By December 20, the initial period of chaos in the Allied lines had passed. The Germans were still pushing against them but hadn’t made their great breakthrough. Thanks to Clarke, they never would. But the crisis wasn’t over yet. That morning, Gen Bruce C. Clarke CO of CCB 7-AD, set out to inspect the perimeter. There, he met a group of MP. Unfortunately, the MPs didn’t recognize him. And after hearing so many stories about Skorzeny’s infiltrators, they weren’t taking any chances. The MPs decided to arrest the general.
I’m General Bruce Clarke! Clarke told them.
But the MPs were having none of it. Even the CIC, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, was being kept under close guard for his own safety.
I’m General Bruce Clarke! the commander repeated.
Like hell! the MPs responded.
Their captor didn’t even know which league the Chicago Cubs were in – he was a spy. They took him to a nearby house and locked him up. One man on the scene was in a position to help. Pfc Mike Klimick of the 87-CRS had seen Clarke before and he knew that the MPs had made a mistake. But what could he do about it? Five hours later, somebody finally identified Clarke to the MPs’ satisfaction. He was let out of captivity and rushed back saving the American Army from disaster. The embarrassed MPs were forced to admit that they had been wrong.
The US soldiers spent an inordinate amount of time checking up on each other, and the GIs questioned everyone, right up to Gen Omar N. Bradley. Questions that could only be answered by a ‘real’ American. Who plays center field for the Yankees? Who is Mickey Mouse’s wife? What is the capital of Illinois? Gen Bradley was detained for answering Springfield for the last question; the soldier who stopped him insisted it was Chicago. Another general was arrested because he said the Chicago Cubs played in the American League.
There was no time to conduct full scale rehearsals with the units. There was no time for personal reconnaissance. Perhaps most importantly, there was no opportunity to conduct the detailed coordination required of such an operation with the conventional panzer units of I.SS-Panzer-Corps that they would be supporting and moving behind. For an operation requiring close coordination with the attacking forces, this situation was to cause several problems later in the offensive. The training of the commando company was a different matter. Although also misled about the actual nature of their mission in the name of containing security leaks, the commandos began training in earnest at Grafenwoehr in preparation for their tasks. Skorzeny naturally devoted special attention to the commando company’s training because they were charged with the second pan of the Greif mission, and because he was concerned over the capability of this force. He expressed this view: none of the volunteers selected for this unit had ever had any experience in that line. There were no trained spies or saboteurs among them. In the few weeks at our disposal, we could hardly hope to teach them their job properly.
But they tried. Initial training focused on becoming realistic American GIs. The commandos of the Stielau Einheit refreshed and reviewed their English speaking ability, with particular emphasis on learning the idioms and slang of the American GI. They worked with their American weapons and gear. The commandos read American literature, viewed American films, and even visited POW camps at Kustrin and Limburg to mix with real American soldiers and observe them firsthand. The team members rehearsed their assumed American identities and learned how to drive and operate the American jeeps. Radio operators received special training in the operation of their radio sets. For those lacking, basic combat skills were hurriedly taught. The volunteers were trained in close combat, sabotage and recon skills, the use of plastic explosives, and employing their new silenced machine pistols.
The training received was far from complete, but the commando unit would have to make do with the few weeks of training time available. While training in isolation at Grafenwoehr, numerous rumors concerning the probable missions for the unit ran wild among the men. Rather than squelch these, Skorzeny fueled some of them in an attempt to maintain a cover for the unit and mission. This was to have amazing repercussions once the operation commenced. Skorzeny attempted to coordinate Operation Greif with the various players involved. However, this coordination was at the highest command levels, and not with the actual commanders of the lead units his men would be working with. This would prove to have serious repercussions later. In an attempt to get better support and coordinate some tactical details, Skorzeny met with FDM von Rundstedt at his headquarters in November. The Feldmarschall’s support for Operation Greif was lacking, as after briefing him on the Operation, Skorzeny noted his reactions as disappointing. He appeared to be like-warm to the special operation and was particularly concerned over the use of enemy uniforms.
A similar meeting with FDM Model’s Chief of Staff, General d. Infanterie Hans Krebs was slightly better. Skorzny’s plans for Greif were approved and he received the promise of full support, though this would prove to be long in coming. Before the offensive, Skorzeny attended one last high-level meeting at Model’s headquarters (December 12) where the final orders were issued to the corps and division commanders. Mödel asked Skorzeny to brief the assembled commanders on Operation Greif. At this meeting, the detailed measures to avoid fratricide between Skorzeny’s Americans and real regular German soldiers were discussed as the danger of inadvertently shooting Greif forces was high. As aids to identifying the Grey forces as friendly Germans, several special recognition signals were employed.
