Document Source: After Action Report, 5th Armored Division, August 1944
On August 1, 1944, units of the 5th Armored Division were commanded by the following named officers:
Commanding General, Gen Oliver E. Lunsford
Combat Command A, Gen Eugene A. Regnier
HHC-CCA, Capt Karl W. Roth
Combat Command B, Col John T. Cole
HHC-CCB, Capt Joe W. Perry
Div Arty, Col Douglas J. Page
HHB Div Arty, Capt Norman W. Cusick
Reserve Command, Col Glen H. Anderson
HQs Co 5-AD, Capt Larry H. Greenwood
HQ 5-AD Div Tns, Lt Col Glen G. Dickenson
HQ Co 5-AD Div Tn, Capt James R. Bagwell
MP Plat 5-AD, Maj Alexander T. Nelsen
145th Armd Sig Co, Capt Glenn A. Welde
85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, Lt Col Kent Fay
10-TB, Lt Col William A. Hamberg
34-TB, Lt Col Thomas B. Bartel
81-TB, Lt Col Le Roy H. Anderson
15-AIB, Lt Col John S. Wintermute Jr
46-AIB, Maj William H. Burton
47-AIB, Lt Col Howard E. Boyer
47-AFAB, Lt Col John B. Rosenzweig
71-AFAB, Lt Col Israel B. Washburn
95-AFAB, Lt Col James W. Mc Neer
22-AEB, Lt Col Fred E. Ressegieu
75-AMB, Lt Col Benjamin H. Bader
NARRATIVE
The 5th Armored Division, assigned to the US Third Army and attached to the XX Corps, landed at Utah Beach France and was assembled in a bivouac area in the vicinity of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in Normandy during the period July 26 to July 31, 1944.
At 0935 on August 1, the Division was attached to the XV Corps. An oral movement order was issued by the Commanding General for the Division to assemble with the Division CP in the vicinity of La Feuillie. The move was started at 1800 on August 1, and completed by 1000 on August 2. At 1100 on August 2, orders were received for the first action by the division. The division was given the mission to proceed south without stopping, cross the Sée River and the Sélune River, assemble south of the Sélune River, seize the town of Fougères, and reconnoiter the vicinity of Saint-James, Saint-Martin and Saint-Georges for further action. The CG issued orders to the Major Commands to drive south with all possible speed on two routes and to capture Fougères. Order of march: East Route: CCB and CCR; West Route: CCA, Division HQs, Division Troops; Division Trains to remain in vicinity of Mineville.
The movement was started at 1430, August 2, by the 85th Cavalry Recon Sq. Upon departure from initial concentration area, duffel bags and baggage were left in open storage in the vicinity of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte with a warrant officer and twelve men of the division band as a guard detachment and caretaking detail. Latrine screens, truck tops and extra tentage were utilized to cover this baggage. In anticipation of battle casualties bags were systematically arranged to insure rapid and easy access to baggage of any individual. The march of the division was made difficult by cross traffic of troops of the XX Corps, moving east into the First Army zone. Control was very difficult at many points. Columns were cut and held up for so long, at times, that the division CP could not keep radio contact with the heads of the combat commands.
Elements of the 85-CRS made first contact with the enemy, in the vicinity of the lines Fougères-Saint-Ellier. Enemy vehicles were pursued by C Troop patrols at 0850, and small arms fire was encountered east of this line at 0930. Five prisoners were taken. Civilian reports and reconnaissance indicated that the enemy was falling back rapidly in a disorganized retreat, without attempting to erect defenses or to establish road blocks or strong points.
At 0320 on August 3, a message was received from XV Corps to halt movement until further orders. Combat Commands and the Recon Squadron were ordered to clear roads, bivouac in adjacent fields, and await orders. By this time the Recon Squadron was well south and in contact with some light enemy resistance along the line: Les Vieuville (A Troop), Le Perhadier (B Troop), Malval des Bois (C Troop). CCA was between Saint-Denis and Ducey. CCB was between Saint-Denis and the Sée River. CCR and Division Troops were in vicinity of Saint-Denis. The Division was attacked at various times during the night of August 2/3 by enemy air. All attacks were light. At 0820, the CG departed for HQs of the Third Army and returned at 1015 with the instructions for continuing the action. The Division was to occupy positions in the Corps reserve with the leading Combat Command at La Chapelle-Urée between roads GC5 and GC47, the second Combat Command at Saint-James, and the remainder of the Division between the two Combat Commands.
