Well done Skorzeny, very well done! I’ve promoted you to the rank of SS-Obersturmbannführer and I have also awarded you the German Cross in Gold a jubilant Adolf Hitler proclaimed Otto Skorzeny, commander of the Waffen-SS Jagdverband Commandos, had just returned from his latest triumph, Operation Panzerfaust, the successful kidnapping of the son of the leader of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, and the storming of his residence on Castle Hill.
Skorzeny met with the Fuehrer in the Führerhauptquartiere (Wolfsschanze) (Code Named: Askania Nord and/or Wolf’s Lair) located in Kętrzyn (Rastenburg) in East Prussia (Poland), and thrilled him with the exciting details of the planned mission, for by then Otto Skorzeny had become one of the Fuehrer’s trusted favorites as a result of his daring exploits throughout the war. But on this day, Oct 21, 1944, Hitler summoned the SS-Obersturmbannführer to his headquarters for an additional purpose. The Fuehrer turned serious as he spoke next: I have perhaps what will be the most important job in your entire life. So far very few people know of the preparation for a secret plan in which you have a great part to play. In December, we will start a great offensive, which may well decide our fate.
A startled Otto Skorzeny attentively listened as Hitler continued speaking and presented the following mission guidance: One of the most important tasks in this offensive will be entrusted to you and the units under your command, which will have to go ahead and seize one or more of the bridges over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur in Belgium. You will have to wear British and American uniforms. The enemy has already done us a great deal of damage by the use of our uniforms in various commando operations a few days ago. I received even a report that the use of our uniforms by an American force had played no inconsiderable part when they captured Aachen our first city to fall into their hands. Moreover, detachments in enemy uniforms can cause the greatest confusion among the Allies by giving false orders and upsetting their communications to send bodies of troops in the wrong direction. Your preparations must be completed by December 2, and you can settle all the details with Gen Jodl. I know that the time is very, very short, but you must do all that is humanly possible.
Such was an example of the type of initial planning guidance given to Otto Skorzeny for his upcoming role in the great offensive. With this, the special operations planning to support Wacht am Rhein began. Eventually, two operations would be planned to help the offensive reach its objectives. The guidance given in terms of specific missions and intent would be fairly clear, and planning would begin immediately. The planning conducted for the operations would suffer from problems. Inadequate intelligence, faulty assumptions, and poor coordination would result in plans that were to become non-executable on the ground. The primary reasons for these planning deficiencies were the incredibly short amount of available planning time and the unusually strict operational security blanket thrown over the entire offensive. These problems would plague what were to become the two special missions of the offensive, Operation Greif (Skorzeny) and Operation Stoesser (von der Heydte). Although these problems would not be immediately apparent during the initial planning for both operations, they would soon manifest themselves during the extensive preparations required for both missions that would soon follow.
Operation Greif, named after the mythological winged lion, was to be the primary special operation of the offensive. Skorzeny was to form a special brigade, Panzer-Brigade.150, whose purpose would be to capture one or more of the bridges over the Meuse River before they could be destroyed. Hitler informed him that he had decided that this could be accomplished more quickly and with fewer losses if Skorzeny and his men wore US uniforms. Skorzeny was well aware that under the Hague Convention of 1907, any of his men captured while wearing US uniforms could be executed as spies and this possibility caused much discussion with Generaloberst Jodl and Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Anyway, this was to offer the greatest potential positive impact on the success of the overall campaign.
Consisting of forces masquerading as American soldiers, the men of Operation Greif were to infiltrate into the American rear areas in order to seize the critical crossings over the Meuse River, and cause confusion throughout the enemy’s defense. As commander of his group of specially trained Waffen-SS commandos, the Jadgverbande Skorzeny had successfully conducted numerous strategic and operational level operations.
Operation Stoesser was planned as a parachute operation in which an airborne battle group would drop behind American lines in order to secure vital crossroads along the flank of the German line of advance and block the movement of Allied reinforcements. The commander of Stoesser was to be Oberst Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, one of the premier paratrooper’s commanders still alive in the German Army. He was among the best of the remaining airborne commanders to choose from. He had commanded an airborne regiment into the jump on Crete and led it through the bitter fighting that followed.