So, to identify themselves as disguised, German soldiers of Operation Greif would remove or tap their helmets when approaching German lines or forces. Additionally, the second button of their shirts would be unbuttoned, and they would wear pink or blue scarves. At night, a blue flashlight held up in the left hand would serve as a challenge, while a red flashlight held aloft in the right hand would serve as the reply. All of the brigade’s vehicles were to display a small yellow triangle painted on their rear. Jeeps bore the letters C, D, X, Y, or Z in white letters on their hoods, while tanks were to keep their gun tubes pointed in the nine o’clock position when near German forces. These procedures seemed to work as no incidents of friendly fire casualties to the Greif forces were reported, despite the high probability of them occurring.
These recognition signals did produce one significant drawback. Despite the counter-productive wall of secrecy surrounding the offensive, the details were distributed in writing form to front-line units after the meeting with Skorzeny. Although by their nature, all units would need to know the recognition signals, and hence the existence of Operation Greif, details about the mission were not essential and should never have been carried forward of the line. Nevertheless, despite orders to the contrary, this is exactly what occurred, and inevitability as always seems to happen in these cases, the instructions were captured on the first day of the offensive.
A note was distributed within the 62.Volksgrenadier-Division was captured in the vicinity of Heckhusheid (Belgium) on December 16 and compromised Operation Greif soon after the first commando teams had infiltrated the lines. The note outlined the recognition signals, described the use of American vehicles, equipment, and uniforms, and even outlined the three routes the Greif forces would travel along. After months of painstaking security effort, the cat was out of the bag, and this was already the first day of the offensive.
Although the training and equipping of the Greif forces fell far short of what Skorzeny and the other leaders may have felt was required, the men of the 150.Panzer-Brigade and the Einheit Stielau were motivated to fight. Skorzeny described his men as clearly animated by the most glowing patriotism. Skorzeny would rely on this motivation and the audacity and initiative of these men to overcome the deficiencies in training, equipment, and organization that confronted the Greif force. Midway through the preparations for Greif, just as these deficiencies caused Skorzeny to alter his task organization, it likewise forced him to modify his commander’s intent. He explained it in his own words: when we realized in the middle of November that the camouflage outfit of the brigade would be very far from complete, we were forced to consider certain changes to our plans. In the absence of camouflage for everybody, we must try to obtain the same results by expedients, cunning, and above all, bluff … My colleagues and I fully appreciated that we should have to rely on improvisation.
Likewise, lacking precise and detailed intelligence about the enemy, Skorzeny was unable to assign exact missions other than the bridge and route recon to the commando company. Rather, in typical German military fashion, he relied on giving the Einheit Stielau teams mission-type orders to conduct recon and learn about enemy dispositions, create confusion among the enemy, disrupt communications, and delay or disrupt reinforcements. We must leave them as much as possible to their own initiative stressed Skorzeny. Thus improvisation, boldness, and initiative were to be the hallmarks of Operation Greif. In comparison to their comrades of Operation Stoesser, the men of Greif were well prepared.
Operation Stoesser
Operation Stoesser would have far less time compared to Operation Greif to organize, equip, and train itself in preparation for its part in the offensive. Like Greif, the necessary coordination for the mission would also be lacking. Oberst von der Heydte would have less than one week to organize, train, and prepare his airborne battle group for action during Operation Stoesser and accomplish his mission of blocking the Eupen – Malmédy road. Like the Greif commanders, he too was misled about the actual location and nature of his mission until only days before the offensive.
Denied, his immediate request to employ his former command the 6.Fallschirmjaeger-Regiment as an intact force, the baron would have to create a unit from scratch in just a matter of days. His request was disapproved by Heersgruppe H because it was felt that the secrecy of the offensive might be compromised by the movement of an entire parachute regiment out of the line. The 1200-man battlegroup would be created by each regiment in the 11.Fallschirmjâeger-Korps gave up one hundred of its best and most experienced paratroopers to von der Heydte. However, he would be able to choose his own company commanders and officers.
Von der Heydte organized his scratch force into a simple battle group consing of four light infantry companies, a heavy weapons company, and a signal and supply platoon, in addition to a small group headquarters and staff. The promised personnel were to assemble at von der Heydte’s headquarters in Aasten on December 9, 1944. As perhaps is the case in all armies, von der Heydte did not expect to receive the best men that the parachute regiments had to offer. Rather he received the usual deadbeats and troublemakers that battalion commanders normally manage to transfer to other commanders on such occasions.
Von der Heydte was to say of them, never during my entire fighting career had I been in command of a unit with less fighting spirit. But then who gives up his best soldiers to another unit?