At 0355 on August 4, CCA had first contact with the enemy when the Service Co of the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was fired on by enemy snipers. No casualties were suffered. At 1300, orders were received to keep Combat Commands in present positions and to move the remainder of the division south of the Sélune River; Division Trains was to move to the vicinity of Saint-James; the Recon was to start patrol of the line Vitré-Laval-Mayenne, contact being maintained with 106th Cavalry Group on the right and 90th Infantry Division on the left. The recon screen moved toward the designated line encountering small scattered elements which were easily mopped up. Enemy aviation was active during daylight and evening hours, strafing columns by day when allied fighter cover was absent. 16 PW’s and 16 enemy dead were reported by the Division. Civilian reports stressed the absence of transportation with enemy straggler groups which were moving at night along roads towards Laval and Domfront.
On August 4, a directive was received from the XV Corps to furnish one hundred trucks immediately to help motorize elements of the 79th Infantry Division and the 90th Infantry Division. Assurance was given that no movement of the division would be ordered until these vehicles had returned. Fuel and lubricant trucks of the unit combat trains were dumped to provide this detail.
At 0730 on August 5, orders were received from XV Corps stating that the Corps mission was to secure crossings of the Mayenne River from Laval to Mayenne. The division’s mission was to advance, echeloned to the right rear of the 79-ID, prepared to support the attack of the assaulting divisions; to extend the front to Château-Gontier or extend the Corps front as far south as Angers. By 1600, units were encountering scattered roadblocks and defensive positions, covering small retreating enemy groups. Tanks and artillery were reported by civilian sources by were not encountered by our troops. The Division on this date had taken 80 PWs, identifications being: 5.Fallschimjaeger-Divison, 2.SS-Panzer-Division, 266.Infantry-Division; 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division, 91.Infantry-Division, 319.Infantry-Division and scattered service units. Bivouac areas were again strafed and bombed by the Luftwaffe with some casualties.
The division prepared to move on August 6, using the main route Saint-James- Fougères-Vire. However, the 100 trucks had not returned from their detail with the two infantry divisions. During the night of August 5/6, the 3912th QM Truck Co was attached and ordered immediately to fill trucks with gasoline at the Army Cl III, and join the column at Saint-James the next morning. Gasoline was not made available at the Truck head in sufficient time to permit the 3912-QMT Co to carry out orders. As a result of our movement this information was not received until the division HQ had reached at Vitré. An officer was sent back to locate the Truck Company and to lead the gasoline train forward. Due to delay in the loading of the trucks at the Truck Head and traffic congestion at Saint-James and Fougères, these vehicles did not reach the combat elements in time to permit refueling of combat vehicles until the early morning hours of August 7.
At 1430 on August 6, orders were received to push forward rapidly on Le Mans by all possible routes in the Corps Zone that would not interfere with advance of the 79-ID. The advance was to be made as follows: CCA to cross the Mayenne River in the vicinity of Château-Gontier, to proceed east on the axis Château-Gontier, Grez-en-Bouère, Bouessay, Chantenay-Villedieu, Chemiré-le-Gaudin and Le Mans, to stay north of Sarthe River, seize and hold Le Mans, to block all movement of enemy to the south and the east; CCB to cross the Mayenne River at Houssay, proceed east on axis Villiers-Charlemagne-Meslay-du-Maine-Chevillé-Loué-Chassillé-Coulans-sur-Gée-La Milesse; CCR to follow CCA; Division HQs, Division Troops and Division Trains was to follow the axis of CCR.