He led the regiment through campaigns in North Africa and in Normandy, where he had the opportunity to come face to face with American paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division. Perhaps, in contrast to Skorzeny, von der Heydte was noted for his calm and steady approach to fighting. His bravery and coolness under fire were beyond reproach. Like Skorzeny for Greif, von der Heydte was the right man for the job of leading Stoesser.
Newly promoted SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lt Col) Skorzeny coordinated the details of his new mission with Gen Alfred Jodl, CoS-OKW. Hitler had explained to Skorzeny why he let him in on the plan so relatively early: I am telling you all this so that you can consider your part in it and realize that nothing has been forgotten.
Given the mission guidance received from Hitler, Skorzeny was left to plan the specifics of Operation Greif’s mission analysis, if conducted by the current US Army Doctrine, would have started with Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and followed by an assessment of his own forces and higher Headquarters missions. Additionally, guidance is given, and tasks assigned to him by Hitler would have been broken down into specified tasks implied tasks, mission essential tasks, and limitations. An analysis of this would lead to a mission statement for the operation, an intent, and a concept of operation. Skorzeny would find out that he was not only fighting the Americans, but also fighting against time, terrain, and amazingly, the German military system.
Skorzeny’s area of operations was in the zone of attack of Sepp Dietrich’s 6.Panzer-Army, which initially was the offensive’s main effort. The area consisted of typical Ardennes countryside. The rugged ground in the eastern half of the zone was bisected by a handful of east-west running roads twisting through the hills. The dominant Hohe Venn Ridge formed a north-south running spine that lay halfway to the Meuse. Closer to the river, the terrain gradually opened up some and consisted of less severe elevation. Numerous towns dotted the area, while several rivers crisscrossed through the valleys. The terrain in the area favored the defenders.
The defense consisted of a crust of infantry divisions and cavalry forces holding an extended frontage, with some armored formations positioned in-depth as a reserve. Reconnaissances conducted by the German units in the line, and signals intelligence from specialized units were able to paint a fairly clear picture of the front line defenses. On Nov 28, 1944, the situation in the American rear areas, as well as information regarding the important bridges over the Meuse River, was not so clear. Skorzeny requested all available intelligence concerning them and even asked that air reconnaissance photos be taken of the bridges. These were eventually received by Skorzeny for only the bridges at Huy and Amay in late November. Although they showed AAA positions near the bridges, they did not indicate any other special defensive measures. Skorzeny was forced to assume that some type of local defenses would be established at the Meuse crossings, even if only initially by rear area troops. He also fully realized that the bridges would be more heavily defended, if not outright destroyed if he did not reach them within the first critical days of the offensive.
One key planning assumption was that the initial conventional attacks would achieve a clean breakthrough on the first day of the offensive. It was assumed that the defenders in the area would be in disorderly flight on the first day, thereby allowing the Greif force to infiltrate the bridges unhindered. This critical assumption upon which the nature and concept of the operation were founded was ultimately proven faulty, and would even spell doom for the success of the mission. Skorzeny anticipated that if he was successful in seizing the bridges, it was very likely that his forces might be cut-off and isolated for a short period by Allied counter-attacks until the main body of the German advance could reach him. Very importantly, Skorzeny’s assessment of the terrain and forward defenses led him to believe that his special units would not be able to break through the American’s lines on their own, but would have to exploit a penetration achieved to some significant depth by the conventional forces making the initial attacks. He knew that the available preparation time was short, he had less than five weeks to prepare for this new mission.
In fact, he had voiced his concern over the lack of adequate planning and preparation time to the Führer personally. The unique nature of the mission would require special equipment and soldier in the form of captured American equipment, and English-speaking troops with a knowledge of American slang and idioms. His own SS Commando unit, of less than a battalion strength, could provide some expertise, manpower, and leadership, but the force would have to essentially be established and trained from scratch. His original designs for the force proposed a unit of over 3300 men dressed and equipped to pose as an American outfit. His initial task organization for the unit proposed a full-sized, robust, brigade. The creation of such a force, with such a unique and unorthodox mission, would take some time to do properly.
Additionally, Skorzeny was keenly aware of the operational timeline for the offensive and knew that once committed, his forces would have only one day to reach and capture the bridges. Skorzeny also realized the limitations imposed upon his forces by the terrain. He identified the critical importance of the defensive advantage offered by the Hohe Venn Ridge along with the enemy’s forward defenses. The restricted nature of the Ardennes provided little maneuver space and confined his force to the few good roads that ran directly to the bridge targets on the Meuse.
