house to overcome Germans fighting with primitive fury. The battle in Arsdorf continued all night and on Christmas morning the 2/101 joined and succeeded in clearing the town.
Task Force Hamilton, meanwhile, was assigned the mission of seizing the heavily defended town of Eschdorf, which dominated the approaches to the Sure River. Advancing up the road to Eschdorf, Easy and Fox Cos 328-IR encountered strong enemy resistance at the tiny village of Hierheck. The enemy pinned our infantry down with intense rifle and automatic weapons fire. Tanks of the 735-TB entered the battle, endeavoring to engage the enemy while the infantry infiltrated forward. The bloody fighting on the road to Eschdorf continued, and the battle for the town itself did not begin until 0100 on Christmas morning. In the struggle which began on Christmas day, Eschdorf was to become one of the most bitterly contested points in the campaign, and the town to be reduced to little more than smoldering rubble.
For two days and nights, Eschdorf was shattered and blasted by the battle. Easy and Fox Cos stumbled through the burning village, under artillery and mortar fire, killing the enemy where they found him, losing contact with their own troops and commanders. By Christmas night, most of Task Force Hamilton was forced from Eschdorf by the violent German attacks, but the Task Force re-entered the town on the following morning to recapture it with the the help of the 1/104-IR.
With the strategic villages of Arsdorf and Eschdorf cleared of the enemy, all units of the division were facing the Sure River, winding through its deep channel in the hills, and the lofty snow-covered ridges beyond. The 80-ID, on the right of the 26-ID, having now passed to the control of XII Corps, was still held up by the enemy, leaving the 104-IR facing an exposed flank. All during Christmas day, the 4-AD continued thrusting at the enemy’s frantic defenses to block the road to Bastogne. Finally, on December 26, the 4-AD made contact with the defenders of Bastogne and medical supplies, ammunition and food began to move into the besieged Americans. The same day, the attack by the 26-ID was resumed on the morning, with the 101-IR and the 104-IR prepared to cross the Sure River. The enemy was very active on the opposite bank and the efforts of the infantry and the engineers to secure crossing sites were met by heavy small arms and mortar fire, particularly in the vicinity of Bonnal and Esch-sur-Sure.
By the end of the day using assault boats and footbridges initially, the greater part of the 101-IR and the 104-IR had crossed the Sure. Enemy aircraft were active over the bridging sites, and the 390-AAA Battalion destroyed fifteen enemy planes and damaged three. On the morning of December 27, the 35-ID, having arrived from Metz on the day before, attacked through the 6th Cav Recon Sq, seized objectives north and west of the Sure River on the left of the 26-ID. In the bridgehead of the 101-IR the advance was continued, capturing Mecher-Dunkrodt, Kaundorf and the high ground in the vicinity of Bavigne. Two bridges were now established across the Sure, a Treadway at Esch-sur-Sure and a Bailey Bridge at Bonnal. The 1/104 and the 2/104 had crossed the river at Esch-sur-Sure and seized the high ground east of Kaundorf, assisting the 101-IR in clearing Kaundorf. Through December 28 and December 29, the enemy utilized the high ground to fight a delaying action in the area between the Sure River and the Wiltz River. The 4-AD strengthened and widened the corridor into Bastogne, the 35-ID made slight gains. In the zone of the 26-ID small gains were made by the 1/101 and the 2/101, and Nothum was cleared by the 104 against considerable resistance.
The advance infantry elements were now approaching the key communication and supply center of Wiltz. The enemy indicated a stubborn reluctance to surrender the Wiltz Area, which was vital to carrying on the offensive, which he still hoped to resume.
During the next two days, there were numerous indications that the enemy was preparing a counter-blow to arrest the advance along the III Corps Front. On the morning of December 30, the 35-ID reported a small counter-attack in the vicinity of Lutrebois, which, during the day developed into a major offensive with at least one regiment of infantry reinforced with tanks. Bitter fighting continued all day, costly to both sides, but with no substantial change in front lines. Later in the day the enemy counter-attacked in the 26-ID, striking the 3/101, with considerable force, causing disorganization in the Item and King Cos areas. The situation was fairly stable during the night, but the enemy struck again with fury at 0530 on the morning of December 31. The battle was similar to that in the zone of the 35-ID on the previous day, and fierce fighting raged all day in the zones of both infantry divisions as the Germans battled to regain the offensive.