Only light enemy resistance was met and the advance was rapid. CCA attacked the town of Craon where some enemy resistance was met and the bridge was blown. CCB’s column met only light resistance and at 1900, had reached the town of Degré. CCA at 1800, had reached Laigné after by-passing a blown bridge at Craon. The Division CP was in the vicinity of Cossé-le-Vivien. By 2200, CCB was in Houssay. The bridge at Houssay was taken intact by CCB and its columns were crossing at 0005, August 7. However, lack of fuel resulted in the halting and bivouacking of the column; the major position of CCB on the east side of the river, Division CP on the west side in the vicinity of Houssay. In the meantime, the organic fuel and lubricant trucks had been released from their detail with the 79-ID and the 90-ID. They returned to their old areas, picked up dumped loads and joined, their parent organizations about 0530, August 7. An additional 100.000 gallons of gasoline was moved by US Third Army to Cossé-le-Vivien on trucks which arrived at 0700. This was moved across the Mayenne River in the vicinity of Villiers-Charlemagne where a Division Class III Dump was established under the control of the assistant Division Quartermaster. A platoon of Engineers was left as a security detachment until Civil Affairs Section could secure a sufficient number of FFI to provide adequate guard for the Dump. Communication was maintained with Division thru the SCR-399 radio of the Division Quartermaster station in the Administrative Net.
Prior to crossing the Mayenne, one platoon of the attached QM Truck Co was attached to each of the three combat commands to carry a fuel reserve. This was deemed necessary due to the uncertainty of being able to maintain supply points at a reasonable distance behind an Armored Division operating on an exploitation mission deep in enemy held territory. This plan proved to be sound in subsequent operations throughout France where distances between supply points and the using elements were habitually abnormal. With the arrival of fuel at 0530 in the morning of August 7, the units of CCB were ready to push on within a half hour. The resistance in front of CCA at Château-Gontier proved to be about one company, reinforced. The bridge was repaired and crossing started at 0700. Enemy resistance was much less at this time and by 1100, CCA was in Grez-en-Bouère and CCB was at Meslay-du-Maine. The advance of the division continued throughout the day and the night of August 7, against enemy delaying actions on both columns.
The XV Corps order for the advance from the Mayenne River to Le Mans designated a zone of advance for the 5-AD, for the 79-ID, and for the 90-ID, who were to shuttle. The 5-AD, was given permission to use any routes in the Corps Zone providing the advance of the infantry divisions was not hindered. The original Division plan was for CCB to cut northeast ahead of the 79-ID and the 90-ID and by passing on the west side of Le Mans to move to the north and to the east of the city to prevent escape of the enemy therefrom to the north and east. CCA was to approach the city from the south and southwest and to prevent escape of enemy therefrom to east and south. The 79-ID and the 90-ID were to attack the city from the West.
However, the shuttling of the infantry troops was so rapid that it was impossible for the division to take advantage of the routes other than those in its assigned zone. Midway of this rapid advance a shuttling column of the 79-ID moved via a route which entered the 5-AD zone and so conflicted with the advance of CCB that it was necessary to completely re-route both CCA and CCB by shifting to the south, something that the road net permitted fortunately. However, this also necessitated a complete change in the tactical plan for the containment of the city of Le Mans.
The enemy was using FLAK units for scattered AT positions, two Mark IV tanks (Stug IV) were knocked out by our troops, snipers continued to annoy our columns but with little effect. A moderate number of tanks and some artillery were reported by civilians as retreating toward Laval. On this date, 55 PW’s and 2 enemy killed were reported and during this period, considerable difficulty was experienced by units of the division below Major Commands, due to the lack of operational maps. Up to this time they had been using Michelin road maps, ungridded. No other maps were available.
Reconnaissance by August 8, was patrolling north and east of Le Mans along the line Bonnétable-Bouloire-Tresson. Le Mans was being used as a straggler point by the enemy, who there reorganized men into provisional units for delaying actions. Some artillery was encountered but was of little consequence. Combat aviation lessened its activities on both August 7 and August 8. Demolitions by the enemy were being carried out in Le Mans and Maigné. At 0900, the division was advancing on Le Mans with the heads of the columns three kilometers from their objective. CCA and CCB both crossed the Sarthe River south the city; CCA swung in a wide arc east of and around the city and took a position north and northeast of the city from the river to the main Le Mans-Paris Road; CCB took position south and southeast of the city, covering the section between CCA and a point midway to the river; CCR took position immediately south of the city covering the section between CCB and the river. The division CP located five kilometers southeast of Le Mans. All exits from Le Mans were closed by around 2300. Units were instructed to make all possible preparations for a further move, possibly to north and east.
Our casualties were light throughout this operation. Six enemy tanks were destroyed in various engagements east of Le Mans and enemy infantry activity had considerably increased. Enemy killed were reported for this date as 50, POWs 200.
