But the Germans had so far been able to prevent a crossing of the river. Metz had fallen (November 17) and troops all along the Third Army front were pushing to the edge of the Saar Basin.
The 90-ID, pressing through the Siegfried Line beyond its bridgehead and Königsmacher, had broken into bomb wracked Saarlautern at the German Border and had seized Dillingen, two miles to the north where the Germans were fiercely counterattacking.
The 6th Armored Division had wiped out an enemy salient three miles deep and two miles wide southeast of Saarbrücken. On the north flank of the 35th Infantry Division, elements had crossed into Germany at Sarreguemines, pushed on to the town of Neunkirchen, which was less than one-half mile from the Saar Basin. And when the 26th Infantry Division broke thru the Maginot Line defenses, both the 26-ID and the 35-ID were ready to make a concerted drive on the Saar Basin from the south.
On December 9, the Yankee Division’s mission in Lorraine was coming to an end. After two months of bitter combat, the weary YD infantry had earned a respite from the fight. News reached the foxhole soldiers of impending relief, and that night, the 87-ID began moving into the area of the 26-ID. The 101-IR was the first unit to be relieved (December 10) departing immediately from the XII Corps Sector, proceeding to Metz. On December 11, the 104-IR followed. With the relief of the 101-IR and the 104-IR by the 87-ID, the only Yankee Division doughboys remaining in battle were those of the 328-IR. The 346-IR of the 87-ID was now on the right of the 328-IR, and on the left was the 320-IR (35-ID).
Perhaps because the sacred soil of the Fatherland, only a few miles away, was being seriously threatened, the Germans began a counter-attack in the afternoon of December 9 in the zone of the 2/328-IR. The Germans being repulsed, the 2/238 and the 3/328 began to advance again the following morning. Again enemy armor delivered heavy fires on our troops. The attacking battalions were forced into a slight withdrawal, because of the massed enemy tanks in the Bliesbrucken Woods.
The XIX Tactical Air Command was called upon for air support and in the afternoon a squadron of fighter bombers bombed and strafed the enemy concentrations in the woods. Direct hits were scored on three tanks, others were damaged. The 602-TDB and the 610-TDB were both engaging any enemy armor that came under observation all around the zone. Approximately ten German tanks were eliminated by the Tank Destroyer operations in the Bliesbrücken Woods action. On the night of December 11, the 328-IR established defensive positions in the vicinity of Obergailbach, alerted for any further thrusts by enemy armor. During the night, 11 infantrymen (Item Co) patrolling, became the first YD doughboys to invade the German Soil. On December 12, the three infantry battalions attacked towards the German Border, the 3/328, and the Tank Destroyers, to engage enemy tanks in the vicinity of Obergailbach. By 1530 in the afternoon, meeting stubborn resistance, the 1/328 and 2/328, Able Co leading, had advanced into the Obergailbach Woods, 600 meters inside the German Border. Easy and Fox Cos secured objectives on German Soil while Item Co, still leading, captured Hill 360, a strategic terrain feature in the Corps sector.
Thus, on December 12, ended the first campaign of the 26-ID, beginning on November 8 just east of Nancy, continuing for 66 days of hard combat through the French Department of Lorraine, ending on the 67th day inside Fortress Germany.
In figures, which can never measure the suffering and hardship of the fighting infantrymen, the division advanced approximately 45 miles against stubborn German resistance, wrested from the enemy 132 French towns, over an area of 450 square miles. During this period, the Division captured 2573 prisoners and inflicted an estimated 2307 casualties.
Speaking to the 26th Infantry Division, in a letter of commendation to Gen Paul, the CG XII Corps, Gen Maton S. Eddy, said:
When I tell you that some of the bitterest fighting of our entire front during the last three weeks has taken place in your own zone, I do not tell you something that you and the 26th Infantry Division do not know.
Some of you may not know, however, that your skill and gallantry in your first major engagement have won the respect and admiration of the whole XII Corps – even, I feel sure, of the German troops facing you.
Some of Germany’s finest fighting troops are on your front including the tough and tested 11.Panzer-Division. I can give you no higher compliment to your Division than to assure you that, if these battle-tried German troops expected to deal easily with a new and untried American Division, they have received one of the great surprises of their careers.
The remarkable speed with which your fighting troops have acquired the spirit of veterans deserves commendation second only to the high courage and constant aggressiveness with which you have battled across Lorraine.
On December 10, the 101-IR arrived by motor convoy in the French citadel of Metz, which had fallen in November to the 5-ID and 95-ID. It was planned to send all of the Division, except the 101-IR, into immediate rest. The 101-IR had been given a mission to perform before going into reserve. The same day, all the Forts that had formed a ring of defenses around Metz had surrendered with the exception of one – Fort Jeanne D’Arc. This Fort was still holding out and it was the mission of the 101-IR to take over from the 345-IR (87-ID), the job of conducting the siege until the Fort surrendered. The Regimental CP was established in the Schlier Kaserne, which had been the barracks of the German Officers’ Candidate School before the capture of the city. Under cover of darkness on December 11, the 2/101 took over the siege from elements of the 345-IR. Troops from Love Co of the 3/101 relieved men of the 345-IR guarding Fort Driant and took over the occupation of Fort Dame. The rest of the 3/101 assumed command of Fort Plappeville and Fort Quentin, other forts of the chain.
