Although dismayed by airborne operations after the heavy casualties sustained during the invasion of Crete, Hitler seized upon the idea and approved it. However, he changed the drop location to an area north of Malmedy, Belgium, deeper behind the American front lines than Model’s original concept. This would put the paratroopers beyond the immediate reach of their panzer counterparts until a penetration was made of the American lines. The plans for this new operation were hastily drawn up on December 8, by Army Group B Headquarters. Although getting the paratroopers’ force would eventually pose a problem, getting the commander for this operation did not.
Oberst der Fallschirmjagertruppen Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, was in December 1944, the commander of the German Parachute School in Aalten, Holland. Summoned to the headquarters of Gen Kurt Student on December 8, von der Heydte learned of his role in what was to be the second special operation conducted to support Operation Wacht am Rhein, an operation code-named Stoesser. Oberst von der Heydte was to be the commander of the operation but, in the effort to maintain secrecy, he was initially misled about the actual location of the mission. Student briefed von der Heydte on the plan.
The Führer had decided to undertake a major offensive in which a parachute detachment would be employed. Oberst von der Heydte was to form and command this force. He learned that he was expected to jump behind the Soviet troops surrounding the German bridgehead on the Vistula River in Poland. He also learned that Gen Student wanted his force ready by December 13, the initial planning date for the start of the offensive.
Like his counterpart Skorzeny, von der Heydte was at first stunned, and then thrilled, by the prospects of this new mission. It was not until December 14, after a fortuitous mission postponement caused by the failure to assemble the attacking division in time that he was to learn the details of his real mission. The unit that von der Heydte would support, the 6.Panzer-Army received notification of the airborne operation from Army Group B on December 10. In turn, von der Heydte reported to 6.Panzer-Army Headquarters on December 11 and received detailed mission guidance concerning the real objective of his operation. The 6.Panzer-Army Chief of Staff, SS-Brigadefuehrer Fritz Kraemer, issued Operation Stoesser orders to von der Heydte: On the first day of the attack, Dec 16, 1944, elements of the 6.Panzer-Army will take possession of Liège in Belgium or the bridges across the Meuse River south of the city. Then, at dawn, Kampfgruppe von der Heydte will drop into the Baraque Michel (Belgium) area, eleven kilometers north of Malmedy, and secure the multiple road junctions at Belle Croix (Jalhay) and Mont Rigi (Bevercé) for use by the armored point of the 6.Panzer-Army, probably elements of 12.SS-Panzer-Division. If for some technical reasons this mission is impracticable on the morning of the first day, Kampfgruppe von der Heydte will drop early on the following morning into the zone along the Meuse River in the vicinity of Amay (Belgium) to secure the bridges there for the advance of 6.Panzer-Army’s armored spearhead. The drop was scheduled to commence at 0300, on Dec 16 and, consequently, it would be a night jump.
Oberst von der Heydte also met with the Army commander, SS-Oberst-Gruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich. This meeting did not go very well because, according to von der Heydte, Dietrich was drunk. He attempted to work out the details of his mission, and although Dietrich appeared unconcerned over the operation, he was able to get the Army commander’s intent for the mission. Stoesser was to secure the crossroads either at the Mont Rigi (highway Sourbrodt – Malmedy – Eupen) or at Belle Croix (highway Sourbrodt – Eupen – Verviers) and block American reinforcements until elements of the Army linked up with him. Dietrich assured von der Heydte that the link-up would occur within 24 hours of his drop.
The Oberst managed to coordinate a few details then departed to set about his own preparations. The area of operations for Operation Stoesser was in the 6.Panzer-Army’s zone of attack. The designated drop zone and the objective area were astride Hohe Venn Ridge. Here the steep hills, dense woods, and marshy valleys limited the available avenues of approach. One good north-south running road connected the city of Malmedy with the city of Eupen. This formed the best avenue of approach into the flank of the 6.Panzer-Army. North of Malmedy, a road junction linked the town of Verviers with this highway. The terrain did not favor the employment of mass airborne troops. Very little was known of the enemy situation that Operation Stoesser would face Oberst von der Heydte’s request for an estimate of the enemy situation brought the following reply from Dietrich during their meeting: I am not a prophet, you will learn earlier than I will what forces the Americans will employ against you!.