Neither side could claim any major advances and, at the end of this second day of violent battle, the situation still remained unsettled. In the Yankee Division zone, the brunt of the attack fell full upon the 3/101. Able Co 101-ECB was alerted to go into battle, as infantry, to support the 3/101, and the 2/101 sent George Co around to the left of the 3/101 to relieve the pressure. Able Co 735-TB was unable to assist because of the icy roads. The Division Commander then ordered the 3/238 to position in-depth behind the 3/101. After containing the counter-attack the division reorganized and established defensive positions during the night December 31 – January 1.
During the first week of January 1945, infantrymen of the Yankee Division engaged in a series of attacks towards the Wiltz River, with little success in breaking up the deadlock that now characterized the entire Corps front. The III Corps was endeavoring to reduce the German pocket in the general area Tarchamps-Bras-Doncols-Berlé, but every effort of the 35-ID and the 26-ID, secured little or no advantage. The 6-AD was meeting heavy resistance in the vicinity of Wardin (Belgium) and Mageret (Belgium). It was during this period that our troops experienced an attack by Screaming Mamies rocket, known as the nebelwerfer. This weapon delivered on our troops a barrage of thirty to forty rockets, simultaneously detonating with a powerful concussion.
Many men of the YD will remember the cold night of January 3/4 when the Germans sent large concentrations of nebelwerfer fire into the Division zone. Further discomfort was contributed by the near zero and sub zero temperatures, the snow-covered, frozen ground, and waist high snow drifts. In the period of January 1/4, a succession of bitter attacks and counter-attacks took place approximately one kilometer north of the village of Nothum at the Schumannseck Crossroads, at which point the main road from Bastogne to Wiltz was threatened. On January 2, the 101-IR, with the 3/328 attached, jumped off in an attack to secure the Schumannseck Crossroads and the Hill 490 beyond.
The 2/101 and Charlie Co (1/101) were halted early in the attack by heavy enemy fire from enemy tanks and automatic weapons. The 3/328 was employed to strengthen the attack, but the stalemate was never eliminated. Although our troops reached Hill 490 several times, counter-thrusts by the enemy forced our withdrawal. Other elements of the division, endeavoring to push forward, were forced back to original positions. During the period of January 5/8, elements in the division maintained defensive positions and regrouped in preparation for continuation of the attack on Corps order. The 90-ID was assembling in the Corps zone, prepared to attack along the left flank of the 26-ID, making the Corps main effort to eliminate the enemy pocket.
Task Force Scott was formed on January 7, consisting of the 101-IR, 101-FAB, Battery A, 390-AAA Bn, 26 Recon Troop (less 3d Platoon), one Platoon Able 101-ECB, Able Co (less one Platoon), 818-TDB, two Platoons 735-TB, Able 114-MD (Medic). The 2/101 remained on the left flank of the division zone, and the remainder of Task Force Scott moved by motor to vicinity Baschleiden to relieve elements of the 35-ID on line around Harlange. Through this area, the 90-ID was to launch its attack, with the main body of the YD on its right and Task Force Scott on its left.
At 1000 on January 9, the attack jumped off along the Corps front with only minor gains in the 26-ID zone due to the well-defended enemy positions. Task Force Scott attacked with the 1/101 and the 3/101 abreast, but elements of the German 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division resisted fiercely. The 3/101 was able to reach the high ground east of Tarchamps, in conjunction with Task Force Fickett (6-Cav Group). While Task Force Fickett was battling to collapse enemy resistance in the base of the pocket, the 90-ID had captured Berlé and was advancing on Doncols.
The 6-AD had gained 1200 yards to the southeast. The attack was continued on January 10 and January 11 with the 90-ID seizing Doncols and Sonlez after these towns were pounded by air and artillery. On January 12, as a result of being hammered by the coordinated attack from all sides, the enemy’s defenses began to crumble. The 6-AD had captured Wardin and advanced to a few hundred yards west of Bras, pinching off the pocket between it and the 90-ID. Task Force Scott mopped up the enemy in the area around Harlange and then, with its mission completed, reverted to normal functions in the Division zone. The 101-IR moved by motor into an assembly area in the vicinity of Hierheck on January 12, for reorganization and rehabilitation. The 104-IR and 328-IR continued to maintain defensive positions overlooking Wiltz and Winseler, patrolling along the Wiltz River.