Fortress Metz
Prior to the relief of the 87-ID by the 26-ID, eight enemy patrols had attempted to escape from Fort Jeanne D’Arc and to reach German Lines. It was decided on December 11, to send the 1/101 to reinforce the 2/101, to take over the southern sector while the 2/101 regrouped and occupied the northern sector. Resistance from the Fort was sporadic. Orders had been given the 101-IR not to attempt to attack the Fort other than by fire; and the Fort in its turn answered with a periodic activity of burp guns, automatic weapons and the exchange of signals with German elements somewhere in the vicinity.
On December 13, at 0900 in the morning, Maj Gramm, CO of the 1/101 gave the first report to headquarters that the Fort was on the verge of surrender. He reported that a German officer had left the Fort with a white flag and had come over to Able Co expressing a desire to discuss terms for capitulation. Maj Gramm was instructed to tell the German officer that he returns from the Fort with the Commandant; that the party would be met by a similar American party at a road junction southwest of the Fort, and here discussion would commence.
At 0915, an order was given the 101-IR to cease-fire and a party was organized. The party consisted of Gen Hartness, ADC 26-ID, the CO of the 101, the Regimental Operations Officer with the Regimental Stenographer, the CO of the 1/101 and 2/101, an IPW Team, a Signal Corps Team, a mine-sweeping detail and an AT detachment. The parties met at the prescribed spot at 1100 in the morning. It was agreed that the Americans return with the Germans to the CP inside the Fort to complete negotiation. The terms of surrender were delivered to the Fort Commander, Maj Hans Voss, who accepted, after a short discussion with his officers.
During the surrender negotiations, the remainder of the division, now under command of III Corps, had arrived at Metz for a period of rest, recreation and training. For the first time in several months, the men were living under approximate garrison conditions. Passes were given daily to visit places of interest in the city. The men had showers, ate well, saw movies regularly. A training program was instituted to iron out the errors most commonly noted during the Lorraine Campaign. A battalion was organized under the supervision of Brig Gen Hartness with a cadre of veteran officers and enlisted personnel to train the 2585 replacements that were coming into the division. The schedule, an intensive one, included practice in basic subjects, small arms, bazooka, and mortar fire, scouting and patrolling, combat in cities, personal and field sanitation with emphasis on the avoidance of trench foot. The program was interrupted by an unexpected turn of events. Many of the replacements were destined to perform their duty in combat before they had a full opportunity to take advantage of the training.
On Sunday, December 17, the 26-ID, assembled for the first time in many weeks, gathered to hold religious exercises in the historic churches of Metz. Mass was celebrated in the world-famous Gothic Cathedral and all the regiments and other units held memorial services for the men who had given their lives in the drive from the Moncourt Woods to the German Border. On this day the CG of the Division, the ADC, and the Chief of Staff were guests at a luncheon given in the Division’s honor by the Mayor of Metz. The Mayor, speaking on behalf of the citizens of Metz, expressed his extreme gratitude for the Yankee Division’s part in the liberation of the city. The prospect of a Division rest period in the city of Metz was anticipated with some pleasure by the men who had just finished 67 days on cold, muddy battlefields, but on the morning of December 18, however, began a series of events, which shocked the entire world, and shortly, terminated the rest period at Metz.
Battle of the Bulge (Shouth)
In the early morning of December 16, a German counter-attack in strength lunged westward out of the Siegfried Line, spearheaded by top-notch armored columns, covered by hundreds of new, and hitherto hidden aircraft. Not since Avranches (France) had the enemy endeavored to mount a counteroffensive of the proportion of that which now rolled across the frozen hills of Luxembourg and Belgium. Feldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt offensive in the Ardennes hit the American US First Army in a thinly held sector, extending roughly from the Belgian twins-town of Krinkelt-Rocherath to the south of Echternach in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
In three days, enemy spearheads, overrunning American lines, had penetrated into the area between Bastogne (Belgium) and St Vith (Belgium). Some elements swept further west to bypass Marche-en-Famenne (Belgium) and reach the Meuse River. By December 19, the shoulders of the Bulge were becoming more stabilized, and enemy thrusts were being contained without further loss, in the Krinkelt, Rocherath, Elsenborn area on the North Shoulder, and in the Echternach Area on the south.
The 101st Airborne Division temporarily under the command of Gen Anthony McAuliffe (the CG of the 101st A/B, Gen Maxwell D. Taylor being in Washington for a meeting), with portions of the 9th Armored Division and the 10th Armored Division were making their historic stand at Bastogne against constant enemy pressure which had surrounded the town.