The Fallschirmjaeger Commander attempted then to gain more information from the 6.Panzer-Army HQs Staff members. He did not get much and later, he observed: we had thoroughly reconnoitered the American front lines and the enemy chain of command was well known. However, we were complete without knowledge of the enemy’s strategic reserves. The distribution of his forces within the American communications zone was also unknown.
Oberst von der Heydte requested then a personal air recon of the drop zone and target area. This was rejected for fear of compromising the entire offensive. At the drop time, several days later, little would still be known of the enemy situation. The specified tasks given to the Fallschirmjaeger were fairly clear: conduct an airborne assault, secure the road junction; block enemy reinforcements moving south along the Eupen – Malmedy road; link up with the elements of 12.SS-Panzer-Division, and be prepared to jump along the Meuse River in the vicinity of Amay to secure bridges for the advance elements of 6.Panzer-Army.
The implied tasks for the operation were to assemble rapidly after the drop, establish defensive positions around the road junction, and be prepared to block enemy forces for up to twenty-four hours. The key limitation Oberst von der Heydte was working under was the incredibly short amount of time available for the planning and the preparation of the operation, less than five days. The other limitation was that of available trained forces. Fighting as conventional infantry for the past three years, by Dec 1944, no parachute regiments were on active jump status. Additionally, no large-scale airborne drops had been conducted by the Luftwaffe. Ironically, the SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt Rybka’s 500.SS-Fallschirmjäger-Battalion that conducted the last Airborne jump during Operation Rösselsprung on May 25, 1944, the daring but unsuccessful parachute and glider-borne assault on Josip Broz Tito’s headquarters in Drvar (Yugoslavia), would not be able to conduct Operation Stoesser as it was operating on the Eastern Front and had suffered heavy casualties.
The solution would be to form a kind of Fallschirmjaeger Kampfgruppe or Task Force with elements from various remaining parachute regiments still operational in the Luftwaffe. Although this battle group concept was a standard procedure for the German military, the results would be far from anyone’s standards. Based upon the specified and implied tasks, the restated mission for Operation Stoesser might have read: on order, Battle Group Stoesser conducts an airborne assault to secure objective A (Crossroads Belle Croix), and establish defensive positions to block enemy counterattacks into the northern flank of the 6.Panzer-Army. This operation intended to block any allied advances against the flank of the 6.Panzer-Army, thereby allowing them to continue their advance across the Meuse unhindered.
The restrictive nature of the terrain in the entire area would make this possible at certain key points on the battlefield, like the road junction at Mont Rigi (Bévercé – #5 on the map). This is what was desired by GFM Walter Model and eventually understood by Oberst von der Heydte. However, the original guidance from the 6.Panzer-Army’s Chief of Staff, SS-Brigadeführer Fritz Kraemer to the Fallschirmjäger Kampfgruppe’s commander, indicated securing the road junction for use by the armored spearhead of the 12.SS-Panzer-Division, although this was not what the originators of the plan intended. This disconnect in guidance would serve to give von der Heydte some latitude on how he would conduct the mission. This issue would resurface later in the operation.
The concept of the operation was very simple!
(1) The paratroopers would conduct a mass night parachute assault into a drop zone in the immediate vicinity of their objective. (2) They were to assemble rapidly, then secure the road junction and immediate surrounding area. (3) At the road junction, they were to establish a blocking position astride the Eupen – Malmedy – Verviers road to cut the American lines of communications to their forward defenses. (4) The defensive position astride the road junction would then block combat units attempting to move south and reinforce the southern American defenses, or engage the flank of the 6.Panzer-Army. (5) Link up with the elements of the north flank division of the 6.Panzer-Army, the 12.SS-Panzer-Division, would occur by the end of December 16.
The Fallschirmjäger Group was expected to hold its positions for two days, if necessary until German forces could swing north and relieve them. Two days would be pushing the limits of the small battle group’s capabilities, but it was not a completely unreasonable demand. The Stoesser force was to be an airborne battle group of approximately 1200 men equipped with airborne short barrel 81-MM mortars, AT weapons (Panzerfaust), and MG-42 machine guns. The Kampfgruppe would be inserted by the conventional Luftwaffe Ju-52 aircraft.