During the week of January 13/20, the situation in the 26-ID zone remained stable with periodic relieves of front line battalions. Some limited attacks were made to eliminate enemy forces south of the Wiltz River, and patrol activity was constant. In the remainder of the III Corps sector, the 90-ID and the 6-AD continued to make small gains, which still were resisted vigorously by the enemy. By January 20, however, the overall picture of the von Rundstedt offensive showed the Bulge to be no longer such. First Army troops had pushed down from the north and joined the Third Army forces in a squeeze that completely destroyed the German penetration, enabling both Armies to move to the east and drive the enemy back into the Siegfried Line. In this final stage of the campaign, the mission of the 26-ID was to cross the Wiltz River, secure Wiltz, and continue to drive the enemy eastward. In preparation for the attack, the 101-IR relieved elements of the 328-IR in the right portion of the zone. During the night of January 20, the 3/328 crossed the Wiltz River and secured a bridgehead while engineers constructed a bridge, northwest of Grumelscheid.
On January 21, at 0800, the Corps attack jumped off. In the 26-ID zone, two regiments attacked abreast, the 328 on the left and the 101 on the right. The 2/101 led the infantry advance across the river, followed by the 3/101. The 2/101 cleared Brühl and Noertrange, organizing the high ground vicinity Noertrange. The 1/101 crossed the Wiltz River, entered Wiltz from the north and northwest, clearing that portion of the city north of the river by nightfall. In the attack of the 328-IR, the 2/328 secured Grumelscheid while the 1/328 advanced rapidly to the high ground vicinity Brachtenbach. The regiment thus gained approximately seven kilometers over steep snow-covered hills and roads that were blocked and mined. The 101 also reported encountering numerous booby traps and mines in its attack on Wiltz.
The Division continued the attack to the east towards the Clerf River on January 22, with the 3/101 capturing Eschweiler, in conjunction with the 6th Cav Group. By the following day, with little resistance, the enemy was cleared from the Division zone up to the Clerf River. On January 24, the 101-IR and the 328-IR launched the attack to cross the Clerf River. Considerable enemy fire was received by the 1/328 and the 3/328 as they attempted to find crossing sites along the Clerf River. The 1/328 cleared Urspelt by 1200 on January 25. The first elements of the division to reach the east bank of the Clerf River were from the 3/101. The 1/101, attacking with elements of the 6th Cav Group succeeded in clearing Clervaux. By January 25, the Battle of the Bulge was rapidly drawing to a close with enemy withdrawing his forces to the east bank of the Our River, into Germany and the Siegfried Line.
Throughout the Ardennes Campaign, various enemy units were encountered, including the 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division, the 276.Volksgrenadier-Division, the 9.Volksgrenadier-Division, the 340.Volksgrenadier-Division, the 167.Volksgrenadier-Division, and 1.SS-Panzer-Division (LSSAH).
On January 25, the III Corps was notified that the 26-ID was to pass to the command of XX Corps in France. The 17-A/B was directed to effect the relief of the 26-ID and elements of that division began to arrive on January 26. The 104-ID, which had remained in successive reserve areas from January 19, departed from the vicinity of Niederwiltz (Luxembourg) on January 27, and moved by motor to the XX Corps area of the 95-ID zone. During the afternoon and night of January 27, the relief of the 328-IR and the 101-IR was executed by elements of the 17-A/B and the 6-AD.
On January 28, the main body of the division began moving to the vicinity of Boulay (France). Thus closed the Ardennes Campaign for the Yankee Division. Thirty-six days from the cold morning in December when the fighting infantry had headed north to go battling against German fanatic forces who had delivered defeat and cruel death to many in their path. The 26-ID played a leading part in the campaign, engaging in more costly, bloody, violent battles than had yet been met in fighting the Germans. Places like Eschdorf and the woods at the Schumann Mount will always be remembered with a grim sadness by those who know how dearly we paid to wrest our victory from the enemy.