This is briefly the situation into which Gen Patton’s Third Army was soon to play a leading and spectacular role, and in which the 26th Infantry Division was to meet its heaviest engagements with the enemy. As plans were hurriedly formulated in Supreme Headquarters, the part of the Third Army would play in reducing the German penetration in the First Army sector became known.
Gen Patton’s offensive, along the German Border approaching the Siegfried Line, was to be suspended; the present line held with a minimum of troops and the main effort of the Third Army to be directed in a smashing blow against von Rundstedt south flank. The units most immediately available to the Army Commander were the III Corps Headquarters in Metz, the 4th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division, and the 80th Infantry Division, none of which were at this time actively engaged. On December 19, the III Corps was ordered to employ these divisions in launching an attack on December 22 against the enemy’s south flank.
On December 20, the III Corps moved its Headquarters from Metz to Arlon (Belgium). The 4-AD and the 26-ID began assembling in the area in preparation for the attack. With road priority directed to the armor, elements of the 4-AD became the first Third Army combat units to arrive on the new scene of battle, but only a few hours behind, elements of the 26-ID closed in the concentration area. Although the 26-ID had followed closely the developments of the Ardennes offensive, the order directing the entire division to move to Luxembourg was received with a suddenness, which allowed only ten hours until elements must begin the movement to the north. Orders were received by the Division Chief of Staff on the night of December 19 to start moving the following morning.
By midnight, on December 20, the entire division had moved from Metz (France) to the assembly areas in the vicinity of Eischen (Luxembourg). On December 21, the 4-AD had completely assembled in its area near Arlon and the 80-ID had assembled north east of Luxembourg City. The III Corps then directed these 3 divisions to attack at 0600 on December 22.
The 4-AD was to advance up the Arlon-Bastogne Highway, with the 26-ID in the center of the Corps zone, and the 80-ID on the right. At no time prior to the attack was the division able to secure any substantial amount of information concerning the location of the enemy, or other details related to the situation. The infantrymen who remained concealed in the Luxembourg Forests during the day and night of December 21, making last-minute preparations, were, of necessity, to begin the attack the following morning in which they must seek out and find the enemy. They were to move north aggressively, engage the flank of the German Salient pushing west. Ahead, in their path stretched the hills, woods, streams, cold and frozen ground, covered now with a raw mist, and shortly to be covered by snow. And somewhere, the enemy.
At 0600 on the morning of Dec 22, with the countryside still wrapped in a chilling mist, the 26-ID began the attack with two regiments abreast, the 328-IR on the left, the 104-IR on the right. In a column of battalions, on foot, because the possible point of meeting the enemy was unknown, the infantrymen of the two regiments walked approximately 16 miles before contacting the German columns moving west.
The first contact with the enemy on December 22 was met by the 26th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop which had been sent out in advance of the infantry to screen and probe across the division front. The 1st Platoon of the Troop had advanced north to Ell and then to Rambrouch without sighting the enemy. Just outside of Rambrouch the platoon, now approximately 16 miles north of Arlon and Eischen, went into concealment along the side of the road. From this position, the cavalrymen, firing from their armored cars, were able to ambush two enemy vehicles carrying personnel and one motorcycle bearing a German colonel. Soon enemy infantry began to arrive in larger numbers, followed by tanks and AT guns. The Recon Platoon, heavily outnumbered, fought a stubborn delaying action, withdrew to the town of Rambrouch in which they resisted for two hours the savage attacks of the enemy. Other elements of the Troop had contacted the enemy at Rodt-Les-Ell. The 328-IR struck the flank of the enemy when the 1st Battalion encountered self-propelled guns on a hill in the vicinity of Rindschleiden. The I&R Platoon of the 104-IR found the enemy in the vicinity of Grosbous. During the afternoon of December 22, the enemy became aware of the threat that was pushing into his left flank.
In the zone of the 4-AD, CCA advanced up the Arlon-Bastogne Highway as far as Martelange. On the right of the Corps zone, the 80-ID encountered stiff resistance from the 352.Volksgrenadier-Division at Merzig and Ettelbruck. Later in the day, the enemy had sufficiently recovered from the surprise of this flank attack, to launch a counter-attack south of Grosbous, forcing our troops to withdraw one mile. On the second day of the attack, the terrain became an increasing obstacle to operations. In the area north of Grosbous, toward Eschdorf and the Sure River, the ground was broken into a series of deep gorges and high wooded ridges. During the day, in which the enemy resisted vigorously, the 104-IR captured Grosbous and pushed on to Dellen and Buschrodt. King Co, 328-IR, occupied Wahl on the morning of December 23, and the 2/104 became part of a combat team known as Task Force Hamilton. This Task Force was organized to fill the need for a quick, powerful, mobile armor-infantry team, consisting of the 2/328-IR motorized, Charlie Co (less one platoon) of the 735-TB, one Platoon, Able Co, 818-TDB, one Section Battery C, 390-AAA Battalion, one Section Able Co, 101-ECB.