His freedom of maneuver and action with any sizable combat force was dictated by the available road network behind the American lines as much as by any possible enemy counteraction. The specified tasks assigned to Skoneny were to seize a minimum of two bridges over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur to infiltrate enemy lines covertly, posing as American soldiers; and to confuse the enemy by disrupting his communications and rear areas. The implied tasks that Skorzeny derived for his mission were: to conduct coordination with the conventional forces of the 6.Panzer-Army; conduct a forward passage of lines through the attacking divisions west of the Hohe Venn Ridge; exploit the confusion and disorganization within the enemy’s ranks, conduct deep recon of the bridge targets on the Meuse River for the commando force; seize the bridges at Andenne, Amay, or Huy through a surprise ‘coups de main’ attack; defend and hold two or more of the bridges until relieved by 1.SS-Panzer-Division; conduct a link-up with the 1.SS-Panzer-Regiment at the bridges; increase confusion and panic behind the lines among the defenders by circulating false reports, removing signposts, cutting telephone lines, and blowing up ammunition dumps; conduct tactical reconnaissance forward of the Skorzeny force and the conventional armored spearheads.
Two key limitations that Skorzeny was operating under were the requirement for strict secrecy and operational security (OPSEC) and the accepted laws of war. Hitler’s desire for utmost secrecy prevented Skorzeny from briefing his forces on their real mission or coordinating with the associated conventional units until only days before the offensive. Also, by wearing American uniforms his force would give up their protected status as prisoners of war (POWs) and if captured, would face execution as spies. Hitler directed that Skorzeny’s commandos were to wear their German uniforms under the American clothing, and were not to fight in American uniforms, i.e. they were to take off the American clothing before fighting. Although no record of a formal mission statement exists, if presented in current US Army fashion, Skorzeny probably would have looked something like this: on order, Battle Group Skorzeny infiltrates the zone to seize bridges over the Meuse River at Andenne, Amay, and Huy, to ensure the uninterrupted advance of the 6.Panzer-Army across the Meuse, and conducts unconventional warfare operations to disrupt enemy defenses in the area of operations.
Skorzeny, after the war, presented a less formalized description of his mission: the mission of the Brigade was to seize undamaged at least two Meuse River bridges from among the following possibilities: Amay, Huy, or Andenne.
The concept of the operation was not particularly complex, but it was not necessarily easy to execute either. Skorzeny’s forces would follow immediately behind the lead spearheads of the I.SS-Panzer-Corps (SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Priess) attacking divisions as they pushed through the initial penetration created by the infantry divisions.
Once west of the Hohen Venn Ridge, Skorzeny’s battle group would side-slip or pass through the lead panzer regiments and advance to the Meuse. Special recon teams would race ahead of the main body by jeep once a penetration was achieved, conduct recon of the routes, and place the bridge targets under surveillance. The main body of Skoneny’s force would then split into three smaller Kampfgruppe and would advance west following three separate directions of attack directly to the bridges, now called Objectives X, Y, and Z. One of the Kampfgruppe would each move behind the lead elements of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division (SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke), 12.SS-Panzer-Division (SS-Standartenführer Hugo Kraas) and the 12.Volksgrenadier-Division (Generalmajor Gerhard Engel).
This was to have occurred by the end of the first day of the offensive. Tactical recon teams would advance immediately forward of the attacking divisions and these groups to report on local enemy defenses. Independent teams of commandos would conduct small-scale acts of sabotage ahead of and behind the main body to disrupt enemy communications and create disorganization within the defenders. Resistance would be bypassed and reported, as speed was essential and the limited combat power of the battlegroups was to be preserved for seizing and defending the bridges. Once captured, the bridges were to be defended, then turned over to the I.SS-Panzer-Korps. Skoneny’s force would then be prepared to continue acts of sabotage, and deep recon in support of the main attack. This was all to have occurred not later than the second day of the offensive. However, Skorzeny’s force would not be operating behind American lines completely on its own.
Concerned over the threat of reinforcement posed by the large American forces to the north of the 6.Panzer-Army, GFM Walter Model, the commander of Army Group B, the operational headquarters for the offensive, proposed on Dec 4, to Hitler another special operation. It would consist of an airborne force dropped behind American lines in the area of Krinkelt, Belgium to block enemy moves south against the northern flank of the 6.Panzer-Army.