Both Operations, Greif, and Stoesser, appeared in concept as viable missions. As events were to show during the limited preparation, and ultimately during the execution of the operations, the problems caused by the limited amount of time that hampered the planning effort would carry over throughout the missions. Although conceptually Operation Greif and Operation Stoesser fit well into the overall campaign plan for the offensive, realistically they were to be prepared in isolation and almost considered afterthoughts by the conventional commanders of the campaign. Based upon the concept of operations for each mission, Skorzeny and von der Heydte began their preparations immediately. From the start, the problems that would plague Operations Greif and Stoesser throughout their existence began to appear.
OPERATION GREIF
The tasks of assembling and preparing the men and machines of Operations Greif and Stoesser began immediately after their inception. The Führer has ordered the formation of a special unit of a strength of about two battalions for employment on recon and special duties on the Western Front. The personnel will be assembled from volunteers of all arms the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, and the Waffen-SS who must fulfill the following requirements: (a) physically A-1, suitable for special tasks, mentally keen, strong personality; (b) fully trained in single combat; (c) Knowledge of the English language and also the American dialect and slang. Especially important is a knowledge of military-technical terms.
This order is to be made known immediately to all units and headquarters. Volunteers may not be retained on military grounds but are to be sent immediately to Friedenthal near Orianenburg, Otto Skorzeny’s HQs outside Berlin, for a test of suitability. The Volunteers that do not pass these tests satisfactorily will be returned to their headquarters and units. The volunteers are to report to Friedenthal by November 10 latest. So read the order sent on Oct 25, 1944, from the OKW to all units on the Western Front. It sums up, in a nutshell, the process for assembling the special operator trainees, which in this case, would be the heart of Operation Greif. It also serves as an example of just one part of the many varied mission preparations that were undertaken for both operations. Special operations units require select personnel, unique equipment, and thorough training to successfully accomplish their high-risk special missions. The German special operations forces participating in Wacht am Rhein was no exception. The unorthodox, unique, and diversified nature of their tasks would place a premium on cohesive well-drained, and properly equipped forces. Unfortunately for the Germans, neither of the forces conducting the two operations would be well-manned, well-trained, or well-equipped.
Finally, the Panzer-Brigade 150 was created and assembled with nearly 2500 men coming from:
SS-Jagdverband Mitte (one company)
SS-Fallschirmjäger Abteilung 600 (2 companies)
Sonderverband Jungwirth (2 companies)
7.Panzergrenadier-Company (reserve)
11.Panzer-Regiment (4 companies)
655.Panzeräger-Abteilung (1 company)
190.Panzer-Aufklärung-Abteilung (1 company)
2.Panzeraufklärung-Abteilung (1 company)
I./Artillery-Abteilung.40 (4 batteries)
The lack of available time, coupled with the ad hoc nature of the organizations, would serve to prevent the formation of units truly capable of accomplishing their assigned missions with a reasonable probability of success.
Thus despite tremendous organizational efforts, and a large dose of improvisation, the special operations forces would not be the high mission-capable units that were envisioned during the initial planning of the higher command headquarters. Rather than task-organizing forces to accomplish their missions, both commanders were forced to do it backward. They tailored their organizations and missions, to what forces were ultimately made available to them. Both the lack of time and the depleted state of the German Army were working against them. Operation Greif suffered from a lack of qualified soldiers and insufficient amounts of equipment. The force, by nature of its mission, required a large number of English-speaking personnel. It also required a broad range of combat skills from the soldiers. Everything and everyone from tankers to signalers would be needed. American uniforms, arms, and vehicles of all types would be required for the unit’s cover.
No German unit existed that could meet all of the requirements of the Greif force. Even Skorzeny’s own SS-Jagdverbande, less than a full battalion in strength, would not fit the bill. It lacked the English speakers needed and it was a special mission unit that had focused on primarily strategic level special operations in the past. The creation of such a large unit with the requirement to use the ruse of posing as an enemy unit was something new to the special operations planners and the conventional staffers alike. From the start, it did not go well. Otto Skorzeny forwarded his plans and requirements for Greif to the OKW CoS Generaloberst Jodl within five days of receiving his mission tasking at the Fuehrer Headquarters. Although his request for personnel and equipment might have been considered somewhat optimistic, (a 3300-man full Panzer-Brigade in addition to the commando unit), he was promised unlimited support for his mission by Jodl. German forces had undoubtedly captured American equipment and uniforms, and a number of Germans had traveled to or even lived in America and were thus familiar with the language. Although seemingly possible, the reality of assembling the force turned out to be a different matter.
